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Abstracts 
 
  
Vishwa Adluri,  
vadluri@hunter.cuny.edu 
“Gita, Greek philosophy, and Arendt” 
 
This paper examines the interface between Greek and Indian notions of action. My starting point 
however will be Arendt’s notion of thinking as the paradigmatic activity. Through showing how the 
life of thought is not opposed to the life of action in Arendt I will introduce an important nuance 
into the Bhagavadgītā’s notion of action (karma). As in Arendt, the Indian text makes a distinction 
between mere work or labor and action in the true sense. A recovery of this notion of action is 
essential not only for understanding the Bhagavadgītā, but also for addressing our contemporary 
political context. I will also discuss allied issues such as the distinction between private and public 
spheres and the concept of immortality versus eternity in both the Gītā and Arendt. 
 
 
Han Thomas Adriaenssen, University of Groningen 
h.t.adriaenssen@rug.nl 
“Peter Olivi and Peter Aureol on Conceptual Thought False Friends?” 
 
As human beings, we can cognitively engage both with particular objects such as John and with 
general concepts such as ‘man in general’. But crucial as this latter capacity may be, it is also highly 
elusive. For when I cognize John, it is clear what the object of my cognition is: John. But what is the 
object of my conceptual thought of man in general? One option that was often discussed by 
scholastic authors was that conceptual thoughts were directed at inner representational devices. This 
is what I call a ‘representationalist’ account of conceptual thought.  
In this paper, I ask how the Franciscan thinkers Peter Olivi (1248-1289) and Peter Aureol (1280-
1322) relate to such an account. Olivi and Aureol were among the most daring and original 
Franciscans of their times. Importantly, they are often mentioned in one breath as foes of 
representationalist accounts of cognition (for instance Prezioso 81-4; Kraml, 1548; Marenbon, 295). 
And indeed, both are highly critical of representationalist theories of perceptual cognition. In this 
paper, however, I argue that the two thinkers diverge when it comes to analysing conceptual 
thought. To this extent, then, they are false friends. While Aureol firmly sticks to his anti-
representationalism, Olivi makes significant concessions to the representationalist by  assigning a 
crucial role in his analysis of conceptual thought to image-like representations. 
First, Olivi thinks that when my intellect conceives of man in general, my imagination must at the 
same time present an individual man to me. It does so by presenting me with a so-called ‘memory-
species’. A memory-species for Olivi is an image-like representation that is the object of cognition 
when we remember of imagine something (Toivanen, 293-326). By assigning a crucial role to such 
species in conceptual thought, Olivi makes a concession to representationalism. This puts him at 
odds with Aureol. While Aureol agrees that intellect and imagination must work together in 
conceptual thought, he resists representationalist accounts of  the imagination:  ‘the father who is 
imagined by me is the man himself in intentional being, not, indeed, a species’ (Aureol, 697-8). 
Imagining my father, my cognitive powers immediately reach out to the man himself, not to an inner 
representation.  
Second, Olivi thinks that in mnemonic conceptual thought, our intellectual acts are primarily  
directed at memory-species. Commentators who propose anti-representationalist readings of Olivi 
on conceptual thought (Perler 138; Pasnau, 273) have underestimated the extent to which this is a 
concession to representationalism. Indeed, for Olivi to say that an intellectual act is primarily 
directed at a memory-species is to say that an intellectual act is primarily directed at some kind of 
inner image. This once more puts Olivi at odds with Aureol, who extensively argues that such an 
account interposes a veil between the human mind and external reality. To conclude, then, Olivi and 
Aureol are not simply the like-minded foes of representationalism they are sometimes made out to 
be. When it comes to their analyses of conceptual thought, they are false friends.  
Aureol, Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum (ed. Buytaert), Louvain, 1956 
Kraml, ‘Why did Ockham reject Species?’ In Pacheco, Intellect and Imagination in Medieval 
Philosophy, Turnhout 2006 
Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy’, London 2007 
Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the later Middle Ages, Cambridge 1997 
Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, Frankfurt 2004 
Prezioso, La species medievale e i prodromi del fenomenismo moderno, Milano 1963 
Toivanen, Perception and the Internal Senses, Leiden 2013 
 
 
Doug Al-Maini, St. Francis Xavier University 
dalmaini@stfx.ca 
“Two Types of Love in the Phaedrus” 
 
Plato's Phaedrus presents a debate between a lover and a non-lover for the favours of a youth.  
However, the terms of that debate are left ambiguous by the participants: what 'love' actually 
consists in, what the youth receives in return for the granting of favours, and indeed whether anyone 
competing in this debate can be coherently described as a 'non-lover' are questions that receive 
different answers depending on who is speaking.  All of this would seem to lead to a very confused 
youth who is expected ultimately to choose which speaker to embrace.  Using the concepts of philos 
and eros as they are outlined in the debate I shall try to disentangle the various positions taken 
regarding these questions and provide some assistance to the beloved in making his choice. 
 
 
Audrey Anton, Western Kentucky University 
audrey.anton@wku.edu 
“Ignorance and Moral Vice According to Aristotle Or Why stupid jerks are the worst” 
 
Having taught Aristotle’s four main human character types for several years now, I now anticipate 
that students will strongly object to Aristotle’s ranking of the worst types of character.  According to 
Aristotle, it is worse to be vicious than it is to be incontinent, even though both character types are 
to be avoided.  What’s more is that the vicious person, according to Aristotle, is ignorant of the 
good.  These two facts generate the common objection that Aristotle must have been mistaken in 
this assessment, for we all know that it is worse to knowingly do wrong than to do wrong in 
ignorance.   
In this paper, I aim to defend both Aristotle’s characterization of the incontinent and vicious 
persons as well as his ranking of these characters.  In order to first motivate a reason for a defense, I 
must carefully construct a phenomenological account of what acting immorally seems like from the 
point of view of the vicious person. I do this with the help of Aristotle—arguing that the vicious 
person views bad ends as good ones, receives pleasures that are “alien” pleasures (achieved in ways 
that are not proper to such feelings), and does not recognize her behavior as morally wrong. Then, I 
shall provide an analysis of Aristotle’s criteria for voluntary behavior that is subject to praise or 
blame.  This analysis will show how Aristotle held that there were at least two different ways a 
person could be ignorant, and only one way constitutes an excuse for bad behavior (EN III.2). The 
second type of ignorance is, in fact, the kind of ignorance attributed to the vicious person.   
Still, like my students, I am skeptical that making such a distinction is sufficient for solving the 
problem. We must consider why such ignorance is inexcusable.  Unfortunately, Aristotle does not 
provide a clear explanation beyond this distinction. Finally, I argue that such ignorance is 
inexcusable because, given what Aristotle seems to hold about communities and character 
acquisition, it is likely that such ignorance was willfully acquired.  That is to say, while the vicious 
person may be mean and stupid without even knowing it, her ignorance is more a result of self-
deception than simply being mistaken. 
 
 
Carolina Araujo, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 
correio.carolina.araujo@gmail.com 
“Adeimantus' challenge” 
 
A large amount of contemporary literature on Plato’s Republic deals with Glaucon’s speech as the 
major challenge Socrates is to face in his defense of justice, seeing in Adeimantus’ speech nothing 
but a restating of the question. However, Plato is very clear in stating both that Glaucon’s argument 
was not enough and that he did not make the most relevant point to the matter (362d3-5). The aim 
of this paper is to present Adeimantus’ contribution to the problem in two general theses: first the 
objection to piety as a virtue, submitting it to justice; second the argument about the power of 
collective concealment as a device for breaking the cause/effect pattern that sustains the logic of 
retribution. The conclusion is that, while Glaucon presents an account that would grant justice to 
members of a community that obey its laws, Adeimantus considers this only an appearance of justice 
that would still produce collective unjust actions. By means of Glaucon’s challenge, Socrates is 
expected to prove that justice has a power in the soul besides its communitarian function, but 
because of Adeimantus’ challenge, he is to demonstrate that it has a power in the soul despite the 
injustice that constitutes a community. 
Key-words: Plato, Republic, Adeimantus, justice 
 
 
Kelly Arenson, Duquesne University 
arenson.k@gmail.com 
“Plato on Why Injustice Can't Kill You” 
 
In Book X of the Republic, Plato presents an argument for the immortality of the soul that turns on 
the claim that each thing has a particular evil. Injustice, as the worst and/or only psychic evil, cannot 
destroy the soul; hence, the soul is immortal. Most scholars find this argument to be laughably 
illogical, but Eric Brown has convincingly shown that the argument makes sense if its steps are 
interpreted in certain ways and if it is considered in light of Plato’s overall project in the Republic “to 
establish that internal, corrupting evils are far the most destructive dangers, so powerful that no 
amount of external rewards can make up for having an unjust soul.” (Eric Brown, “A Defense of 
Plato’s Argument for the Immortality of the Soul at Republic X 608c-611a,” Apeiron 30 (1997):  220). 
Assuming Brown’s interpretation of the particulars of the argument is correct, I consider the 
consequences of treating the Book X argument in light of the overall project of the Republic as 
Brown understands it. Although I agree with Brown that the argument for immortality is itself 
internally consistent, I contend that it is incongruous with the rest of the Republic. For starters, the 
Book X argument would seem to lessen the blow of the Republic’s message about the dangers of 
internal evils since the argument shows that internal evils are incapable of bringing about the soul’s 
ultimate destruction. Indeed, the message of the Book X argument is that even the soul’s particular 
evil, injustice, cannot kill the soul in any reasonable senses of ‘kill’ or ‘die’ (which might include 
dispersal, as discussed in the Phaedo; decomposition, as happens to the body; or some sort of 
substantial change, such that the soul would become a different thing altogether). In addition, the 
fact that injustice, as the soul’s main corruptor, cannot destroy the soul weakens the parallel between 
the city and the soul in the Republic. Cities, after all, can be obliterated by injustice: its parts can be 
dispersed and scattered as a result of internal corruption. The city, in other words, can become 
sicker and sicker until it dies; the soul, however, can only keep getting sicker, the reason for which, I 
argue, could be that immortality serves a didactic and often punitive purpose: psychic injustice can 
be punished in the afterlife only if there is no way the soul can die. 
 
 
Anne Ashbaugh, Towson University 
aashbaugh@towson.edu 
“Impersonation: An Approach to the Performative Aspects of Plato's Philosophy” 
 
Impersonation: An approach to the Performative Aspects of Plato’s Philosophy 
We find most famous among Platonic impersonations Socrates’ enactment of how the Laws would 
address him were he to attempt an escape from prison (Crito, 49e-54d).  Also noted are Socrates’ 
impersonations of Protagoras and Heraclitus within the discussion of perception in Theaetetus, 
151d-186e.  What remains puzzling is why should impersonation in any way serve to advance the 
course of philosophy.   The question, I believe, goes to the heart of Platonic philosophy because in 
an important sense, Platonic dialogues enact the practice of philosophy.  In fact, if we accept the 
midwife analogy in Theatetus, 149a-151d, every Socratic interaction is a doxastic delivery and every 
questioning a labor.  This essay will address the puzzle of impersonation by first defining what 
impersonation entails and its performative powers, then, showing the importance of this rhetorical 
device for the practice of philosophy.  Central to that task is the following question: Do the 
ornaments of rhetoric veil truth by concealing the weaknesses of arguments or do these ornaments 
facilitate inquiry? 
 
 
Emily Austin, Wake Forest University 
austinea@wfu.edu 
“The Politics of Fearing Death in Plato’s Republic” 
 
This paper defends a new interpretation of Socrates’ arguments for communalizing the family in 
Book V of the Republic (452c-465d).  Scholars have addressed whether the proposal itself is an 
elaborate joke [Bloom (1968)], whether it counts as meaningfully feminist [Annas (1976), Okin 
(1977)] and whether it would be practicable [Ar. Pol. II 3-5].  I focus instead on the role the 
communal family plays in the regulation of the negative emotions (e.g., grief and fear) that arise 
from natural human desires for procreation.  Textual evidence external to the Republic suggests that 
Plato thinks we have a natural and divine desire to pursue immortality by creating children, art, and 
political organizations that are of necessity unstable and subject to fortune (Symp., 206cff; Lg 4: 
721b-d).   This instability gives rise to negative emotions that are painful and that serve as 
impediments to virtue: fear of death impedes courage, too much grief is intemperate, etc.  For this 
reason, Socrates claims that the ‘greatest good’ for the city is when joy and grief are shared and 
dispersed (462a-e).  For Socrates, collectivizing children stabilizes negative emotions by ensuring the 
general satisfaction of the desire for procreative ‘immortality’.  It ensures that individuals die without 
fear that they have failed to produce something that persists after they die.  I argue that insofar as 
political structure plays an essential role in regulating anxiety arising from natural desires for 
procreation, commentators should be more cautious about treating the collective family as a joke or 
inessential to the larger ethical picture of the Republic [Annas 1999]. 
 
 
Andreas Avgousti, Columbia University/University of Pennsylvania 
aa2773@columbia.edu 
“Rehabilitating Philosophy’s Reputation: a Reading of Plato’s "Republic"” 
 
This paper provides a framework for understanding the role of reputation (doxa) in Plato’s 
"Republic". The dialogue is peppered with claims that most people believe that philosophy is at best 
useless and at worst dangerous. It follows that if the dialogue argues for philosophic rule, then 
rehabilitating philosophy’s reputation must be its aim. Plato’s Socrates targets the false beliefs most 
have about philosophy via three images. The Cave simile, the Ship analogy, and the personification 
of philosophy as a bride, collectively show that philosophy’s reputation is contingent to it. Given 
that the philosophers are just men, in order to fully rehabilitate philosophy’s reputation Socrates 
must successfully respond to Glaucon’s challenge in book II. Glaucon insists that the just man must 
have a reputation for injustice and reports that most people believe that a reputation for justice is 
desirable only for its benefits such as political office. Socrates’ answer is at once a solution to the 
problem of political deception: he who appears just is just, and if he is not, then the result will be the 
corrupt political constitutions illustrated in book VIII. Therefore, only the just philosopher can 
wield political power effectively. Rehabilitating philosophy’s reputation suggests an escape from a 
paradox that sits uncomfortably in the core of the dialogue, to wit, that those who are wise, just, and 
ought to rule, do not seek either a reputation for their traits, nor political office. 
 
 
Allan Bäck, Kutztown University 
back@kutztown.edu 
“Avicenna on the Sea Battle” 
 In Al-‘Ibārā (Aš-Šifā I.3), a “commentary” on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) 
discusses the problem of future contingents and the famous example of the sea battle.  Here I 
present what he says. Avicenna insists upon there being logically contingent events.  I end by 
showing how this view is consistent with his necessitarian metaphysics. 
 
 
Jesse Bailey, Sacred Heart University 
baileyj34@sacredheart.edu 
“Mystery Cults and Pythagoreanism in the background of the Phaedo” 
 
Religion in Greece undergoes radical transformations in the 6th and 5th centuries. The Phaedo can, in 
large part, be understood as a transformation or development of religious concepts; specifically, the 
dialogue develops the concept of the psyche, and of the afterlife that the psyche can expect, from 
out of the context of these religious traditions which were integral to the polis. Thus, it is clear, in 
line with Socrates’ conviction on the charge of impiety, that philosophy begins with a tense 
relationship to the polis, and to religion. This paper explores one dimension of this tense 
relationship as it figures in the historical context of the Phaedo.  
In Plato’s time, Mystery cults gained prominence which, while staying within the broader outlines of 
the traditional accounts of the gods as presented in Homer and Hesiod, nevertheless begin to 
question the place of the individual both within the polis and within the kosmos. While many of 
these cults had been in existence for over a thousand years, these cults gained in size and import 
within Athens in the 6th century (particularly, the Eleusinian Mysteries under Peisistratus, who ruled 
Athens from 546 to 527). These movements are connected to a transformation of the understanding 
of the meaning and nature of the psyche. At this same time, agnosticism regarding the nature and 
even the existence of the gods begins to become fashionable with the sophists and educated people 
of Athens. A brief account of some of these changes will clarify what might be at stake in Plato’s 
discussion of the self in the Phaedo. 
 
 
Nicholas Baima, Washington University in St. Louis 
nichbaima@gmail.com 
“False Words and True Souls in the Republic” 
 
Plato's attitude towards truth and falsity in the Republic is puzzling. On one hand, it is obvious that 
truth is highly valued. On the other hand, practical considerations often override the value of truth. 
Perhaps this is most apparent in Book III where Socrates says that "being deceived about the truth 
[is] a bad thing, while possessing the truth is good" (413a). Nevertheless, a few lines later Socrates 
founds the Kallipolis on a "noble falsehood"(414d-415c). What exactly is Plato's attitude toward 
truth and falsity in the Republic? Is falsehood tolerable in some instances and not in others? And if, 
so what are these instances? 
 I argue that the key to answering these questions lies in Socrates' enigmatic distinction 
between "true falsehoods" (hos alethos pseudos) and "mixed falsehoods" (ou panu akraton pseudos) 
(382a-e). Socrates maintains that "true falsehoods" are located in the soul and concern the most 
important things, and thus are hated by gods and humans alike. However, "mixed falsehoods" are 
located in words and are sometimes useful to humans. I argue that the latter term corresponds to 
semantic truth, while the former refers to practical truth or well-being. I argue that Socrates is 
tolerant of semantic falsity because sometimes believing semantic falsehoods can lead to practical 
truth, which is the primary concern of human life. However, I will argue that this only partially 
solves Plato's paradoxical attitude towards truth. Part of the tension is irresolvable because Plato has 
two distinct concerns—truth and well-being—and these two goods cannot be completely unified in 
human life; only the gods can harmonize them. When they do conflict in the lives of humans, 
considerations of well-being have primacy over truth. 
 
 
Erik Baldwin, University of Notre Dame 
edbaldwi@nd.edu 
“Dvaita-Vedanta and Plantingan Religious Epistemology” 
 
Plantingan Religious Epistemology, i.e., Alvin Plantinga’s proper function account of warrant and 
his models of warranted theistic and Christian belief, is compelling and plausible to many theists, 
Christian and non-Christian alike. But non-Christians who accept a Plantingan religious 
epistemology must make certain modifications to his models. In this paper I articulate a Dvaita-
Vedanta extension of the Standard Aquinas/Calvin model that covers the core creedal beliefs of 
monotheistic Hinduism. (The main outlines of the model apply, perhaps only with some 
modifications, to Bhakti, Śaiva, Vaishnava and Nyāya -Vaiśeṣika belief as well.) I show that since 
monotheistic Hinduism is compatible with Reformed Epistemology, monotheistic Hindus, too, may 
claim that Hindu Belief is rational and, if true, (probably) warranted.  
That there is a uniquely monotheistic Hindu extension of the Standard A/C model has benefits but 
also raises problems. The fact that monotheistic Hindus can adopt Plantinga’s religious epistemology 
exacerbates the problem of religious diversity and threatens to provide any Plantingan with a 
rationality defeater for their ‘extension specific’ beliefs about God. How is a Plantingan to rationally 
determine which extension of the Standard A/C Model is reasonable to accept and why? Is 
reasonable disagreement between Plantingans about which extension of the Standard A/C model 
possible? Can one go about this in a properly basic way? I propose evaluate Plantingan answers to 
these questions and offer my account of how disagreement about which extension of the Standard 
model is true can be reasonable. 
 
 
Michael Baur, Fordham University 
mbaur@fordham.edu 
“The Metaphysical Grounds of Aristotle's Distinction between Distributive Justice and Corrective 
Justice” 
 
Aristotle's distinction between "distributive justice" and "corrective justice" has been exceedingly 
influential in the history of philosophy; nevertheless, what Aristotle means by this distinction has 
been frequently debated and poorly understood.  My primary aim in this paper is to illuminate the 
meaning and implications of Aristotle's distinction between "distributive justice" and "corrective 
justice."  My secondary aim is to show how a proper grasp of Aristotle's distinction between 
"distributive justice" and "corrective justice" can help to correct some of the ways in which 
Aristotle's account of justice has been wrongly applied in contemporary political and legal theorizing. 
In recent years, Ernest Weinrib and others have insightfully made use of Aristotle's thought in order 
to argue for what has been called the "bipolarity" or "correlativity" of corrective justice.  According 
to Weinrib, "Corrective justice treats the defendant's unjust gain as correlative to the plaintiff's 
unjust loss....  The injustice that corrective justice corrects is essentially bipolar....  Just as when the 
equality of corrective justice is disturbed, one person's gain necessarily entails another's loss, so the 
doing of injury by one entails the suffering of injury by another.  The correlativity of gain and loss 
supervenes on the correlativity of one person's doing and another's suffering harm...."  (The Idea of 
Private Law, pp. 64-65). 
Weinrib is right to insist on the necessary "bipolarity" or "correlativity" of corrective justice; but 
Weinrib goes on to misrepresent Aristotle's account when (following Hans Kelsen) he argues that 
Aristotle provides no hints about how distributive justice and corrective justice are related, and no 
hints about when or how one kind of justice is to be "preferred" to the other (ibid., p. 67).  Weinrib's 
concern about "preferring" one kind of justice to another, I argue, rests on a serious 
misunderstanding. 
Aristotle’s comparison of distributive justice to geometrical relations and of corrective justice to 
arithmetic relations is meant to show that distributive justice has to do with the relations between 
wholes and parts, while corrective justice has to do with the relations between parts and other parts.  
Contrary to what Weinrib suggests, there is no question about "preferring" one kind of justice to the 
other, since the two kinds of justice have to do with two different aspects of one and the same body 
politic.  In other words, one must appreciate Aristotle's metaphysical mereology in order to 
appreciate his distinction between distributive justice and corrective justice.  Further evidence for 
this key claim can be found in Aristotle's army analogy (Metaphysics, Lambda), in his arguments for 
the priority of the whole to the parts, and in his arguments for the priority of final causality to the 
three other kinds of causality.  The relevance of Aristotle's metaphysics to his account of justice can 
be further illustrated by reference to his argument against Plato's community of women (Politics, 
Book II) and his account of how the best flutes are to be distributed to the best flute-players 
(Politics, Book III). 
 
 
Martha Beck, Lyon College 
martha.beck@lyon.edu 
“The Socratic Way of Life vis-a-vis the Theory of Forms” 
 
In Phaedo 99b, Socrates explicitly describes his way of life as caused by his mind, “[In everything I 
do] I act with my mind”  Plato’s dialogues give readers “an image in speech” of this kind of life. In 
Apology, Socrates defends his way of life as that of the best citizen in a democratic society. The 
Phaedo is Socrates’ second defense of his way of life, based on his view of the principles of reality as 
such. Socrates describes the view of reality he wished Anaxagoras had defended, “it is Mind (Nous) 
that directs and is the cause of everything” (97c).   If human beings have the capacity to understand 
Divine Mind, then the life governed by mind is the most natural and best human life.  In Republic, 
Socrates claims that human beings by nature possess the power of mind. The best system of 
education is dedicated to educating this power (518c).  The philosophical life, then, is a microcosm 
within the macrocosm, an individual human life empowered by the same drive toward perfection 
and order as the ultimate power “guiding” the universe.  
This paper argues that the nature and existence of “Forms” is a consequence of this view of reality. 
In the Phaedo, Socrates says that once he decided Divine Nous is the power underlying reality, he 
realized that he could not discover the real causes of physical phenomena by uses his senses. Rather, 
he would have to posit a theory, “taking as my hypothesis in each case the theory that seemed to me 
the most compelling, I would consider as true, about cause and everything else, whatever agreed 
with this and as untrue whatever did not so agree” (100a).  Socrates eventually chooses the “theory 
of forms” as the best explanation for the nature of reality as such. Socrates then says here that he is 
always talking about the forms as the causes (aitia) underlying physical reality (100b).   
At some place in Plato’s dialogues, each form is referred to as a power (dunamai), either a natural 
power or a power of the human soul that emerges from the soul’s evolution from and response to 
the universe. Socrates’ speech and actions, his way of life (ergon) are a literary image of the actual 
exercise (energeia) of this power. The philosophical life is empowered by mind, which, in turn, is 
connected to other secondary powers. The universe is empowered by Divine Mind which, in turn, 
leads to the emergence of an ordered universe whose secondary causes, or powers, are the individual 
“Forms.” The forms are not disembodied universals. They do not exist in a universe apart from the 
one we live in. The name for a Form, “Beautiful itself,” “Good itself,” refers to existential powers, in 
the physical universe and the human soul. 
 
 
Yann Benétreau-Dupin, University Western Ontario / Rotman Institute 
ybenetre@uwo.ca 
“Buridan's Solution to the Liar Paradox” 
 
In order to assign a truth-value to such a sentence as “What I am saying is false,” Jean Buridan has 
offered a solution that rests on a conception of truth by supposition and on a requirement of 
contextual consistency, crucial for the assessment of self-referencing sentences. Recent works have 
brought new interest to Buridan's solution to the Liar Paradox (the eleventh sophism of chap. 8 of 
the Sophismata). While Stephen Read has argued that it was an ad hoc solution, others (especially G. 
Klima and C.D. Novaes) have suggested that, if not ad hoc, Buridan's solution weakens his theory of 
truth. I wish to contest Read's accusation of adhoccery, and thereby clarify the scope and strength of 
Buridan's theory of truth. 
It has been argued that Buridan's appeal to the principle of contextual consistency (or virtual 
implication) reveals the insufficiency of his theory of truth by supposition (because it needs an 
additional principle to deal with such insolubilia), and that it is ad hoc, applying only to self-
referencing sentences. 
The accusation of insufficiency makes of the requirement of contextual consistency a new principle, 
an addition to Buridan's theory of truth. However, since this requirement implies other principles 
(namely that of non-contradiction and that of bivalence), this accusation is defendable only if it is 
also directed toward these other principles. 
Even if we accept the accusation of insufficiency, that of adhoccery is more problematic. One could 
not make such an assertion without making Buridan oblivious to the very criticism he addresses to 
others (namely, regarding Ockham’s ban on self-reference). Moreover, it would make him 
inconsistent, since he asserts only four sophisms earlier (the seventh) that the principle of virtual 
entailments applies to every proposition.  
Furthermore, it is clear that the application of the principle of self-entailment is to be done in terms 
of supposition. Thus, it reaffirms the relevance of the criterion of co-supposition for carrying out 
inquiries about the truth and falsity of propositions. 
Buridan's solution to the Liar Paradox then consists in asserting that the particular case of self-
reference forces us to handle assessments of truth by means of supposition more carefully, and 
consider principles that can otherwise be overlooked. This is not the same as introducing ad hoc 
rules, particularly when these principles are consistent with the rest of his logic. 
As has been shown by Novaes, this requirement, if universal, only allows one to identify false 
sentences. True sentences, however, can only be shown not to lead to contradictions if they are 
taken to be true. By refuting the accusation of adhoccery, it is this very interpretation of Buridan's 
conception of truth that I make more plausible. To assert that it is a weakened conception of truth 
would be to forget that it is consistent with the tenth conclusion of chap. 2 of the Sophismata, 
which only gives necessary conditions for truth, but sufficient conditions for falsity. 
 
 
Brad Berman, Portland State University 
bberman@pdx.edu 
“Aristotle on Like-Partedness” 
 
Central to Aristotle’s definition of an elemental body is a negative condition that precludes elements 
from being “divisible into bodies different in form” (DC III. 3, 302a18; cf. Meta. Δ. 3, 1014a26-34). 
The idea is that any part of a given elemental body, say elemental water, would, if separated out, also 
belong to the same natural kind as the whole—that it, too, would be elemental water. According to 
Aristotle, if the parts into which the water was divided differed in kind, then ipso facto it would not 
have been elemental water to begin with.  
For Aristotle, elements are unique among bodies in meeting that negative condition. Yet, their 
uniqueness in this respect has been obscured. This is because, according to the received view in the 
secondary literature, Aristotle thinks that all homoeomerous bodies, not just the elements, are 
indivisible into bodies differing in form. I argue that the received view conflicts with Aristotle’s 
treatments of both homoeomery as such and the various non-elemental homoeomers. 
 
 
Scott Berman, Saint Louis University 
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“Plato's Theory of Perceptibles” 
 
It is commonplace, though not universal, to interpret Plato as holding that perceptibles are illusory 
things and that only the Forms are real things. I will add my voice to those who argue, to the 
contrary, that Plato does not think that perceptibles are not real things but only that perceptibles are 
not real objects of knowledge, as compared to the Forms, which are the real objects of knowledge. 
Nevertheless, a philosophically satisfying account of what perceptibles are, from a Platonic 
perspective, has yet to take hold in the literature. I aim to explain and defense Plato’s theory 
concerning perceptibles which is both textually grounded and philosophically plausible. 
  
Timothy Berryman, University of Oklahoma 
timothy.berryman@gmail.com 
“On Eudaimonia and the Arguments of Nichomachean Ethics I.2 and I.7” 
 
The existence of a highest good, which Aristotle identifies with the activity of eudaimonia, is one of 
the central claims of his project in Nichomachean Ethics I. There are two key passages in which he 
suggests that there is a highest good, the first at EN I.2 1094a18-22 and the second at EN I.7 
1097a15-1097b21. However, the exact relationship between these two passages is never clearly 
presented in the text. This has led interpreters to a variety of conclusions about their relationship; [a] 
some say they are the same argument, [b] others that they are two arguments for the same thing, and 
[c] others still that they are two arguments for different things. There is no consensus on this issue, 
which leaves it open as to what role these passages play in the greater context of the book. It is my 
belief that resolving this question, and thus clarifying the role of eudaimonia, is important for a 
complete, coherent reading of the Nichomachean Ethics. As such, the central question addressed in 
this paper is the following: What is the relationship between EN I.2 1094a18-22 and EN I.7 
1097a15-1097b21? 
In this paper, I will defend the claim that these passages present two different arguments for the 
same thing, i.e. the existence of a highest good. First, since what it is to be an Aristotelian telos plays 
a significant part in the passages under investigation, I must explain the teleological aspects of 
Aristotle’s theory. In this section, I will examine the notion of telos, as well as the ancillary concepts 
of teleion and autarkes, by looking at passages of Physics II and some commentary. Following this, it 
is necessary for me to show how both passages present arguments. Since it is more controversial 
whether EN I.2 1094a18-22 is an argument, I will consider it first. This will involve setting out the 
structure of the argument and addressing allegations of fallacy directed against it. Next, I will present 
a similar analysis of EN I.7 1097a15-1097b21. Specifically, I will show how this passage has two 
parts, one that gives the new argument for the highest good (EN I.7 1097a15-25), and one 
addressing Aristotle’s identification of eudaimonia with the highest good (EN I.7 1097a25-1097b21). 
Finally, I will briefly examine how the conclusions of our arguments enable clarification of the 
puzzle of the relationship between EN I and the remainder of the text. 
 
 
John Bewaji, University of the West Indies 
“Science, epistemology and the challenge of africana development” 
 
There is a sense in which philosophy, and by extension epistemology, have fallen victim of 
"disciplinary decadence", as Gordon (2006) argued.  This decadence has created a situation where 
philosophy has become rather uninteresting as the intellectual discipline for driving the development 
and emancipation of swaths of underprivileged members of societies globally.  To this end, 
philosophy has become a pariah discipline that is not much valued for its capacity to facilitate social 
and economic development.  If this is the global situation, the peculiar circumstances of Africa and 
its Diaspora, with regard to the development of knowledge industries is worse.  The factors of 
global recession and domestic institutional ineptitude of leadership have combined to make 
philosophy a luxury that is left for later.  Even more so is the incapacity of institutions to engage 
epistemological dialogues which will serve as liberating beacons for the emplacement of scientific 
and technological ideologies for development.  In this discussion, I explore the nexus between the 
global issues indicated above and the localized issues of absence of robust engagement of 
epistemological investigations, the ways in which the technological divide/gulf have shaped 
knowledge trade, and the consequent effects of these matters on the capacity of Africana societies to 
be owners of their on developmental destinies. 
 
 
Metha Binita, Texas State University 
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“Self-knowledge and mystical cognition in Plotinus and Indian Advaita philosophy” 
 
Plotinus and Indian Advaita philosophy present the view that complete self-knowledge is attained at 
the level that is devoid of duality. Plotinus argues that if self-consciousness is divided into subject-
object relation such that one part contemplates another part of itself, one will know oneself as 
“contemplated but not as contemplating” (V.3.5.1-22) and no real self-knowledge obtains in this 
case. In a similar fashion, Śaṅkara, who in this paper will serve as one of the chief representatives of 
Indian Advaita thought, points out that that the self cannot know itself as an object because what is 
called an object to be known becomes established when it is separated from the self, the subject 
(Upadeśa Sāhasrī II.99). According to Śaṅkara, the self can be known only through immediate 
“intuition” (anubhava) which transcends the subject-object duality. For Plotinus, the complete 
unification of the self – a necessary condition for self-knowledge – is achieved only at the level of 
the absolutely simple One. Śaṅkara locates the highest state of self-knowledge in the ātman 
consciousness, which transcends all duality and which lie beyond the mental apparatus as constituted 
by manas and buddhi. The first part of the paper will show that from the perspectives of Plotinus 
and Śaṅkara the full reality of one’s self is brought to oneself in a mystical cognition as constituted 
by the non-dual awareness.  Now Plotinus speaks of the One as beyond thinking. But he also 
attributes “immediate self-consciousness” to the One (V.4.2.21-29), suggesting that the One is the 
state of non-dual consciousness without an object, rather than a state where consciousness is absent. 
For Plotinus, thinking is a movement towards an object, that is, it implies a subject-object structure, 
or the existence of otherness (V.3.10). Thus, there is thinking in the intellect, which is a complex 
whole or a one-many: the “Intellect needs to see itself…first because it is multiple, and then because 
it belongs to another (the One)” (V.3.10.14-17). But the One has “nothing to which to direct its 
activity” (V.3.10.24-25); it is an “object of thought to the Intellect, but in itself it will be neither 
thinker nor object of thought” (V.6.2.15-17).  In the second part of the paper, I will examine the 
epistemological significance of the role of non-dual mode of cognition in Plotinus and Advaita 
thought. Here I will analyze the notion of pratibhā, which constitutes an important element in the 
Śaiva Advaita school of Abhinavagupta. Pratibhā is the intuitive light of the ātman or the power of 
self-illumination and the very basis of the subject’s knowledge. I will juxtapose the doctrine of 
pratibhā with Plotinus’ view that thinking is a “movement towards the Good” (V.6.5.11) which can 
be interpreted to mean that non-dual level of consciousness is fundamental in all knowing. 
 
 
Joshua Blander, The King's College 
jblander@tkc.edu 
“John Duns Scotus’s Formal Distinction, Persons  and Natures, and the Question of Separability” 
 
In this paper, I discuss John Duns Scotus’s use of the formal distinction in his account of the 
Incarnation, which sheds light on his distinction between natures and persons, and, as a result, his 
account of the Trinity.  In his examination of the doctrine of the Incarnation, he makes use of this 
distinction when marking the contrast between a person and an individual human nature.  In an 
individual human nature, we can distinguish formally between the human nature and the 
individuating feature that makes the nature an individual nature.  Scotus specifies the conditions 
required for being a person negatively: a person is an individual human nature that neither is inclined 
to depend nor actually depends on another.  Though such a nature is never inclined to depend, if the 
second person of the Trinity were to assume the individual human nature, the nature is subsequently 
actually dependent; therefore, it is no longer a person. 
Scotus’s primary aim in this discussion is the avoidance of the suggestion that there are two persons 
co-present in the Incarnation, i.e., both the Second Person of the Trinity and an assumed human 
person.  It also provides a helpful structural parallel to the doctrine of the Trinity.  As a result of his 
discussion of the Incarnation, he suggests that there is a formal distinction between the (human) 
person and the (individual human) nature.  Similarly, in each Trinitarian person, there is a distinction 
between the (divine) person and the (divine) nature.  Given Scotus’s disposition toward univocity, 
and toward generally unifying metaphysical principles, this should not be a surprising result.  
Scotus’s work here is helpful for extending our understanding of the metaphysical structure present 
in the Trinity, and his general account of constitution. 
However, Scotus’s claims here are complicated by his commitment to the presence of a formal 
distinction between the individual human nature and the person.  As we saw above, the individual 
nature can exist when the person does not (although not vice versa); thus, there is one-way 
independence or separability between the nature and the person.  However, all of Scotus’s 
contemporary commentators claim that the formal distinction entails two-way inseparability; that is, 
if x and y are formally distinct, then each is inseparable from the other.  Furthermore, they claim that 
a real distinction entails (at least one-way) separability. 
If Scotus’s commentators are right to think that the formal distinction entails two-way inseparability, 
the case of the Incarnation suggests a serious conflict for his view, as it implies the co-presence of 
separability and a formal distinction.  I argue that the Incarnation case provides prima facie evidence 
that he was committed to allowing conceptual space for separability in the presence of a formal 
distinction, and that none of the reasons for thinking that Scotus is committed to two-way 
inseparability are sufficient to overcome this evidence. 
 
 
Chiara Blengini, Università degli Studi di Pavia (University of Pavia - Italy) 
chiarablengini@gmail.com 
“De Anima and Aristotle's theory of definition” 
 
Definition has long been a central topic in ancient Greek philosophy, since Socrates introduced it as 
the fundamental tool for philosophical investigation. Plato applied this innovation to his dialogues 
and Aristotle pursued these issues further, developing a technical account of definition in the 
Topics, Analytics and Metaphysics.  
In particular, Posterior Analytics B.8-10 tightly links definition and explanation, based on the 
interconnection between causality and essence (Charles). The theory that thus emerges is 
comprehensive and coherent, although not free of difficulties. A major problem of Aristotelian 
scholarship is in fact whether this account can be seen at work in Aristotle’s scientific practice, 
especially in the biological works.   
This paper specifically addresses the issue with respect to the definition of the soul in De Anima. 
I shall argue that, far from positing an obstacle to the validity of the Analytics account of definition, 
De Anima constitutes the natural development of a wider project aiming at applying such a model to 
substances as well. This ambitious program initiates in Metaphysics Z.17 through the question of 
primary substance and reaches a sort of provisional conclusion in H.6, focusing on the controversial 
theme of a thing’s unity. De Anima is but the continuation of this line of thought, in that it takes 
over such progress and draws heavily on the same resources on which it rests, i.e. the theory of 
matter and form, as described in Physics I.7 and the Metaphysics, and that of actuality and potentiality, 
expressed in Metaphysics Θ. 
Keeping the theory of definition in the background will help us realize the importance of the initial 
chapters of De Anima B – the proper key to understanding Aristotle’s conception of psyché. Both 
what precedes and what follows should be read in the light of the various formulations of the 
definition of soul which we find here. 
The first book of the treatise is best seen as preparatory work for reaching a scientific definition of 
the object of enquiry. It is, in fact, a survey of the views elaborated by preceding Greek thinkers 
about the nature of the soul. Aristotle ascribed to such abundant material examined an overall 
tendency to describe the soul as the source of movement, sensation, and knowledge.  
In accordance with the heuristic function of endoxa in dialectics and in analogy with the role of 
linguistic definition (Modrak), such elements constitute the starting-points of the following 
Aristotelian analysis. This allows, incidentally, a re-evaluation of the long-neglected dossography of 
De Anima A. 
Aristotle’s positive contribution to the enquiry starts indeed with the search for a scientific definition 
which opens De Anima B. The difficulty in its corresponding to the paradigm case of definition in 
the Analytics is due to the fact that the item to define is sui generis, as the one typified by the snub 
as opposed to the merely concave. For this category of items, reference to matter must be included 
in all effects in the essence, while the general version of the theory does not allow it for standard 
cases.  
Once the reason of the aporia is individuated, the rest of the treatise could be seen as a further 
development and expansion of the definition reached by De Anima B.3. 
In conclusion, when reading De Anima, being cognizant of the Aristotelian theory of definition, far 
from leading to puzzles, will grant a better understanding of the structure of the whole treatise and 
its overall strategy. 
 
 
Luigi Bradizza, Salve Regina University 
luigi.bradizza@salve.edu 
“The Place of Philosophy in Xenophon's "Cyropaedia"” 
 
In his "Cyropaedia," Xenophon presents Cyrus as an enemy of philosophy. At the same time, he 
presents Cyrus as a great, heroic figure who reorders the politics of his region to the benefit of great 
numbers of people. This raises the question of Xenophon's attitude towards philosophy. It is my 
argument that Xenophon presents Cyrus as praiseworthy for his political prowess, but defective for 
his lack of philosophic curiosity. Xenophon thus offers a subtle corrective to political action: It must 
in some important sense be ordered by the philosopher. 
 
 
Jay Bregman, UNiversity of Maine 
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“Thomas Taylor on Julian, Sallust and Synesius” 
 
Thomas Taylor (1758-1835) thought Julian was a good Neoplatonist though not of the caliber of 
Proclus. A Philosophical ruler of a Platonic Republic could be a perfect philosopher, but Julian had as 
much philosophical genius as possible for a Roman emperor; better than all before and after him.  
  Taylor's exegesis of Julian follows Proclus' Platonic Theology. He is in sympathy with the 
emperor's mission: "to restore a religion which is coeval with the universe". In order to explicate 
Julian's description of the efficacy of the image of Cybele, upon her arrival in Rome, Taylor noted 
Julian's friend Sallust's theory of statues designed according to divine imitation and similitude; in 
sharp contrast to the false theory of images of Saints; the former "beautifully pious" the latter 
"...impious...full of delusion. 
   Taylor admired Synesius the Hellene, but never quite forgave him for his conversion to 
Christianity; though he refused to translate his Christianizing Hymns, Taylor's Hymn to Jupiter is 
admittedly and demonstrably inspired by Synesius' metaphysical poetics. 
 Taylor's N. American disciples were not rote followers. They acknowledged Christianity as part of a  
syncretistic synthesis, esoterically in agreement with Platonism. I will discuss Taylor's ideas and 
comment on some of his American enthusiasts. Including Emerson, who quipped about a revival in 
the Churches brought on by reading Taylor translations of "pagan" counter-Christian texts; Alcott 
and the later Neoplatonic American Transcendentalists. 
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sbrill@fairfield.edu 
“Deformations of Logos in Aristotle's Ethics” 
 
This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of Aristotle’s explorations of zōē by examining 
the relationship between two dimensions of human life, the analysis of which is necessary for the 
fullest possible account of animate beings:  a) human life admits a plurality of kinds based upon 
distinct forms of character and defining passions (e.g. the pleasure-loving life, the honor-loving life 
and the contemplative life) and b) the possession of logos dictates that the flourishing of human life 
requires that it be shared and creates a variety of better and worse possibilities for this ‘sharing.'  In 
mapping the landscape of pathē and events with which one must contend in a manner that could be 
praised or blamed, Aristotle charts these possibilities and, I argue, attributes to them the means by 
which human life attains sufficient coherence and definition as to permit it to be described by kinds.  
He also offers an account of the deformations of logos that threaten the stability of the city and the 
intelligibility of human life.  These are particularly evident in his analyses of the limits of polite 
conversation (the virtues pertaining to ‘shared words and deeds’ 1126b8), the excellence which 
applies to shared goods and what is one’s own (justice), and the life that is forged in friendship. 
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“Why Socrates is not a Philosopher: One Necessary Condition for the Practice of Philosophy in 
Plato’s Sophist and Statesman” 
 
This paper examines Plato’s Sophist and Statesman in an attempt to outline one necessary condition 
for the practice of philosophy put forward therein by the Eleatic Stranger. At the opening of 
Sophist, Socrates asks the Eleatic Stranger if he can explain the difference between a philosopher, a 
statesman and a sophist, and whether the Stranger believes these to be the same sort of person or 
three distinct kinds. The Stranger says that they are indeed three distinct kinds and proceeds to 
attempt to define each of them. While we get an account of the sophist and statesman in the two 
dialogues that bear these names, there is no dialogue dedicated to the philosopher. Although 
providing a full account of the possible contents of this third dialogue would be an enormous 
undertaking, my paper will draw upon Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman in order to sketch out only 
one necessary condition for being a philosopher put forward by the Stranger. I will argue that, 
according to the Stranger, the philosopher practices a productive art and that he must be the primary 
cause of the thing his art produces – namely, an account of what is. An interesting implication of 
this is that, given what Socrates says about his own art in Theaetetus, he is not a philosopher 
according to the Stranger. Barren of ideas but an expert in helping others give birth to ideas of their 
own, Socrates can only be a contributory cause in the production of accounts of what is. Thus, 
Socrates fails to satisfy the Stranger’s necessary condition. 
        My paper will have three sections. First I will argue that, according to the Stranger’s account in 
Sophist, philosophy must be a productive techne that produces a true account of what is. Next, I 
will examine passages in Statesman where the Stranger suggests that the only person who can claim 
to practice a productive craft (like philosophy) is the person who is the primary cause of its product. 
Finally, I will examine Socrates’ own self description in Theaetetus and argue that, although he is 
very close to the practice of philosophy, Socrates does not satisfy the necessary condition for being a 
philosopher put forward by the Stranger. 
 
 
Miriam Byrd, University of Texas, Arlington 
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“Dianoetic Investigation in the Republic: Socrates' Prelude to Dialectic” 
 In Republic 7, Socrates explains that education is not a matter of putting knowledge into someone's 
soul, but consists of turning the eye of the soul from the sensible realm of becoming to the realm of 
being.   He credits the dianoetic sciences, specifically mathematics, with this pedagogical task.  I 
posit that Socrates’ actions in the Republic provide an important supplement to his discussion of 
dianoetic education.  Though Socrates’ description of the beneficial influence of dianoetic education 
is limited to the context of mathematical instruction of future rulers of the Kallipolis, his answer to 
Glaucon’s challenge in Republic 2-4 exemplifies how dianoetic education may be used in the context 
of philosophical discussion.  I support this thesis by 1) describing dianoetic reasoning and explaining 
its correct and incorrect use, 2) drawing parallels between correct use of dianoetic reasoning and 
Socrates’ investigation into the value of living a just life, and 3) showing how the investigation may 
serve as a prelude to dialectic for the reader. 
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“The importance of intellectual virtues to moral virtues in Plato and Aristotle” 
 
The importance of knowledge to moral virtue is at the core of Platonic ethics.  Although the Republic 
leaves open the possibility of being virtuous by doing right action even if not knowing why it is the 
right action, the emphasis in Plato’s work is full knowledge of the causes or ‘aitia’ of virtuous action.  
This explains his concern with mathematics (episteme) and its importance in the education process 
of a philosopher.  Mathematics teaches us abstract thinking, looking beyond the world of sense 
perception, and gives us training in the evaluation and measuring needed for applications of moral 
virtues.  It has the additional advantage of teaching us about evaluating evidence, reasoning, and 
offering justification for our beliefs.   The influence of Plato on Aristotle is strong and the 
Nichomachean Ethics is no exception.  In the ethics, there is a very strong connection between 
intellectual and moral virtues.  The connection between practical wisdom (phronesis) and moral 
virtues seems clear.  However, in this essay, I will explore the connection between episteme and 
phronesis.  Although not explicitly considered by Aristotle, I wish to explore whether mathematics 
and the theoretical sciences are also useful in the development of phronesis because of the training 
and epistemic practices it entails. 
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“Aristotle on the Content of Perception” 
 
In De Anima, Aristotle criticizes his predecessors for not having properly distinguished between 
perception (aisthesis) and thought (noesis/phronesis).  For this reason, we would expect him to 
draw a sharp distinction between perceiving and thinking. The expectation is met, and in De Anima 
we find a number of arguments in support of this distinction: 
The Argument from Animal Perception: perception is different from thought because, as opposed 
to thought, it is available to both humans and animals.  
The Argument from Truth: perception is always true, while thought can be false  
The Argument from Thinkables and Perceptibles: perception and thought are different because 
perception is of external objects and of particulars, whilst thought is of universals which are "in the 
soul".  
The Argument from Bodily Organs: while perception requires a bodily organ, thought doesn't.  
In this  paper, I first examine these arguments and suggest that Aristotle's demarcation between 
perception and thought is less clear than it may seem. I then argue that the only consistent argument 
Aristotle proposes in order to draw this difference is the Argument from Animal Perception. In the 
second section, I defend this thesis by referring to Aristotle’s account of perceptual illusions. I 
suggest that both Aristotle's account of perceptual illusions and his Argument from Animal 
Perception rely on the idea that the content of perception is different from the content of thought. 
In the third section, I try to clarify the distinction between the content of thought and the content of 
perception by considering Aristotle's account of recollection and his account of persuasion. I argue 
that the content of thought has a complex syntactic and conceptual structure, while the content of 
perception doesn’t. In conclusion, I note that the thesis that perceptual content is unstructured can 
help us clarify the epistemological link according to which, in Aristotle's view, we can derive 
knowledge from perception. 
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“Translating Muthos into Logos in Platonic Literature” 
 
Why does Plato need muthos? He is accepted as the philosopher who makes the intellectual 
revolution. Nevertheless Atlantis, Er and Socrates-Diatoma speech suggests that muthos is included 
in Platonic literature. First of all, muthos is accepted as a type of discourse by Plato. It is also a 
support for rational argument. For myths may have rational arguments but not like logos has. So the 
line between muthos and logos is hard to draw. As a type of discourse, muthos is accepted as an 
unfalsiable one while logos is the falsiable one. Muthos and logos work together for a new way of 
understanding, mthys have the information about the distant past which neither can be falsified nor 
has an argumentative structure, it has a certain usefulness though. In the second book of Republic, 
Socrates suggests that an education must use both muthos and logos but first of the false, that is, 
muthos (376e6-377a8). In the Sophist, myth is accepted as a discourse which gives information 
about facts or events in the past (262c9-d7), it is an interweaving of verbs and nouns (261e-262d). 
Muthos belongs to the sensible world and has a value insofar as it participates in the world of 
intelligible forms. Consequently, in this paper I will try to figure out the importance of muthos for 
Plato. What are their proper functions, what value of truth can be assigned to them? Are mthys 
accepted as poetic or philosophical discourses? 
 
 
Paul Carelli, University of North Florida 
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“Psychic Representation in Plato’s Phaedrus” 
 
Abstract: Psychic Representation in Plato’s Phaedrus 
The three parts of the soul in the Myth of the Charioteer are most often understood to correspond 
to the three parts of the soul in the Republic, with the charioteer representing the rational part of the 
soul, the good horse the spirited part and the bad horse the appetites. Such an interpretation, 
however, is at odds both with the suggestion at the end of the Republic that the soul is a unity when it 
is free of the body and with the creation of the human soul in the Timaeus, where the soul receives 
its spirited and appetitive parts only after embodiment. Further, this interpretation causes problems 
with the elements of the Myth of the Charioteer itself. In this paper I argue that it is better to 
understand the elements in the Phaedrus myth as representing divisions within rational soul. 
Keywords: Plato, Phaedrus, soul 
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“Rehabilitating Aquinas' psychological model of the Trinity” 
 
In his Summa Contra Gentiles(Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles (4.26.6; 4.11.13; 4.19.7–12.), 
Aquinas presents a development of Augustine's psychological model of the Trinity, whereby the 
Father is to the Son and the Holy Spirit as a perfect knower is to his self-knowledge through his act 
of knowing. William Lane Craig (2009) critiques this model as not implying the subsistence of 
multiple persons in the Godhead. I attempt to rehabilitate the analogy in the light of recent 
developments in analytic epistemology and phenomenology. More specifically, I argue that there is a 
type of non-conceptual or experiential knowledge of oneself that can only be had from a second 
person perspective. Thus if God has perfect self-knowledge then he must experience himself as both 
an 'I' and a 'You,' which implies that there must be multiple subjects of experience within the 
Godhead. Any omniscient being must exist in an I-Thou relationship with his/herself. 
 
 
Aiste Celkyte, University of St Andrews 
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“The Stoic Argument ‘That Only The Beautiful is The Good’” 
 
The Stoic Argument ‘That Only The Beautiful is The Good’  
In this paper, I reconstruct and analyse an often-overlooked Stoic syllogism designed to prove that 
only the beautiful (to kalon) is the good. Although Cato in Cicero’s On Ends describes this 
argument as only an auxiliary proof to the standard Stoic thesis that the only good is virtue and the 
original form of this argument is not at all clear, these difficulties ought not to prevent us from 
studying this piece of material further. This material, on the contrary, is very promising evidence for 
Stoic ideas of beauty and ethics, because it not only contains an argument about a relationship 
between the good and the beautiful, but also shows how ideas of beauty were embedded in Stoic 
philosophy. 
There are two main obstacles to analysing this argument. The first is that there is conflicting 
evidence about the form of the original syllogism. The body of the argument typically consists of a 
varying number of propositions connected by the similarity of terms used (ex., what is good is 
praiseworthy, what is praiseworthy is beautiful; therefore, good is beautiful), but the sources that 
record the argument do not specify how the propositions of this syllogism are linked or what the 
precise significance of the conclusion is.  
There are two different interpretations of the implications of this argument in ancient sources, 
which constitutes the second problem I address in this paper. Diogenes Laertius and Seneca offer 
different interpretations of this argument. Diogenes claims that this argument is a statement of 
equivalence of the good and the beautiful. Seneca, meanwhile, claims that there is a distinction 
between the good and the beautiful.  
I suggest that these two problems are related and that by determining what the original form of the 
argument might have been, it is possible to determine whether Diogenes or Seneca interprets the 
implications of the argument more accurately. In order to do this, I compare all the surviving 
versions of the argument and determine its logical form. I propose that originally the argument most 
likely had a modus ponens form. From this, I argue that the form of this argument shows that it 
cannot be an equivalence statement, as Diogenes interprets it. Instead, Seneca’s reading, which 
suggests that the argument is an attributive statement, picks out the original intentions of the 
argument much more clearly. Then I suggest that such an interpretation of the argument is also in 
sync with other common Stoic beliefs.  
Finally, I argue that the important implication of the way in which this argument conceptualises 
beauty is the distinction of beauty as the actual good from only seeming goods. The reconstruction 
of the obscure argument provides much information about one of the ways in which the Stoics 
conceptualised beauty and relationship between the beautiful and the good. This syllogism reveals 
that Stoic ideas about beauty were sophisticated, complex and deserving much more scholarly 
attention than they have received so far. 
 
 
Rose Cherubin, George Mason University 
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“The Eleatics and Aristotle's Sciences” 
 
Aristotle’s account of sciences (epistēmai) in general, and his investigations into physical sciences in 
particular, reflect attention to Eleatic concerns in several ways.  
On the one hand, in Physics I.2-3 he portrays Parmenides and Melissus as working outside the scope 
of phusikē, and arguably outside the scope of epistēmē as Aristotle understands it (he charges that 
the premises he associates with them prevent one from learning what what-is is, 187a5ff.). In Physics 
VI and VIII, he strives to produce an account of motion that does not fall to Zeno’s paradoxes of 
motion. In general, Aristotle accepts neither the ontological claims nor the arguments that he 
attributes to the Eleatics. 
On the other hand, Aristotle adopts and develops several key epistemological points that can be 
found in the Eleatics, especially Parmenides. Some of these he explicitly associates with Parmenides 
or Melissus (as e.g. at De caelo 298b). Others appear without reference to predecessors. Examples 
include the reasoning behind the multiplicity of approaches to the question of whether what is can 
come to be or perish (De caelo and De generatione et corruptione); and the accounts of the 
distinctions among sciences and between “special sciences” and the “science of being qua being” 
(Metaphysics IV and Posterior Analytics I).  
I will examine these passages in light of Parmenides’ goddess’s account of the requisites of inquiry 
and (time permitting) Zeno’s and Melissus’ argument-forms. While Aristotle’s account of epistēmē 
shares much with Parmenides’ account of inquiry, questions arise as to whether the assumptions that 
enable “special sciences” in general, and epistēmai concerning things that appear to move in 
particular, also compromise inference. 
 
 
Suk Choi, Towson University 
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“Neo-Confucian Discussion on Dao (道) and Aesthetic Value” 
 
The aim of this paper is to compare Neo-Confucian perspective on aesthetic values with moralism 
in contemporary aesthetics, focusing on Zhu Xi’s view of the relation between Dao (道) and wen (
文literature). For this aim, I will note two points: 1) a tension between autonomism (the moral 
qualities and defects of artworks are never aesthetically relevant.) and moralism (the intrinsic moral 
flaws of an artwork can be evaluated as aesthetic flaws) in recent debates on aesthetic and ethical 
values. 2) Zhu Xi’s position as an exemplar of Neo-Confucian ethical criticism of art and a possible 
role of his aesthetic view in recent debates. Some contemporary leading aestheticians, who recognize 
that ethically concerned criticism of art has been neglected in contemporary aesthetic discourses, 
have been developing their arguments on the relationship between ethical and aesthetic values. I 
note two assumptions of their arguments; 1) They support aesthetic cognitivism (a crucial aesthetic 
value of some artworks lies in what they can teach us); 2) They focus mainly on the relationship 
between artwork and its appreciators. In the Sung period when different intellectual traditions such 
as Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, were lively inter-exchanged, Neo-Confucian scholars 
learned and experienced a broad range of diverse perspectives on Dao, human beings, mind, 
emotion, and the universe. They developed their contemplations of those issues and applied them to 
their reading and writing of literary works. Through an examination of Zhu Xi’s view as an exemplar 
of Neo-Confucian aesthetic theory and practice, I will argue that; 1) He would agree with recent 
ethical criticism and aesthetic cognitivism, asserting that the relationship between Dao and literary 
works should be the most central question in understanding literature; 2) For this reason, he is 
concerned with the method of research, self-cultivation, and writing from the standpoints of both 
writer and reader. 
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“Is Place a Partial Formal Cause?” 
 
At 208b9-12 and at 20-23 in Chapter 1 of Book IV of the Physics, Aristotle says that place has a 
certain potency (τινὰ δύναμιν/τῇ δυνάμει). Many interpreters have attempted to understand what 
Aristotle means when he says that place has a certain potency or influence. For example, W. D. Ross 
claims that, “The proper place of a body, according to Aristotle, has an actual influence on it; an 
attractive influence which draws the body to it” (Aristotle: Physics 563). More recently, in his book 
On Location: Aristotleʼs Concept of Place, Benjamin Morrison has rejected the thought that place 
has an attractive influence on bodies. Instead, Morrison claims that the potency of place can be 
found in the fact that places are "partial formal causes" insofar as places appear, in part, in the 
definition of the simple bodies (On Location 51). However, attributing places with the status of 
partial formal causes seems to contradict Aristotle's assertion that places are none of the four causes 
(Physics 209a18-22). This paper investigates the potency of places and shows that, against Morrison, 
places should not be understood as partial (or full) formal causes. 
 
 
Graziana Ciola, Scuola Normale Superiore 
“Modalities, Consequentiae, and Scientific Knowledge: Logical and Natural Necessity in John 
Buridan” 
 
Modern discussions of medieval modalities tend to separate into two paths: the one, 
ontological/metaphysical; the other, technically logical. The connection between these two paths is 
deep, appears to be fundamental, and to run both ways: it might be deceptive or plainly wrong to try 
to deal with one without any consideration of the other. 
 On the one hand, every logical analysis or employment of modalities presupposes an interpretation 
of modal concepts i.e. a conception of modalities, a modal paradigm (statistical, diachronic, 
synchronic…) that rightfully belongs to the first path. Furthermore, the distinction, the analyses, and 
the discussions of a logical notion of necessity/possibility vs. a natural one have rightfully a foot on 
both paths. Broadly, the way we think about modalities conditions what we do in modal logic and its 
technical developments. 
On the other hand, the ontological/metaphysical path is in turn affected by the logical one in 
various ways and at a multiplicity of levels. In general, logical techniques are largely used as a tool in 
the analyses of ontological, theological, philosophical questions. Such instruments are not neutral 
with respect to the analysis itself: they give a direction to the philosophical enquiring and they have 
in turn to be calibrated on it i.e. what we try to do with them affects the way we conceive them.  
With this kind of framework in the background, I will take John Buridan as a case study. Taking 
modal paradigms as a guiding thread, I shall examine the interaction between the two paths we have 
delineated by focusing on the role played by modal notions in Buridan’s theory of consequentiae and 
in his natural philosophy. 
If we ask ourselves “What is Buridan’s take on modal paradigms?”, we find a twofold answer. 
On the one hand, modal notions are an essential component in the medieval development of 
consequentiae under two aspects at least: the quite traditional notion of necessitas ex hypothesis and 
the recurring modal element in the widespread Chrysippean and Abelardian definitions of 
conditional. Buridan deals with such matters in his analyses of consequentiae, giving also a 
systematization of the modal inferences and of modal syllogistic. In this kind of properly logical 
context, he embraces a synchronic modal paradigm. 
On the other hand, the modal paradigm he embraces in natural philosophy is the more traditional 
statistical model. This appears to be a justified and unproblematic choice to treat natural necessity as 
it came to be defined since the late XII century.  
Yet, Buridan employs a great deal of logical tools and logically interesting concepts (consequentiae, 
suppositio naturalis, an analysis of Universal affirmative propositiones as conditionals) while 
working on  natural philosophy; and his stand on natural necessity results not so straightforward: in 
some cases, some natural principles can be formulated as conceptual necessities simpliciter. 
Therefore, a closer analysis of modal notions and logical tools in Buridan’s natural philosophy and a 
comparison with his positions in logic might be a good starting point to examine the dialectic 
between the two paths delineated in dealing with such questions as: how do the logical instruments 
condition the matters they are applied to analyse? And, vice versa, how does the application affect 
the conceptual definition of the formal tool?  What is the relationship among ontological 
presuppositions, logical theories, and logical applications? 
 
 
Alison Coombs, Binghamton University 
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“Moral cultivation and the self in Arisotelian and Early Buddhist Thought” 
 
Aristotle’s account of persons starts from a fairly general point of being hylomorphic body-soul 
compounds, which we share with all living things. As he enumerates the different functions of the 
soul, we get a pretty clear picture of human beings in general as unique with respect to many 
intellectual and social capacities. In particular, it seems that human capacities are largely directed and 
promoting individual flourishing. In this sense, the any account of persons as selves seems to be in 
this moral context, and not in any other sense. However, if we look at Aristotle’s account in light of 
Buddhist metaphysics of substances and selves, we can see how the various functions of the soul 
might be said to contribute to an account of selves that is compatible with the Buddhist account.  
Early Buddhists give an account of the self that corresponds, more or less directly, to the causal 
account they give of substances more generally. This gives rise to a connection between their 
understanding of the role of the self and the role of substance in moral cultivation and perfection. 
Namely, their account involves dissolving the sense of both self and substance (and, not surprisingly, 
the self as substance) as ultimately real. They contrast this with a sense of the self and substances as 
conventionally real, which their account of these things lends itself to quite readily. Interestingly, the 
parts of living things, especially persons, in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and De Anima correspond relatively 
closely to the five components or skandhas that, according to early Buddhist metaphysical accounts, 
make up the self. However, looking at the Aristotelian person in light of the Buddhist metaphysics 
of self allows us to see the self in Aristotle as more well-developed. Looking at selves in this way also 
allows us to see some compatibilities and tensions between Buddhist and Aristotelian accounts of 
morality and self-cultivation. 
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“Action Theory in the Nicomachean Ethics” 
 
The still-young discipline of action theory or philosophy of action owes, to a proportionally greater 
extent than possibly any other field in contemporary philosophy—history of philosophy of course 
excepted—very much to direct reading of Aristotle. By way of example, we have the work of 
G.E.M. Anscombe, who made explicit and lengthy references to Aristotle in her paper “Modern 
Moral Philosophy” and even more so in her book Intention, both founding texts for the philosophy 
of action, and that of Donald Davidson, who claimed Aristotle’s support in his paper “Actions, 
Reasons, and Causes,” which is another founding text for the discipline. This attention and the 
attention paid to Aristotle by later generations of action theorists are neither undeserved nor 
unfruitful. On the contrary, it has been a vital force in the development of the discipline, both in the 
sense of irreplaceability and vivification. It is, however, still vulnerable to the caution offered by 
David Wiggins in his paper “Deliberation and Practical Reason:” there remains “the difficulty of 
finding a perspective or vantage point, over a philosophical terrain still badly understood, from 
which to view Aristotle’s theory.” 
 I wish in this paper to offer a preliminary outline of such a vantage point for the 
Nicomachean Ethics, which is the subject of the majority of contemporary commentary in the 
philosophy of action. I take as my point of departure the certainly not unprecedented observation 
that Aristotle nowhere gives a systematic treatment of action. There are passages which treat kinds 
of action, or action considered under a certain aspect, but never simply action. One upshot of this, 
which is again not unnoticed by contemporary thinkers, is that the exegete interested in learning 
from Aristotle on the subject of action must be prepared to undertake a lengthy and careful exegesis, 
one which takes him far beyond the confines of Aristotle’s ethical works. I submit, however, that 
there is another conclusion which may be drawn and subsequently utilized as an interpretive 
principle: It need not, and should not, be assumed that Aristotle gives the same sense to what is 
translated “action” (usually praxis) in the Nicomachean Ethics as contemporary action theorists; 
instead, his intended sense, along with its degree of consonance with the contemporary, must first 
be determined before attempting to apply his findings today. 
 I shall first undertake to show that it is likely that Aristotle gives “action” a different sense 
than the contemporary by means of some remarks on Aristotle’s project in the Nicomachean Ethics. 
Next, I shall undertake to show that it is impossible that the senses should be identical by means of a 
close examination of a few passages. Finally, I shall show the fruitfulness of the above principle by 
applying it to passages which some contemporary exegetes find problematic and showing that the 
problem disappears with its application. 
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“Plato on Contemplation as Internal Action” 
 
Based on a non-merely analogical interpretation of the city-soul analogy, I will articulate a sense in 
which, for Plato, the contemplative life is at the same time the most practical. Contemplation is the 
activity by means of which both cities and souls rearrange the political relations among their internal 
parts. Just as cities become internally harmonious through the activity of philosopher-kings, souls 
become internally harmonious through the activity of contemplation. In so far as contemplation is 
the principle of the soul's internal harmony and, hence, of the virtues, it is not only a theoretical 
activity but a practical one; it is, indeed, the most practical one. The city provides us with a model 
writ-large of the process by which this is possible. Contemplation, I will conclude, is an internal 
action of the soul, an action whose nature is political but its object is not external but internal. 
Aristotle confirms it in Pol. VII, 3, where he affirms that the happiness of the state consists in the 
activity that is more complete, self-sufficient and for its own sake, i.e. contemplation. 
 
 
Antonis Coumoundouros, Adrian College 
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“Plato on Laughter and Humor” 
 
Plato on Laughter and Humor. 
Contemporary theorists of humor argue that Plato was the most influential critic of humor and 
laughter in the western philosophical tradition.  Following him, the tradition has mostly negative 
things to say about laughter and humor.  These theorists place Plato’s view on laughter and humor 
under superiority theory: laughter and humor are expressions of feelings of superiority over others.  
Plato seems to have two main objections to laughter and humor.  In the Republic, Socrates wants to 
prevent poetry from causing the guardians to laugh violently since violent laughter deprives one of 
his capacity to reason well (388e).  In the Philebus, Socrates claims that laughter is malicious (48-50). 
When we laugh we do so at another person's self-ignorance which is a vice and thus we delight 
immorally in another person's vice.  In this paper, I argue that such an interpretation of Plato’s view 
of laughter and humor is mistaken since it fails to account for the fact that Plato uses various forms 
of humor in the dialogues with the purpose of causing laughter or amusement in the reader.  After I 
examine the several passages in which Plato discusses laughter and humor (in Republic, Philebus, and 
Laws) and some of the main usages of humor used in the dialogues, such as Socratic irony, I argue 
that Plato thought there is much in laughter and humor that is morally acceptable and 
philosophically useful. 
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“The Errors of the Virtuous” 
 
“The Errors of the Virtuous” 
Anna Cremaldi, Appalachian State University 
Surprisingly, Aristotle’s virtuous person makes mistakes.  In the discussion of liberality, for example, 
Aristotle attributes to the liberal person a tendency towards giving so excessively that “he leaves too 
little for himself” (1120b4-6).  Similarly, in his discussion of good temper, Aristotle remarks that the 
good-tempered man too readily forgives the people who have offended him (1125b35-1126a3).  The 
claim that the virtuous person tends to err is problematic, first of all, because it conflicts with 
Aristotle’s view that the virtuous person cannot willingly perform a non-virtuous action.  Second, 
the claim also conflicts with the very notion of Aristotelian virtue, since the virtuous person does 
not, insofar as she is virtuous, have tendencies towards excess or deficiency.  Commentators have 
solved the problem of the error-prone virtuous person in two ways.  According to the first view, 
defended by Howard Curzer, virtue is a disposition to hit the mean for the most part.  According to 
a second view, defended by Shane Drefcinski, virtue is a disposition to hit the mean in the ideal case, 
so that Aristotle’s definition of virtue in NE II.6 describes a moral ideal, rather than an actual 
virtuous person. But these solutions assume that these errors are expressions of imperfection in the 
state of virtue.  Rather, I claim, the errors of the virtuous person are expressions of virtue.  To 
defend this interpretation, I argue that Aristotle’s virtuous person commits errors in cases involving 
what Aristotle calls the ‘natural goods’ (ta phusei agatha).  I draw on Aristotle’s discussion of natural 
goods in NE IX.9 and EE 8.3 to show that the virtuous person will set aside her claim on natural 
goods when giving up those natural goods gives her the greater share of the kalon. Thus, while the 
virtuous person appears to be making errors of negligence regarding the natural goods, she is, in 
fact, exercising her virtue fully by pursuing what is most consistent with the kalon.  My reading not 
only resolves an interpretive controversy, it also sheds light on the important and neglected topic of 
natural goods in Aristotle’s ethical theory. 
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“Significative Supposition and Ockham's Rule” 
 
Paul Spade argues that there is a tension between Ockham’s descriptions of the various types of 
supposition at Summa Logicae (SL) I.64 and a rule he provides at SL I.65.  According to Ockham's 
Rule, a term can have material or simple supposition in a proposition if the other extreme is a term 
of second imposition or intention respectively.  But if a term supposits significatively (i.e. personally) 
just in case it supposits for something it signifies, and material and simple supposition are non-
significative, then 'noun' cannot supposit materially in 'Noun is a written word', despite the fact that 
'written word' is a term of second imposition.  A similar problem arises, with respect to simple 
supposition, when we consider the supposition of 'concept' in 'Concept is a species'.  In later papers, 
Spade proposes a solution: a term supposits significatively just in case it supposits for everything it 
signifies.  I evaluate Spade’s proposal and explore some of its implications.  I show that it 
successfully resolves the tension and that it suggests a way to more precisely describe material and 
simple supposition.  Material supposition occurs when a conventional term supposits for itself only, 
and simple supposition occurs when a conventional term supposits for its superordinate natural 
term only.  Besides the fact that the proposal resolves the tension, Spade does not provide any 
evidence to suggest that Ockham maintains it.  I argue that Ockham maintains the proposal 
(perhaps implicitly) by showing that his theory implies it.  In doing so, I raise and refute two 
potential objections.  According to the first, the proposal implies that syncategorematic and empty 
categorematic terms always supposit personally.  According to the second, exceptive propositions 
provide counterexamples to the proposal.  Finally, I highlight and discuss a controversial result:  self-
signifying conventional terms can supposit materially.  I argue that this result makes for a more 
satisfying theory. 
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“The Matter of the Elements” 
 
At De Gen. et Cor. II.1 Aristotle says that there is some matter of the perceptible bodies, and that it 
is from this that the so-called elements come to be (329a24-6). What this seems to suggest is that the 
elements fire, air, water, and earth are not the most fundamental kinds of matter that Aristotle 
recognises, for there is a ‘matter of the elements’, in the sense of a matter that composes the 
elements. In this paper I want to argue that that is not the case. I shall argue that there is scope in 
Aristotle’s texts for an interpretation that accommodates both the claim that the four so-called 
elements are the most fundamental kinds of matter, and the claim that there is some matter from 
which the elements come to be, which is other than, but common to, the elements. In other words, I 
do not believe that the acceptance of the latter claim threatens the elementary status of the so-called 
elements fire, air, water, and earth.  
A key distinction to which I shall appeal in this paper is that between the ways in which one thing 
may be said to be ‘from’ (ek) another. If we say, for instance, that ‘A is from B’, then we might 
intend that A is from B in the sense that B is that out of which A is made, or composed; 
alternatively, we might intend that B is the source or origin or principle of, or the starting point in 
the change that leads to, A. The distinction is important because, whereas with the former use of 
‘from’, B is a constituent of A, with the latter, B need not be, and generally is not, a constituent of A 
(Metaph. XIV.5, 1092a29-30). Let’s call this a distinction between ‘constitutive’ and ‘non-
constitutive’, or ‘originative’, uses of ‘from’. In this paper I intend to argue that the elements come 
to be from the matter of the perceptible bodies according to the second use of ‘from’. In other 
words, the elements come to be from (ek) some matter, in the sense that they emerge from this 
matter, or are generated from it; the matter is, as it were, the origin of the elements, but it does not 
persist as material constituent of the elements. It is not, then, the matter ‘of’ the elements in the 
constitutive sense of ‘that of which each of the elements is composed’, or ‘made of’. But what is this 
matter? It is precisely what Aristotle says it is, i.e., the matter of the perceptible bodies, understood 
as the matter of familiar composite substances; in other words, it is itself something that comes to 
be from the elements (that is, in the constitutive use of ‘from’). 
I believe that the rather novel interpretation I propose is supported by the textual evidence; it is 
consistent with key principles of Aristotle’s system; and, moreover, it defuses a number of problems 
in Aristotle’s De Gen. et Cor. 
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“Plato's Rejection of the Instrumental Account of Friendship in the Lysis” 
 
In the Lysis, Socrates argues that friendship is always motivated by a desire to use others for one’s 
own gain (210b-d), and some commentators take Socrates to be speaking for Plato on this point. By 
contrast, I shall argue that the Lysis is a reductio ad absurdum of this instrumental account of 
friendship.   First, Socrates reaches the counterintuitive conclusion that good people cannot befriend 
each other (214b-215c). The natural way to avoid this conclusion is to abandon the premise that 
friendship is instrumental.  Second, Socrates shows that unlike love, friendship must be mutual 
(212b-d). Socrates later argues that neither-good-nor-bad people and good people can befriend each 
other (216c-217a). But neither-good-nor-bad people are not useful to good people. Again the 
instrumental account of friendship should be abandoned.   Third, Socrates distinguishes between 
people who are desirable because they are useful, and “true friends” who are desirable for their own 
sake (219c-220b). This is an explicit rejection of the instrumental account of friendship.  Finally, 
Socrates shows that equating “desire for someone” with “wanting to use that person to improve 
oneself” leads to the absurd implication that someone who is truly loved must reciprocate. This is 
yet another reason to reject the instrumental account of friendship. 
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“Aristotle’s Empirical Foundationalism in the Posterior Analytics” 
 
There are two dominant approaches to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics [PA]. The latter admits of 
competing interpretations. The main split is between those who believe it is a predominantly non-
epistemological project concerned with something other than knowledge and those who believe it is 
an epistemological project concerned with ‘scientific’ or ‘intellectual’ knowledge. Those who assume 
that there is an epistemological project in the PA debate whether it is empiricist or rationalist in 
nature. Even approaches that combine empiricism and rationalism raise questions of primacy.  This 
work supports the empiricist reading. It argues that, at minimum, Aristotle has an empirical 
foundationalist epistemology in the PA. Aristotle’s epistemological project begins with an empirical 
knowledge base on which all further knowledge depends: perceptual data. His epistemological 
project is accordingly fundamentally empirical at its outset, even if acquisition of some types of 
further knowledge depends on rational processes. Once this position is clear, the piece goes on to 
suggest that this picture is not as implausible as it may seem at the outset as it has some broad 
consistency with modern epistemological viewpoints. The strong principle of charity often applied 
to Aristotle can be applied to the empirical foundationalist reading. 
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“Starting Points of Inquiry in the Nicomachean Ethics” 
 
Many scholars have regarded the methodological passage (1145b1-7) prefacing Aristotle's discussion 
of akrasia as articulating the “diaporetic” method by which the entire Nicomachean Ethics proceeds.  It 
is often supposed that the method proposed in this passage involves two central claims: (1) the goal 
of ethical inquiry is reach true beliefs about happiness, virtue, friendship, pleasure, and other matters 
relevant to the good life; and (2) this goal is always achieved by first identifying the relevant ethical 
phenomena, then raising difficulties concerning those phenomena, and then resolving dialectically 
those difficulties in a way that preserves as many of the reputable beliefs about the phenomena 
(endoxa) as possible.   
 A recently growing minority of scholars have rightly argued that the “political science” 
(epistēmē politikē, 1094b11) presented in the Nicomachean Ethics does not, in fact, follow the 
diaporetic method, but rather conforms to the structure of demonstrable scientific inquiry discussed 
in the Posterior Analytics.  As with any epistēmē, the Nicomachean Ethics begins by showing the 
existence of its subject matter – in this case the human good, or happiness.  Having identified its 
subject matter, the text then proceeds to gain an understanding of it.  This understanding is acquired 
through definition.  First a nominal definition is given (to eu prattein: A.4, 1095a19-20), and then an 
essential definition (cf. An. Post. B.8, 93b29-32) is reached through the “function argument” (A.6, 
1097b22ff).  The remainder of the Nicomachean Ethics then seeks to articulate this conception of the 
good human life by defining each of the moral and intellectual virtues, as well as ancillary ethical 
concepts like friendship and pleasure. 
 This reading of the Nicomachean Ethics has led a number of scholars to hold the claim that 
that the starting points for political science are, as in all sciences, “the facts” (ta hoti; cf. Post. An. 
B.1, 89b25-31; NE A.4, 1095b3-7).  This, however, is a misunderstanding.  Although the Nicomachean 
Ethics indeed presents a political science, the starting points of inquiry are not scientific facts, but 
rather dialectical premises, as defined in the Topics.  The text is intended to guide listeners  from 
premises they would accept to conclusive definitions of ethical concepts like happiness, virtue, and 
so forth.  In order to serve this didactic purpose, Aristotle must present his ethical definitions in a 
way that begins from dialectical premises that are more familiar (gnōrimōteron) to his audience (NE 
A.4, 1095b3-4; cf. An. Post. A.2, 71b20-72a6; Met. Z.4, 1029b3-12). 
 In order to help correct this misunderstanding, this paper will offer a close reading of the 
four passages most often adduced as examples of where Aristotle either (a) makes a methodological 
remark about employing facts as starting points, or (b) appeals to “facts” rather than endoxa in order 
to reach or confirm definitions of ethical concepts: A.7, 1098a33-b8; A.8, 1098b9-11; I.12, 1172b4-7; 
and K.8, 1179a16-19.  It will be argued that when these passages are understood in their contexts, 
none of them do, in fact, refute the claim that the starting points for inquiry in the Nicomachean Ethics 
are dialectical premises. 
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paul.dirado@uky.edu 
“The Normative Structures of Judgment in Plato's "Theaetetus"” 
 
In the "Theaetetus," Plato critiques what would now be described as a representationalist account of 
knowledge. In this paper, I will argue that Plato’s critique reveals that judgment has an implicit 
normative structure. These norms are the standards that the soul uses to reach concrete 
determinations concerning the concepts it considers in judgment, but they are not themselves 
concepts or representations. Thus, on Plato’s account, representationalism overlooks the very non-
representational normative structures that allow judgment to operate in the way that 
representationalist accounts presuppose. 
Plato arrives at this conclusion as a result of investigating whether Theaetetus’ second definition of 
knowledge is capable of accounting for the possibility of falsehood. Theaetetus claims that 
knowledge is true judgment (doxa), where judgments are formed when the soul calculates the non-
perceptual features of its various perceptual experiences. Theaetetus understands this calculation as a 
kind of comparison—experience leaves behind certain markers or concepts in the soul that 
represent past experience, and the soul forms judgments by matching these concepts with other 
concepts and present experiences. However, for this account of judgment to succeed, it must be the 
case that the soul knows these concepts, as the soul cannot make determinations about something it 
doesn’t know. This account seems to make falsehood impossible, however, because it is unclear how 
the soul could ever make incorrect determinations about something it knows.  
Socrates attempts to explicate how such falsehood is possible by presenting the representationalist 
images of the waxen blocks and the aviary. These images, the aviary in particular, demonstrate the 
existence of an intermediate stage between knowing and not knowing a concept. The soul can 
possess some concept without actively applying that concept in a given situation. Though this 
solution resolves one version of the problem of falsehood, both images make it clear that the 
concepts formed from experience are in principle separable from the experience that those concepts 
are intended to represent. The waxen block image shows that nothing necessitates that the 
Theaetetus waxen block be matched up with the present perception of Theaetetus, since it could just 
as readily get applied to the perception of Theodorus. Similarly, in the aviary the soul does not have 
to choose the representative concept of “12” when attempting to add 5+7, as the 11 “bird” can just 
as readily be selected as the 12 “bird.” The correctness of a given match between representative 
concept and phenomenon thus requires that the soul grasp some normative standard in addition to 
the representational concept. This normative standard would govern the application of the concept 
to the thing. However, if this norm is itself one of the representations present in the soul, an infinite 
regress emerges—the application of that representation would require some further governing 
norm. Thus, the norms governing judgment cannot themselves be representations and must be 
explanatorily prior to the acquisition of knowledge via experience. 
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“Thomas Aquinas on Persons” 
 
Nowadays the concept of person is widely supposed to be of central importance to both 
metaphysics and ethics—metaphysics insofar as ‘person’ is thought to indicate a peculiar class of 
beings with certain properties, and ethics insofar as being a person is thought to grant special moral 
status or consideration. But the history of this concept is obscure, both in its definition and in its 
implications. One important figure that can throw light on both facets is Thomas Aquinas, who (like 
his contemporaries) discusses the meaning of persona largely in connection to Trinitarian doctrine, 
but also (unlike his contemporaries) suggests linking the word to societal status, jurisprudence, and 
dignity vis-à-vis the rest of nature. 
The paper will proceed in three stages. The first is to dispel certain mischaracterizations of Thomas’s 
concept: ‘person’ does not pick out the soul-body (or so-called ‘hylomorphic’) unity; ‘person’ as such 
is not specially related to morality; Thomas’s association of ‘person’ with dignity is unlike the 
contemporary expression, “the dignity of the person.” The second is an argument that the concept 
in Thomas does not indicate a metaphysical class, ‘persons,’ of which (say) human beings, angels, 
and God are all members. This is due to the priority of nature over person in Thomas’s Boethian 
formula, and the determination of the latter by the former. The third is an exposition of a few 
neglected texts in Thomas that link ‘person’ with the use of persona in the medieval jurists, and the 
implications of these texts for our understanding of ‘person’ in historical perspective. 
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“Mimetic Sympathy in Aristotle's Poetics” 
 
While Aristotle makes clear in the Poetics that a blending of pity and fear with pleasure is central to 
tragedy’s proper effect – and indeed, much of the text is devoted to the proper composition of 
dramatic structure to this end – it is decidedly less clear how this overall effect is brought about in 
terms of the psychology of the spectators.  For such blending implies a psychological contradiction:  
in Woodruff’s words, “The poet must make us respond to events represented on stage as if they are 
actually happening, so as to evoke fear and pity, and as if they are not, so as to cause pleasure rather 
than pain.”  This complex state, wherein we are seduced into feeling with and for fictional 
personages as if they were real, and which Skulsky refers to as the work’s “almost hypnotic 
domination of consciousness” on the part of the audience, is only mentioned in passing in Poetics 6, 
under the somewhat mystical term ‘psychagōgia’.  Yet even more vexing for the modern reader, who 
would be inclined to explain such experience with reference to the imagination, is the fact that 
Aristotle nowhere invokes phantasia in his extensive treatment of poetic mimesis.  This paper 
undertakes the speculative project of tracing out an implicit connection between phantasia (as 
discussed in De Anima 3 and the Rhetoric) and psychagōgia in relation to mimetic representations in 
order to account for just what it is, beyond the necessary rational comprehension, that the audience 
contributes to a tragic performance such that the latter can do its proper work. 
 
 
Maureen Eckert, UMASS Dartmouth 
meckert@umassd.edu 
“Assessing the Origin Myth of Western Philosophy” 
 
Is (Western) philosophy inherently agonistic?  Are intellectual contest and conflict the means to 
achieve philosophical truths?  And, further, are these aspects of philosophical practice exclusionary?  
Renewed debate regarding contemporary academic philosophy and exclusions found with respect to 
gender, race and class frequently refer to an Origin Myth located in ancient Greek philosophy.  
Plato’s depiction of Socratic dialogue, specifically the elenchus, is central in the origin myth 
establishing Western Philosophical discourse. The vast diversity of Pre-Socratic writing forms 
muddies this supposed paradigm-setting moment for what counts as philosophical discourse. 
However, further complexities arise, as Plato's works are, themselves, literary illusions of this 
paradigm setting moment. Plato engages in a form of historical fiction in dialogue, landing him 
squarely within the diversity of the "Pre-Socratic" writers (despite the fact that he wrote after 
Socrates).  The labeling of “Pre” and “Post” Socratic philosophy fails to do justice to the historical 
context and diversity of options available for philosophical expression.  The entrenched Origin Myth 
of Western Philosophy conceals its origins. To some extent, the agonistic model of philosophical 
practice, itself entrenched, generates this very occlusion as it relies on a selective interpretive method 
with respect to the source materials central to the Origin Myth.  Debates about present 
philosophical practices could be improved by either reflective, historically grounded assessment of 
our myths or even abandoning mythic justifications entirely. 
 
 
Ariane Economos, Marymount University 
arianeeconomos@gmail.com 
“An Aristotelian Approach to the Ethical Treatment of Animals” 
 
An Aristotelian Approach to the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
In this paper I argue that contemporary debates concerning the ethical treatment of animals would 
be greatly enriched if we were to utilize two elements of Aristotle’s philosophy, namely, (1) a 
teleological explanation of animals’ natural operations, and (2) an emphasis on the role of practical 
reason in ethical decision-making.  By combining these elements with a loose form of natural law, a 
new and fruitful starting-point emerges for addressing ethical concerns regarding the treatment of 
animals.  
The paper will begin by outlining some current ethical approaches concerning the treatment of 
animals (in particular, contractualist and utilitarian approaches), and I will argue that these 
approaches rely on unjustified assumptions about the mental states of animals.  I will then argue for 
my own view, namely, that we need not make any assumptions whatsoever about animals’ mental 
states in order to come up with a robust ethical position which can address how we ought and ought 
not to treat them.  Instead, we can develop such an ethical position solely by relying on the 
observation of: (1) the typical behavior of a species, (2) the typical behavior of an individual, or (3) 
both, depending on the ethical issue under consideration.  That is, we should observe how animals 
do tend to behave, and then treat them in such a manner that they are able to continue behaving in 
such a manner.  It is in this part of the paper that I will discuss how the roots of my view may be 
found in Aristotle’s discussion of teleology and Aquinas’s discussion of natural law.  
I will provide a few examples of the application of my view to particular cases, highlighting how it 
can make a similar case for the consideration of animals’ interests as do rights-based and utility-
based approaches, while avoiding some of these views’ pitfalls.  The benefits of adopting my 
approach will be shown in three ways: first, that it is in accord with some of our common intuitions 
about how we ought to treat animals; second, that it encourages us to make similar changes to the 
way we currently treat animals as do other ethical approaches, but without the baggage of 
assumptions about animals’ minds; and third, that it provides a response to one of the most 
common reasons people give for failing to act in an ethical manner toward animals, namely, that we 
“can’t really know” if they are suffering.  Finally, the paper will address some objections to my view. 
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“Virtue Embodied and Embedded” 
 
A central debate in ancient moral philosophy concerned the “sufficiency thesis”, according to which 
a life of virtuous activity is sufficient for happiness. In the ancient debate, the Stoics defended the 
thesis, while Aristotle and his followers rejected it, on the grounds that happiness requires certain 
bodily and external goods in addition, such as health, wealth, and friends. Despite the recent revival 
of interest in ancient virtue ethics, contemporary philosophers have not usually regarded the 
sufficiency thesis as open to serious discussion: they have tended to dismiss it as obviously 
implausible, and to assume that the ancient debate was effectively settled by Aristotle. In “Virtue 
Embodied and Embedded”, I argue that we should regard the ancient debate as far from settled, and 
that we should place the sufficiency thesis back on the agenda for contemporary virtue theory. In 
particular, I aim to provide a novel defense of the sufficiency thesis that allows us to combine the 
essential insights of the Stoic and Aristotelian positions while avoiding their respective limitations. 
 My argument begins by identifying the profound but usually neglected insight behind the 
sufficiency thesis. This insight is that as human beings, we are essentially agents of a certain sort, and 
therefore our happiness lies in what we make of our lives, rather than in anything that merely 
happens to us. The traditional problem for the sufficiency thesis, as Aristotle rightly pointed out, is 
that it seems to ignore the dependence of human happiness on the body and the world, and thus to 
deny our vulnerability to factors outside of our control. This problem has seemed to doom the 
sufficiency thesis, I argue, only because we tend to assume a particular conception of human agency, 
which I call “internalism about agency”. According to internalism, virtuous activity primarily consists 
in certain “inner” states, such as choosing or intending, and is essentially independent of anything 
bodily or worldly. In opposition to this internalist conception, I develop an alternative, externalist 
conception, according to which virtuous activity should be thought of as the successful performance 
of certain bodily and worldly actions. This externalist conception allows us to affirm the sufficiency 
thesis, while also acknowledging our vulnerability, since from an externalist perspective, our capacity 
to perform virtuous actions is itself subject to factors beyond our control.  
        I conclude by contrasting my argument with Daniel Russell’s recent attempt to revisit the 
ancient sufficiency debate. Russell and I agree that neither the Stoic nor the Aristotelian position is 
fully acceptable, and that a third alternative is needed. But we differ fundamentally over the shape of 
that alternative. Russell has proposed that the key to overcoming the ancient debate is to 
acknowledge that virtuous activity can be indexed to particular persons and relationships. By 
contrast, I argue that the fundamental assumption driving the ancient debate is internalism about 
agency, and that a successful alternative needs to begin from the thought that virtuous activity is not 
simply a matter of what we choose or intend, but of what we do. 
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“Truth and Temporality in Aristotle” 
 
Here I examine what Aristotle’s tensed notion of truth in conjunction with his metaphysics of time, 
in order to determine what can be truly (or falsely) said about things that existed in the past as well 
as things that don’t exist yet. Things that no longer exist, or that do not exist yet, are of different 
kinds, according to Aristotle: things that no longer exist (but once did) are definite, and we can 
represent them linguistically with statements that either correspond or don’t correspond to how they 
existed; things that do not yet exist, on the other hand, are a more difficult problem for logicians and 
philosophers of language, for what we can say of them depends on how we imagine a metaphysics 
of time. The problem of future contingents in De Interpretatione 9 tells us Aristotle’s views on what 
is possible for us to truly say about the future, limited by the contingency introduced by events that 
occur as a result of deliberation. What is true of the future is also clearly dependent on the concept 
of time Aristotle is working with, and how temporality is present in assertions (as a possibly truth-
functional element). I will begin by describing the problem of Aristotle’s future sea battle and how it 
has been traditionally interpreted, with more and less success, as describing Aristotle’s views on a 
possible exception to the Law of Excluded Middle, and as an attempt to define “contingency”. 
While much of the literature has been critical of Aristotle, I will defend his view and demonstrate its 
consistency with his ideas on time we find in the Physics. One problem with traditional 
interpretations is where we should locate temporality within an assertion. That is, where something 
does not exist yet, what is true to say of it or, more importantly, when is it true to say such things—
at the moment of utterance, or when the time to which we refer becomes the present time. In a 
third section, I will point out the relevant sections of Aristotle’s De Anima which indicate that 
temporality is not only evident in the copula or verb of an assertion but also in the complex 
affections of the soul to which we refer when we assert something of something. Where something 
no longer exists, it is possible to match up the times included in the subject and predicate if I were to 
say, for instance, “Socrates was a monster,”; for, if the temporal aspect of the thought I have of 
Socrates is that he existed in the past, the verb agrees in tense with the time included in my thought. 
If, however, I attempt to make a similar match up of a future subject with a future tense, there is 
nothing yet to which the subject term of my assertion refers—that is, I can have no accurate thought 
of Future Socrates or what he will be like, for the mere fact that I do not yet know him. 
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“Plotinus’ Metaphysical Foundation of Eternity in Intellect’s Completeness, Unity, And 
Immutability” 
 
Although there has been worthy discussion of Plotinus’ Ennead III.7 “Eternity and Time,” our 
understanding of his concept of eternity remains hazy.  Scholars have not formulated a clear, 
unequivocal definition of what precisely he means by eternity.  When the metaphysical 
underpinnings of eternity and Intellect’s intensity of being are taken into account, however, a much 
clearer definition can be formulated.  These allow eternity to be seen as a byproduct of Intellect’s 
changeless and complete way of existing rather than as a separate entity or independent reality.  
Incidentally, such an account has major impacts for Plotinus’s theory of time, but this latter theory 
has been better discussed and its proximity to our experience makes a clear definition less necessary 
for our understanding of his meaning.  Clarifying Plotinus’ theory of eternity will enrich our 
understanding of his theory of eternity, time and his broader metaphysical doctrines.  Additionally, it 
may help advance the contemporary debate on the nature of time by suggesting for debate a 
metaphysical underpinning for time.  This paper attempts to clarify what Plotinus means by eternity 
in an attempt to reach a well-defined statement of his notion.  I will conduct this analysis as follows.  
I examine III.7 to lay out a preliminary understanding of what Plotinus means by eternity.  This 
examination will include a brief discussion of time as a counterpoint to help understand eternity.  It 
will also show that temporality and eternity are each the consequence of being in a specific way.  A 
discussion of Intellect follows to show how Plotinus theory of the intellectual world strengthens, 
clarifies, and entails this or a similar concept of eternity.  Lastly, I examine contemporary discussions 
of his theory to show how the exposition of the first two analyses solves some major ambiguities.  I 
conclude that Plotinus sees eternity as the “temporal” analysis of Intellect’s way of being, of 
possessing its being all at once instead of spread out past, present, and future in a line, as it were, 
over the temporal dimension. 
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“Aristotle vs. Guthrie: The question of Philosophy's birth in relation to Africa” 
 
Did philosophy began in the 6th BC in Asia Minor, as the Western historiographers contend? We 
will consider this question from two contrasting perspectives, Aristotle's and that of Guthrie, as 
typical representatives of the Ancient Hellenic and Modern European approach, respectively.  By 
analyzing their respective arguments critically, we will expose their respect of truth and bias. 
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“Pletlho's Response to Aristotle's Critique of Platonic Ontology” 
 
Pletho’s Response to Aristotle’s Critique  
Of Platonic Ontology 
By 
Dr. Christos Evangeliou 
Professor of Philosophy 
Towson University, USA 
Abstract 
It is my purpose in this study to identify and discuss the major points on which Aristotle differs 
from Plato ontologically, in Pletho’s judgment, by critically presenting the main arguments of his 
sustained critique. It will be shown that these arguments are invariably favorable to Plato, because of 
the perceived imbalance in favor of Aristotle, at least in Western Europe and in the Scholastic era.  
In spite of his Platonic bias, it will become clear that, by pointing out fundamental differences 
between Plato and Aristotle, in their respective theories of being, as well as in other areas, Pletho’s 
critique accomplished its specific goal of reviving even briefly the Platonic philosophy in the Italian 
Renaissance. 
Our discussion will also make clear Pletho’s method of approach and the main target of his critique, 
which was Aristotle’s novel conception of being as a “πολλαχώς λεγόμενον.” In this sense, Pletho’s 
critique of Aristotle can be seen as a continuation of Plotinus’ critique of the Aristotelian ontological 
novelties, in defense of the divine Plato. 
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“On Teaching Plato's Republic as a Dialogue on the Education of the Soul” 
 
On Teaching Plato’s Republic as a Dialogue on the Education of the Soul 
 When I teach philosophy, I don’t tell students much in advance what they will find in the 
readings; instead I aim to help them to see the philosophers’ ideas revealed as we read the books 
together.  But Plato’s Republic presents special problems in setting out on this road: it is so rich in 
ideas as to seem labyrinthine, and students need some guiding thread to find their way through it; 
the Republic is a dialogue, not an essay or treatise, so that not only what is said, but who says it, to 
whom and at what time, are not dispensable and only add to the dialogue’s complexity; and Plato 
himself never speaks in his own voice, making attributions of theories or ideas to Plato risky.  Unless 
one has the time to study the entirety of the Republic, so that the dialogue in all its richness might be 
gradually revealed, one faces the problem of what parts of the dialogue to use.  This choice should 
be guided by some conception of what the Republic is about, but therein lies another problem: is it, as 
commonly believed and as the title suggests, a work primarily of political philosophy?  Is Plato 
presenting a sketch of a utopian state and a critique of lesser states?  Or is Plato a metaphysician 
presenting his theory of forms?  I suggest that we teach the dialogue differently, that its subject 
matter is the nature of the soul and what improves it.  This is clearly implied by the city-soul analogy 
and by Socrates’ remarks at the end of Book IX.  In order to support this reading I will focus on the 
character of Socrates, especially on his frequent expressions of doubt and his hesitancy about what 
he proposes.  As a philosopher who in his own terms is in doubt and still seeking the truth, we can 
better understand his frequent use of images, especially of the Good. The Republic, then, is essentially 
open and undogmatic: it is an image of the soul of the Socratic philosopher, ever seeking but not 
possessing wisdom, in dialogue with others about the very nature of the soul and what improves it, 
which allows us to ask whether Socratic dialogue really is an activity that improves the soul. 
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“The least serious music, and some others” 
 In Laws 2, the Stranger says "whenever someone says that pleasure is the criterion of music, we shall 
necessarily reject his statement, seeking such music as the least serious--if indeed such music can 
come to be, rather seeking that which carries along likeness (homiotita) to mimesis of the beautiful."  
This paper will try to answer two questions: Why does the Athenian Stranger consider it doubtful 
that a music that is “a harmless pleasure only” can even exist?  What does he mean in seeking art 
which “carries along likeness to mimesis of the beautiful”?  
   Our first question seems perfectly reasonable given the context of the remark we are questioning.  
Just before it, the stranger said, “in all things which are accompanied by some charm (charis) [isn’t] 
the most important or serious feature either this charm itself, alone, or a certain correctness, or 
third, the benefit?”  
   The second seems excessively verbose; the Stranger could more briefly consider what “carries 
along likeness to the beautiful (or good)” or “is a mimesis of the beautiful (or good)”? to state what 
is usually considered the Platonist point more precisely. 
   A careful reading of the scene will argue that the Stranger seems to want us to make a distinction 
between what he calls the eikastic and the mimetic aspects of a work of art.  Such a distinction 
allows us to answer these questions in a way which reveals that a judgment of the beautiful does not 
depend upon a pleasure engendered by the work having a correct relation to a thing, but rather a 
beneficial relation to the subject, the audience.  The judgment that a thing (or rather experience of it) 
is beautiful will include pleasure, but must also be distinct from the pleasant, for we will have seen 
how pleasure haunts every sort of soul—mad, prudent, well-trained, ill-raised as well as the arational 
child. This, in turn, allows us to see that there can be (against Kleinias) an incorrect but beneficial 
music--comedy.  The Stranger, then, is not himself concluding that “the poets are so inferior, as 
poets, to the Muses themselves.  The latter would never make a mistake like setting a man’s words to 
a woman’s color and tune, or like harmonizing the tune and postures of free men with the rhythms 
of slaves” (669c).  Rather this is what Kleinias must say given his incapacity to make the distinction 
the Stranger suggests.  The Stranger himself may praise a comedy that is full of such things, as 
Dionysus, in Frogs, exemplifies. 
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“Aristotle’s discussion of shame in the Nicomachean Ethics and in the Rhetoric” 
 
A preliminary question we have to ask with respect to Aristotle’s discussion of aischyne in the 
Rhetoric is whether this concept only partially overlaps with that particular segment of the emotional 
continuum that we would nowadays call shame. One related problem is that in Greek culture we 
cannot find a word corresponding to guilt. Scholars who characterize Greek culture as a culture of 
shame point out that, while for us guilt and shame are two interrelated concepts, the absence of the 
concept of guilt in classical philosophy and literature has significant moral relevance, and ought to 
play a role in our attempt to understand aidos/aischyne. A person feels guilt, the argument goes, 
with respect to her actions when she feels she may have wronged others. Guilt is an emotional 
response to moral responsibility. Shame, on the other hand, is not primarily related to an authentic 
concern for others; rather, it is a self-related emotion. We feel shame at our bad actions because they 
may endanger our good reputation. Others play a role only insofar as we care for their opinions. 
With respect to Aristotle’s conception of shame, the question is then if a concern for reputation may 
entail a concern for moral action and to what extent shame plays a role in the virtuous life.  
However, Aristotle speaks of shame not only in the Rhetoric (when he addresses the emotions), but 
also in the Nicomachean Ethics (where his focus is on virtue and vice), and he employs two different 
terms with slightly different meanings: in the Rhetoric he speaks of aischyne, while in the 
Nicomachean Ethics his focus is on aidos. Aidos and aischyne do not seem to refer to the same 
emotion. While aidos roughly corresponds to a prospective and inhibitory sense of shame for future 
actions, aischyne corresponds to the shame one feels for past actions.  
In this paper I am going to address both the possible distinction between aidos and aischyne in 
Aristotle’s work and the moral relevance of shame in Aristotle’s overall conception. With respect to 
the Nicomachean Ethics, I will concentrate on the reasons why Aristotle maintains that aidos can be 
helpful in the education to virtue but cannot itself be considered a virtue. With respect to the 
discussion of aischyne in the Rhetoric I will first address the relevance of temporality, and then 
focus on the role that witnesses are supposed to play with respect to shame. In the last part of the 
paper I will attempt to draw some conclusions with respect to guilt and shame. My claim is that on 
the one hand Aristotle attributes to shame certain functions that we would commonly attribute to 
guilt; on the other hand, however, I will also claim that shame for Aristotle covers a wider range of 
phenomena than we might be inclined to expect (not just actions for which an agent can be 
responsible, but also situations in which the agent plays no active role, or even events in which the 
subject suffers passively evil done by others), and that it would be wrong to interpret shame only in 
moral terms. The concept of shame that emerges from the reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric is related 
to guilt but wider and more complex than guilt. 
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“Lessons From De Anima I: The Argument from the Emotions” 
 
LESSONS FROM DE ANIMA I: 
The Argument from the Emotions 
Aristotle’s conception of the soul was radical in his day. His hylomorphic soul departed from the 
theories of his predecessors in terms of its purview, capacity to move, and inseparability from the 
body. Aristotle’s predecessors took movement and discrimination to be the chief characteristics of 
the soul, belonging to it in virtue of its nature. And as an operationally independent entity, the soul 
was ascribed a constitution distinct from the body.  Aristotle widens the purview of the soul by 
making it responsible for all natural activities of a living being. The result is that nutrition, growth, 
and reproduction come under the scope of the soul’s responsibilities, allowing him to group plants 
among the entities with souls on the condition that he can show it unmoved by its nature.  
Aristotle’s positive treatment of the soul appears in Book II and III of the De Anima. Book I 
prepares the reader for the innovations detailed in the later books by mining the views of his 
predecessors for valuable insights and engaging their positions to bring to light problems that must 
be avoided. The De Anima thus employs the dialectical method to arrive at and justify psychic truths. 
None of this should be new knowledge to anyone familiar with Aristotle’s psychology. Yet the 
dialectical nature of the De Anima is often treated as marginal or irrelevant for understanding 
Aristotle’s positive assertions in Book II and beyond. It is typical, for instance, to find the arguments 
in Book I analyzed without any reference to Aristotle’s opponents, and at least three translations, or 
publications, of the De Anima encourage this treatment of the text by providing only portions of 
Book I.     
The purpose of this paper is to provide a contextually sensitive analysis of the argument in Book I 
that uses fear and anger as examples to show that the affections of the soul belong properly to the 
complex of body and soul.  This is an important argument not in the least because it serves as a 
central piece of evidence in support of a functionalist interpretation.  In this paper I shall argue that 
a contextually sensitive analysis of Aristotle’s argument prohibits such a reading. The functionalist 
interpretation takes the argument out of its historical context by directing the argument towards 
opponents that Aristotle did not have. I shall then provide an interpretation of the argument that 
provides insight into why Aristotle was driven to unify the body and soul with his hylomorphic 
treatment.  The argument from the emotions, I contend, reveals that Aristotle conceived the body 
and soul as providing two aspects of a single affection: the body provides the felt sensations, the 
soul the articulable discriminations.  The body is a necessary component of any thought or desire in 
that it expresses their content and explains the manner (not the reason) by which we act.  Only a 
body that is made one with the soul, as Aristotle’s novel treatment does, can account for the unity of 
an individual’s experience. 
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“Aristotle and Plato on Derivative Naming: Paronymy and Onomatopoeia in the Categories and the 
Cratylus” 
 The Categories of Aristotle and the Cratylus of Plato are both fairly enigmatic works, yet each 
provides a fairly unique opportunity for insight into how each author understood the relationship 
between words and things. In this paper I discuss how this broad question of how words are related 
to things can be investigated in both texts through an analysis of derivative naming—the process 
whereby some name is either originally contrived or applied to a thing only insofar as it is derived 
from some other name. In the first and primary part of the paper, this analysis is a discussion of 
Aristotle’s relationship of paronymy, a concept which is introduced in ch. 1 of the Categories, but 
receives crucial further development in the context of qualities (ch. 8) and relations (ch. 7). I analyze 
the grammatical, predicational, and ontological circumstances of Aristotle’s examples of paronymy 
in each of these contexts, showing how, in Aristotle’s theory of relations, paronymy can necessitate 
onomatopoeia—name-creation. I also briefly outline a connection between paronymy and the 
controversial situation of so-called “non-substantial individuals” in ch. 2. I argue that an analysis of 
the logistics of paronymy relations sheds light on the Categories as a work of “proto-metaphysics,” a 
kind of phenomenology of how words are used in describing being. In the second part of the paper, 
I compare these conclusions to the situation in Plato’s Cratylus, where Socrates introduces the 
onomatourgos—the hypothetical demigod of ideal name-creation. First I recapitulate key points in 
the dialogue’s conflict between Hermogenes and Cratylus regarding the source of correctness in 
names, and I discuss Socrates’s responses to each character’s position. I aim to show that Socrates’s 
remarks—even the notoriously idiosyncratic “etymologies”—can, like Aristotle’s claims in the 
Categories, also be interpreted as a “proto-metaphysics,” with some crucial differences and 
distinctions (along the lines of perennial divergences of Aristotelian philosophy from Plato). 
Socrates’s emphasis on the act of name-bestowing, and on a kind derivative naming in particular, 
allows us to carve out a via media in the theory of names somewhere between the conventionalism 
of Hermogenes and the naturalism of Cratylus, one which shares some important features with the 
Categories account. In both works, all claims to metaphysics, “proto-metaphysics,” or the theory of 
language are governed by a positive commitment to a primary ontological association between 
words in their use and the true nature of things. 
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“The Vicious Circle: The True Definition of Knowledge in Plato’s Theaetetus” 
 
Plato’s Theaetetus appears to end without arriving at a true and accurate definition of knowledge. A 
number of responses to this puzzling inconclusiveness have been offered in the history of 
interpretation. This paper presents a new proposal. I argue that Socrates provides the accurate 
definition at the beginning of the dialogue, shows that three alternative views cannot be correct, and 
then calls for a return to the place that served as the starting point.  The approach relies on recent 
research concerning parallelism and ring composition in Plato (and the Greek tradition more 
generally). In parallelism, the overall plot of a work is organized by topic into a series that is then 
repeated in exactly the same order: A-B-C-D-A-B-C-D. In ring composition, the order of the topics 
in an initial series is reiterated in reverse to return to complete the circle: A-B-C-D-C-B-A.  Socrates 
in the Theaetetus divides knowledge into four distinct parts by way of four views of “what 
knowledge really is”: (1) the position that “knowledge and wisdom are the same thing” (Tht. 145e); 
(2) the view that “knowledge is nothing else than perception” (Tht. 151e); (3) the saying that 
“knowledge is the true opinion” (Tht. 187b); and (4) the notion that “knowledge is true opinion 
accompanied by reason” (Tht. 201d).  After asserting that knowledge is “neither perception, nor true 
belief, nor the addition of an ‘account’ to true belief ” (Tht. 210b), he warns that we have been 
moving in “the most vicious of circles,” and tells Theaetetus to go back to the beginning. I propose 
that the plot pattern of the dialogue follows the sequence, D-A-B-C. The discussion begins from the 
final place in the sequence: D, moves to the A position in the series, and then in turn through B and 
C, whereupon there is a return to the starting point, i.e., D-A-B-C.  Thus, the correct definition, that 
“knowledge and wisdom are the same” is found at the beginning and not at the end of the dialogue. 
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“Principles and Metaprinciples in Philolaus and the Earlier Pythagoreans” 
 
Within Meta. A 5 Aristotle distinguishes between two Pythagorean accounts of the principle of 
things, that which arrays the principles of all things in two opposed columns, and that which takes 
numbers to be the principles of all things.  Aristotle takes these accounts to arise from different sets 
of Pythagoreans, and scholars today agree.  The first account is an attempt to schematize the sort of 
associations among contraries that anthropologists recognizes as implicit in the conceptual 
frameworks of many pretechnological cultures.  The second is that of Philolaus (as Aristotle reads 
him).  Although Aristotle does not attempt to integrate the two accounts, the genuine fragments of 
Philolaus show that the second has much to do with the first.   Philolaus’ core distinction between 
those principles that are limiters and those that are unlimited is related to the distinction between 
limit and unlimited, as presented in the table of opposites.  Odd and even, which are among the 
opposites given in the table, are principles of number.  Although this is somewhat speculative, it is 
reasonable to understand Philolaus’ account of principles as a response to and development of the 
account of principles that underlies the table of opposites.  Although the particular principles 
posited by Philolaus are instances of what is limiting or unlimited, the limit and the unlimited are 
implicit as more fundamental principles, by which the particular principles are to be understood.  
Philolaus thus shows how one pair of principles in the table of opposites is thus logically and 
conceptually prior than the others, as it is that pair that explains why the other pairs have the role 
that they have.  Philolaus has thus moved beyond the identification of causes and principles; he has 
determined what it is about a cause or principle that makes it a cause or a principle.  This marks a 
major advance in the development of ancient Greek theories of explanation and causation.  The 
reification of these meta-principles, however, awaits Plato’s Philebus. 
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“Heidegger’s (Re)Turn to Aristotle: the Seminars of 1944 and 1950-52” 
 
Much has been written about Heidegger’s intensive engagement with Aristotle during the 1920’s and 
the heavy debt to this engagement of the major work that would close the decade: Being and Time. 
Much less attention has been given to the importance of Aristotle for Heidegger’s later thought 
(after the so-called Kehre) for the simple reason that this later study seemed limited to the essay on 
the essence and concept of phusis in Physics II from 1939. Now the recent publication of volume 83 
of the Gesamtausgabe, Seminare: Platon – Aristoteles - Augustinus shows us that Heidegger’s later 
study of Aristotle went far beyond the second book of the Physics and was pursued much later than 
1939. At the very end of the war (April 20 to July 28, 1944) Heidegger led a seminar on Metaphysics 
Gamma and Zeta. Here Heidegger finds in the first sentence of Book Gamma the problem of the 
ontological difference between being and beings, since the phrase “being insofar as being” is 
explained by the ambiguity of the Greek word for being (on) between its nominal (beings) and 
verbal (to be) senses. After the war, when the ban that prevents him from teaching is lifted, 
Heidegger immediately devotes three seminars to Aristotle. The first dates from the winter semester 
of 1951-52 and focuses on the notion of causality: a notion that in its importance for Western 
metaphysics Heidegger sees as arising from the forgetting of the distinction between being and 
beings. The second dates from the summer semester of 1951 and focuses on the notion of causality 
again and the phenomenon of motion in Books 2 and 3 of Aristotle’s Physics. The third dates from 
the winter semester of 1951-52 and, continuing the reading of the account of motion in Book 3 of 
the Physics, also turns to the account of being as truth in Metaphysics Theta 10. In these last two 
seminars Heidegger is significantly returning to two issues that were central to his reading of 
Aristotle during the 1920’s: being as motion and being as unconcealed. The aim of the present paper 
is to determine why Heidegger returns to Aristotle with this intensity in the 1940s and 1950s, how 
this later reading both continues and departs from the early reading, and what the later engagement 
tells us about a contemporary appropriation of Aristotle the story of which still remains to be fully 
told. 
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“Eriugena and the Intimacy of Being” 
 
In his Periphyseon, Duns Scotus Eriugena explores the meaning and direction of existence within 
the comprehensive and comprehending totality that he calls Nature. One way to look at his work is 
to consider it as a consideration of what it means to belong within and beyond Being. This paper 
seeks to show what Eriugena’s mystical thought tells us about the problem of belonging and why 
this is an enduring problem. After briefly suggesting a hermeneutic of belonging, this paper 
discusses Eriugena’s Neoplatonist theme of the Infinite from which all things begin and to which all 
things return. The metaphysical consubstantiality of all things points toward a primordial belonging 
that already structures the intellect, reason, and sensibility of each individual. 
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“Shall we not show that none of them missed the truth?'  Simplicius of Cilicia on the value of 
philosophical commentary, and his possible sources” 
 
In this paper, I would like to explore an interface between philosophical education and inquiry in 
later ancient Greek philosophy, focusing on the work of the commentator Simplicius of Cilicia (c. 
490–c. 560 CE). Simplicius is well known as an interpreter (exēgētēs) of the formative texts of 
Hellenic philosophy (a function whose qualifications he outlines at in Cat. 7,23-29; cf. Baltussen 
2008), and he regards the commentary as an important vehicle for what we might call 'research' or 
inquiry into an array of subjects: a philosopher can progressively uncover the truth about a subject 
by interpreting a canonical text on that subject with care, or perhaps by synthesizing a detailed 
doxography of differing but reputable views (cf. in Phys. 640,12-18). Simplicius also treats 
commentary as a useful tool for pedagogy. A student who reads a book like Epictetus' Handbook 
with Simplicius' commentary may advance in virtue (in Ench. pr.87-90, with discussion by Hadot 
1996, Hoffmann 2008).  
In the first half of the paper (1), focusing on Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Categories, I will 
suggest that a common psychological or pedagogical theory underlies the function attributed to the 
commentator by Simplicius in both inquiry and education: a pupil who engages in dialectic with a 
teacher, or with the 'greats' of the past, may recover the natural, undistorted concepts (ennoiai) that 
were her birthright, before they were distorted by the fall of the soul and the rattle and hum of our 
quotidian experience (illustrated by Simplicius in an evocative passage at in Cat. 12,10-13,4). This 
analysis has a sound justification in Neoplatonist psychology (see Hoffmann 1987), which I hope to 
draw out here.   
In the second half of the paper (2), I will explore possible earlier sources of this psychological 
position, exploring two possible lines of approach, drawing alternately from Aristotle's approach to 
historiography of philosophy or alleged "endoxic method" (challenged by Frede 2012, but perhaps, I 
suggest, more viably attributable to the commentators), coupled with the Stoic tradition of 
allegorical exegesis of ancient or 'primitive' thought to recover the human ennoiai (Boys-Stones 
2001). In closing, I will try to draw some conclusions of general interest about the self-perception of 
commentators like Simplicius in ancient philosophical traditions. 
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“Reasonable impressions and reasonable assent in Stoicism” 
 
This paper develops an account of the concept of the reasonable (eulogon) in Stoic philosophy in 
light of its relevance for understanding a number of issues in the Stoic theory of action. An 
appropriate action (kathekon), for instance, is described as one for which a reasonable defense can 
be adduced. The term eulogon also modifies the eupatheiai, or the “good” affective states 
experienced by the sage. Finally, a proper understanding of eulogon is necessary to evaluate the 
Academic proposal on behalf of the reasonable as an alternate “practical criterion” to the Stoic 
insistence on the cataleptic.  
Commentators have typically interpreted the reasonable as connoting an ordinary and 
unsophisticated standard of reason that most people use in everyday life, and have accordingly 
glossed eulogon in terms of probability and fallibility. Tad Brennan (1996) criticizes this “lax 
interpretation” in favor of a stricter one according to which the Stoic sage can sometimes have 
cataleptic impressions of reasonable propositions. That is, even in situations where clear and distinct 
perceptual content is unavailable, the sage could grasp, and give assent to, “it is reasonable that p”, 
rather than just “p”. Brennan’s interpretation, however, by extending katalepsis to merely formal 
features of impressions, threatens to rob the cataleptic impression of the essential transparency with 
which it mediates knowledge of the object. It is that directness of contact with the world that gets 
undermined on the proposal that katalepsis can be of an impression of p being reasonable, rather 
than of it actually being the case that p.  
By contrast, I develop and defend an interpretation of the reasonable impression as being 
characterized first, by a certain mode of representing a proposition; and second, by a type of assent 
that is distinct from the type of assent given to cataleptic impressions. I argue that the reasonable 
impression should be understood as a hypothetical or suppositional mode of thought that bears on 
the evidential value of the object represented, and to which evaluative assent is given. Unlike in 
situations where perceptual content is directly available, reasonable impressions paradigmatically 
involve propositions where that is not the case, such as those about the past or future. In such 
situations, the sage represents a proposition as being reasonable under some set of suppositions, and 
this requires her to give a different kind of assent. The kinds of assent that are given to cataleptic 
and reasonable impressions, I suggest, can be understood as running parallel to the Stoic distinction 
between assenting to a self-evident proposition, i.e., one that reveals its object just by itself, as 
opposed to assenting to a non-evident proposition, one that requires argument. The standards of 
reasonability that determine assent of the latter sort, ultimately, are those of the Stoic sage who is 
guided by her state of virtue and her knowledge of the proper ends of life. The notion of the 
reasonable, thus, far from being a mere concession or stopgap, provides the sage with a robust 
criterion for action in situations where katalepsis is not possible. 
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“Universals and Particulars in Aristotle's Ethics” 
 
Aristotle makes repeated reference to universals and particulars in the Nicomachean Ethics, and 
while he does not offer a clear account of what they are, it is clear that he views them as important 
to ethical activity and to practical reason. The predominant approach to interpreting these references 
holds that Aristotle has in mind what is called the practical syllogism, an argument with a major 
premise that identifies some goal to be achieved (the universal premise), and a minor premise that 
identifies a means to realize that goal within the immediate circumstances (the particular premise). I 
hold, however, that commentators’ misplaced emphasis on the practical syllogism can make 
Aristotle’s account of practical reason look far less plausible than it is. I argue that a different sort of 
account of ethical universals and particulars is at work in the EN. This account articulates a 
distinction between two deeply important aspects of practical thinking.  
First, I show that Aristotle’s talk of universals and particulars in the EN should not lead us to believe 
that there are formal syllogisms in ethics or that practical syllogisms are required for action. I thus 
reject two dominant interpretive approaches to the practical syllogism. I first argue against the view, 
held by Natali, Gottlieb, and Nussbaum, that the practical syllogism is a formal syllogism in which 
the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises; I then argue against the view, advocated not 
only by the aforementioned commentators but also by Charles and Santas, that the practical 
syllogism is a model for practical reasoning or a necessary part of practical reasoning.  
Having rejected these positions, I contend that Aristotle instead holds that performing the right sort 
of action for the right reasons requires an understanding, at the universal level, of what kinds of 
actions are worthy of pursuit as well as a capacity for recognizing, at the particular level, specific 
situations which call for those kinds of actions. I hold, then, that the practical syllogism is neither 
deliberation itself nor a necessary link between deliberation and action. In fact, Aristotle’s syllogistic 
examples and his talk of universals and particulars more generally in practical contexts are not 
evidence that the practical syllogism is central to practical reasoning, or that locating the right formal 
reconstruction of it will show us how practical intuition and reasoning work on his account. Rather, 
Aristotle makes use of the structure of the syllogism to emphasize that performing the right sort of 
action for the right reasons requires both the understanding of what kinds of aims are worthy of 
pursuit (the universal), and the capacity for recognizing situations which call for actions that further 
such aims (the particular). Aristotle has a nuanced account of how we assess situations in ways that 
connect the concrete particular circumstances in which we act to the underlying values we hold. 
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“Time as Interval in Aristotle's Treatise on Time” 
 
In this paper, I offer a reading of Aristotle’s Physics iv 10-11, a portion of his “Treatise on Time,” 
with the aim of showing that chronos here means time as an attribute of motion, as an interval, i.e. 
the type of time that, as Aristotle describes at 218a1, “is taken” (lambanoumenos chronos). In 
support of this thesis, I argue that (1) Physics iv 10 is analogous in purpose to the initial chapters of 
each foregoing treatise in the Physics, e.g. on the archai of nature, kinêsis, the infinite, place, and 
void—namely, it serves to discuss the endoxa as preparatory to Aristotle’s actual analytic—and, that 
(2) the alternative type of time, which Aristotle also discusses at 218a1, “infinite time” (apeiros 
chronos) is outside the scope of Aristotle’s project here in the Physics. Finally, I propose that 
Aristotle’s analytic of time actually begins in Physics iv 11 at 219a1-3.  I work to this conclusion by 
way of a proposal that the “now,” which Aristotle discusses in Physics iv 10, is not only (1) non-
temporal, as Ursula Coope has suggested, but also (2) a name for existing self-subsistent natural 
beings undergoing kinêsis. 
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“Religion in Plato’s Laws:  The Gods and What the Citizens Believe About Them” 
 
In book three of Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger describes the origins of constitutions by first 
describing human existence in an age prior to the development of the art of politics (676a-681d).  
He praises the characters of individuals living in that age, and cites a simple-minded outlook toward 
the gods as one of the major factors that contribute to their good ethical condition (679c).  This 
simplistic outlook consists in the acceptance of what is learned about the gods and goodness as the 
literal truth.  The Athenian’s account suggests that such an outlook ensures that individuals will not 
alter their views about the gods and will reliably act in accordance with them.  If such an uncritical 
view has a positive effect on the ethical characters of individuals living in the pre-political age, it is 
reasonable to ask whether, and to what degree, such a view might also contribute to the virtue to be 
attained the Cretan colony.  The purpose of this paper is to examine the Athenian’s remarks about 
religion in the Cretan colony and highlight the role that unquestioned belief in the gods plays in 
cultivating virtue in its citizens.  Since the colony exists in the age of politics, its aim (i.e., complete 
virtue) will encompass the development of the rational capacities of its citizens.  This is in clear 
contrast the pre-political age, where the very simple-mindedness that is responsible for the 
unquestioned belief in the gods compensates for the lack of any rational development in the 
individuals living in that age.  In this regard, a comparative assessment of the religious views of the 
Cretan colonists will highlight the difficult balance the Athenian is trying to maintain in achieving 
the secure beliefs that approximate what is found in pre-political life in citizens whose rational 
capacities are to be cultivated to the extent necessary for complete virtue.  By examining the case of 
religious belief in these contrasting ages, we gain a deeper appreciation of the broader theme found 
in the Laws, namely, that the enterprise of politics can be understood as an attempt by human 
beings to rely on their own rational capacities to approximate the kind of happiness that in another 
age is the result of divine reason. 
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“Plato’s and Aristotle’s Approaches to Economic Anthropology” 
 
As Leo Strauss’s most famous book - The City and Man - indicates, Plato and Aristotle consider that 
the understanding of the nature of the polis and politics goes hand in hand with the understanding 
of the human nature. More precisely, these ancient philosophers’ ideas about the perfect state and its 
corrupted forms are based on an anthropology that close consideration reveals is economic in 
nature. According to them, it is mainly through economic practices and institutions that human 
nature has an effect on the organization of the polis. But as far as I know, while their ideas on 
economy have been studied, very little has been said about the anthropology that informs their 
respective works. My aim is to show that Plato’s and Aristotle’s distinct anthropologies determine 
their political and economic ideas, in particular their opposite thoughts on private property and 
wealth. 
Both Plato and Aristotle consider it man’s nature to be desirous of owning and appropriating 
something, but they do not give the same value to this desire, and the practical conclusions they 
draw from it are very different too. Plato sees private possession as the root of political evil, for it 
gives rise not only to war but civil war. The same holds true for wealth. Plato shows himself stricter 
than his disciple, not because he thinks wealth is bad in itself, but because it can “tyrannize a soul 
made wild with desires” (Laws IX, 870a1). On the contrary, Aristotle sees private possession as 
legitimate, and considers wealth as the raw material for generosity and magnificence, which are 
obviously helpful to the city. 
Plato’s and Aristotle’s economic anthropologies each give way to two different economies and cities. 
In both cases, the common and the private spheres are woven into two distinct webs for the sake of 
one same ideal, which is called justice. The nature of justice is slightly distinct according to each of 
these two philosophers. Nevertheless, Plato and Aristotle share the idea that a city is not a mere 
economic association, nor politics a mere regulation of the economic sphere. For both of them, the 
true political art consists in giving the city its unity through common values, to which the material 
aspect of the city must be subordinated. In both cases, the regulation of economics and economy by 
ethics and politics is then a condition of the just city. 
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“The Yijing as a text of Cosmic Principles and Divination” 
 
The Yijing as a text of Cosmic Principles and Divination 
I would give fifty years to the study of the Yi, then I might come to be without great faults 
(Confucius, Analects, 2.7). 
 The topics pertaining to the Yijing explored in this paper are: the principles of harmony and 
change, the metaphysical and ethical implications and the parallels between the Pre-socratic 
philosophy and the Yijing. 
 The Yijing  transcends the division between mysticism and rationalism. There has been a 
dichotomy regarding the Yijing  either as a text of cosmic principles which belongs to wisdom 
literature  or as a text of divination. The present study seeks to reconcile  the two approaches. The 
important connection between knowledge of nature  and  the right course of action has been 
emphasised in the philosophical tradition of China from Confucianism and Daoism to Neo-
Confucianism and also in Western philosophy from the Pre-socratic thought to the conception of 
natural law.   
 The underlying assumption of the Yijing is that the universe and man’s actions are governed 
by moral purposiveness. The basic outlook of the Yijing, that only the accurate understanding of the 
physical world can lead to right actions in the human realm, is far from superstition. The belief on 
which the Yijing is based is that there are general patterns and principles of physical and human 
reality which can be comprehended. 
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“Freedom, Happiness and Justice in the Gorgias” 
 
Freedom, Happiness and Justice in the Gorgias 
In the Gorgias, Plato explores the topics of foremost importance in ethics, values and society: 
freedom, happiness and justice.  Socrates encounters escalating ferocity of the three sophists, 
Gorgias, Polus and Callicles who put forward forceful arguments  that the tyrant  is the happiest 
man as he has the complete freedom to act as he pleases without being constrained by justice.  
Gorgias confidently declares that he knows how to teach all who seek “freedom in their own 
persons”  and to attain the greatest good sought after by men:  power.  Polus’ view of happiness is 
frankly hedonistic: “to be at liberty to do and to follow my own pleasure in every act.” Callicles 
argues for the position of egoism. The happy man is he who has the power to satisfy his passions 
and desires to the full and obtain wealth and honour.  This is acting in accordance with nature. Self-
control is praised only out of weakness when men lack the power to take what they want.   
In his refutation of the three sophists Socrates demonstrates that far from being happy, the tyrant is 
more miserable than those he injures: to do wrong is the worst that can befall a man. Socrates is 
convinced that only those who are just and good are free and happy. 
The central philosophical questions raised by Socrates in the Gorgias are: What kind of life should 
we live? What is the difference between knowledge and belief ? How do we distinguish the pleasant 
from the good? 
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“Modality and Thomas Bradwardine's account of future contingents” 
 
Modality and Thomas Bradwardine's Account of Future Contingents 
 In his treatise _De futuris contingentibus_ (On future contingents), Thomas Bradwardine (d. 
1349) presents an interestingly original account of future contingents in opposition to that of 
William Ockham.  The problem for both thinkers, of course, is how to go about reconciling God's 
foreknowledge with the real contingency of future events.  According to Ockham's highly influential 
account, this is possible because although God has knowledge in the present of future contingent 
events, the fact that the subject matter of that knowledge is future and contingent makes the 
knowledge itself future and contingent in some special sense; thus, Ockham denies that the sort of 
inferences we may make about the necessity inhering in present events can in any way apply to 
God's present knowledge of things future, or in turn to the objects of that knowledge. 
 Bradwardine is not satisfied with this solution, which he considers to be incompatible with 
divine immutability, and instead proposes a solution resting on the distinction between absolute and 
ordered (or ordained – _ordinata_) power.  Bradwardine applies this distinction (which is not itself 
novel to him) in a highly original way to argue that God's knowledge of future events is enacted by 
his ordered power, and that relative to this power, the events of his knowledge are indeed necessary.  
However, this relative necessity says nothing of the events' absolute necessity – and hence the 
contingency of the event, at least in absolute terms, may be preserved.  As should be clear from this 
outline of his argument, tricky manoeuvring in modal logic plays a key role in Bradwardine's 
solution.  In this and other places, Bradwardine employs fine distinctions of modal logic, often 
making surprising claims that defy conventional assumptions about modality. 
 In this paper, I examine some of these interesting features of Bradwardine's modal logic, 
demonstrating the ways in which they are applied in his solution to the problem of future 
contingents.  Though _De futuris contingentibus_ is not the only work of Bradwardine's that may 
be relevant to this discussion, my own treatment focuses on this treatise because of the little 
attention it has been paid up to this point.  It becomes clear through this examination that 
Bradwardine's innovations in modal logic play a pivotal role in his development of a new and 
compelling solution to this problem.  This demonstrates one way in which developments in modal 
logic, far from being an idle theoretical past-time of no practical import, have been central to the 
creation of new and exciting theories and explanations in relation to age-old metaphysical problems. 
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“Revolutionary Athenian Poetry and its Implications for Plato’s Republic” 
 
This paper examines late 6th and early 5th Century Greek poetry as a way of inquiring into how 
politics for the Greeks was not merely an idea, a principle, or an understanding, but also a kind of 
performance, an action, and a craft. More specifically, I examine the political and historical role of 
poetry and the Greek chorus in the Athenian theater leading up to and immediately following 
Athens’ democratic revolution in 508 BCE.  I argue through texts and vase paintings that a 
revolution in poetic practice preceded and influenced the actual democratic revolution in Athens. I 
show that accounts of Athenian poetry before the revolution bear striking similarities to descriptions 
of the revolution itself and to later, democratic reforms that established free and equal speech in the 
Assembly.  I consider the implications of this research alongside Books II and III of Plato’s Republic 
concerning poetry, as well as passages in Book VIII concerning democracy and anarchy.  What I 
hope to show is that unlike much of contemporary democratic theory's focus on norms and 
principles, the poetry of ancient Athens can show us not only what democracy is, but how people 
participated in a democracy that needed to be performed. 
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““Use-love and Enjoyment in Augustine’s Confessions”” 
 
Kyle Hubbard 
Saint Anselm College 
SAGP Proposal 2013 
Title:  “Use-love and Enjoyment in Augustine’s Confessions” 
 In De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine of Hippo (in)famously distinguishes between ‘use-
love’ (uti) and ‘love of enjoyment’ (frui).  He claims that only God should be enjoyed because God is 
the supreme good whereas we should love other things with ‘use-love,’ basically as a means to 
enjoying God.  While there have been many attempts to explain the uti/frui distinction in De 
Doctrina Christiana as well as many defenses and critiques of Augustine’s distinction, there have 
been relatively few attempts to see the distinction in Augustine’s Confessiones.  While Augustine 
does not specifically use the terms ‘use-love’ and ‘enjoyment’ in Confessiones, the lack of 
scholarship on the uti/frui distinction in Confessiones is curious because they are roughly 
contemporaneous texts; De Doctrina Christiana was written in 397 while Confessiones dates from 
397-400.  However, I believe Confessiones offers a helpful way to understand the distinction 
between ‘use-love’ and ‘love of enjoyment’ because Augustine offers a vivid example of the 
problems that arise when he tries to enjoy another person in a way that should only be reserved for 
God. 
 In Book Four of Confessiones, Augustine relates the story of the death of his closest friend.  
Augustine spends much of the book discussing all the problems with this friendship, but they 
essentially boil down to one: Augustine’s belief that he loved his friend in the place of God.  To use 
the language from De Doctrina Christiana, he enjoyed his friend instead of loving him with ‘use-
love.’  I will argue that this story from Confessiones helpfully explains the uti/frui distinction from 
De Doctrina Christiana, even though Augustine does not actually use those terms.  Augustine shows 
the damage done to himself, but, maybe more importantly, he reveals the damage done to his friend.  
While I will not attempt a thorough defense of Augustine’s claim that we should love our friends 
with ‘use-love,’ I will suggest that Augustine is right to recognize deep problems with attempting to 
find one’s ultimate happiness in another person. 
 
 
James Hubler, Lebanon Valley College 
hubler@lvc.edu 
“Aristotle's Fundamental Opposition to Plato's Epistemology” 
 
Although Aristotle and commentators focus on arguments against the theory of Forms, Aristotle’s 
has a more fundamental, logical disagreement with Plato’s theory of cognition.  Whereas Plato 
understands cognition primarily as alio-relative, Aristotle maintains that truth is an identity and 
hence not alio-relative.  Although Aristotle rejects the theory of Forms, he would also reject any 
other alio-relative theory of cognition, given his own identity theory of truth. 
Plato’s theory of Forms is an expression of his basic intuition that cognition is alio-relative and 
defined in relation to its object.  Knowledge can only be certain if its objects are unchangeable and 
eternal.  By contrast sense-perception cannot attain truth since its objects are inherently unstable and 
prone to slip away, undermining any claims to truth.  However, Plato’s view of cognition as alio-
relativity leaves him to puzzle over the self-reflexitivity of knowledge (Charmides 167–9).   
In the Late dialogues, Plato develops an analysis of cognition as psychic motion that helps resolve 
the puzzle, because circular motion can be both alio-relative and self-reflexive.  It is self-reflexive 
because in circular-motion, the immaterial mover never changes its course, but always circles back 
upon itself.  However, since its eternal course conforms to the Forms, it is alio-relative (Timaeus 37 
A–C).  Likewise, Plato understands sense-perception as a shared motion between body and soul 
(Philebus 34 A).  Sense-perception is then both alio-relative and self-reflexive because it is the soul’s 
own motion, originating from the soul as a self-mover, but it is also alio-relative because it is shared 
with another—the body. 
Aristotle, however, rejects motion as an adequate analysis of cognition along with the theory of the 
Forms, but his dispute with Plato runs deeper than any specific arguments against either.  On a more 
basic, logical level Aristotle takes truth to be an identity and hence not alio-relative.  For Aristotle, 
truth is a pros hen analogous notion with the identity between the Unmoved mover and its noetic 
object at its core.  Aristotle also finds identities at other levels of cognition, although he posits 
different types of identities at lower levels of truth.  At the level of the human intellect, there is an 
identity between the human intellect and its objects, but it is not as strong an identity as the 
Unmoved mover because of the potency of the human intellect.  At the levels of understanding and 
sense-perception, he asserts a formal identity with each of their objects.   
Aristotle even analyzes true linguistic predication as a type of identity, asserting that an affirmative 
proposition is true just in case the terms composed in thought are also composed in reality 
(Metaphysics 9.10, 1051 b 1–5).  Analogously, negative propositions are true if their terms are not 
joined in reality.  The species/genus predication, “Humans are animals” is true because every 
instance of a human is also an animal (PA 91b5–7), so he finds an identity in the underlying subject 
of predication. 
 
 
John Humphrey, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University 
jfhumphr@ncat.edu 
“Two Paradigms in Plato’s Theaetetus” 
 
2013 SAGP Conference Paper Abstract 
Two Paradigms in Plato’s Theaetetus 
J. F. Humphrey 
In three previous papers, “Socrates’ Interpretation of His Own Wisdom,” “Socrates and Achilles: A 
Shift in Paradigms,” and “Plato’s Paradigm in the Apology of Socrates” I have been concerned with 
Plato’s paradigm of the philosopher as represented in the character of Socrates. In particular, I have 
examined what Socrates means when claims that the god used his name in order to make him a 
pattern [paradeigma], “as if he would say, ‘That one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like 
Socrates, has become cognizant that in truth he is worth nothing with respect to wisdom’” (Ap. 23a-
b). Considering Socrates as the paradigm of the philosopher, led to an investigation of Socrates’ 
allusion to Achilleus, the paradigmatic warrior in the Apology (Ap. 28b-29a), where Socrates implies 
that the philosopher, the paradigmatic rational individual, should replace the warrior, the 
paradigmatic individual governed by thymos. But just what sort of paradigm is Socrates? Juxtaposing 
Socrates to Achilles, on the one hand, and to Oedipus, who for Sophocles is the unenviable 
paradigm of human beings because he is mortal and enjoys only fleeting happiness, on the other, I 
argued that instead of suffering his fate, Socrates embraces it and thus becomes enviable because, in 
the face of the limits of human finitude, he is a paradigm of a life guided by and subject to reason – 
a noble human life that, by embracing the human condition, transcends it. Consideration of Plato’s 
paradigm of Socrates the philosopher led me to ask what precisely does Plato mean by “paradigm”? 
Hence, in a fourth paper, “Plato’s Republic: The Polis as a Paradigm,” I examined Plato’s use of the 
word “paradigm” in the Republic V where Socrates asks, “Weren’t we … also making a paradeigma in 
speech of a good city?” (472d-e). There I argued that the city in speech is a paradigm that, according 
to Socrates, is absent in the life of evil individuals, but is one on which good individuals may model 
their lives.  
In this paper, I shall return to Plato’s conception of a “paradigm,” not as it appears in the Apology, 
nor the Republic. Instead, I will consider the two paradigms that Socrates identifies in the Theaetetus 
in the context of “a digression” (177b-c): “the divine, which is most blessed, and the godless, which 
is most wretched” (176e). While Socrates does not develop these two paradigms in the dialogue, we 
can understand them in light of his conversation with Glaucon in Republic III where he distinguishes 
the individual who has “a good soul” from the one who is “clever and suspicions” and has “done 
many unjust things” (409c-d). Focusing on these two paradigms, we will see that the first paradigm, 
the divine, is the life of the philosopher and the second, the life of the evil individual who has only a 
confused paradigm within his or her soul. Moreover, each individual must “pay the penalty for this 
by living a life that conforms to the pattern they resemble; and … unless they depart from their 
‘cleverness,’ the blessed place that is pure of all things evil will not receive them after death, and here 
on earth they will always live the life like themselves – evil men associating with evil …” (Theaetetus, 
177a). Thus, I will argue that the use of “paradigm” in the Theaetetus is consistent with Plato’s use 
of the term in the Republic; indeed, understanding the two paradigms in the former work amplifies 
our understanding and appreciation of the importance of paradigms in the Republic and the Apology. 
 
 
Jennifer Ingle,  
jingle@clemson.edu 
“The Beginning of Knowledge: The Prologue of Plato’s Theaetetus” 
 
The Theaetetus can be a vexing dialogue for scholars intent upon interpreting Plato’s dialogues as 
presenting a systematic philosophy.  After all, the dialogue does not mention the doctrines of 
amnamnesis or the Forms when, clearly, for those who advocate a systematic view of Plato’s 
philosophy, either doctrine would yield a positive conclusion to the dialogue’s guiding question.  
Paul Stern has suggested a compelling reason why Socrates does not present the doctrine of 
amnamnesis or the Theory of Forms: to do so would constitute a framework for answering the 
question ‘what is knowledge’.   Such a framework would obviate the need for a fifth century 
interlocutor in the dialogue, or a member of the fourth century audience of the dialogue to 
formulate that framework for themselves.  Moreover, if armed with this framework, the internal and 
external audiences of the dialogue may be inclined to presume that they possess knowledge, when in 
actuality what they would possess is endoxa (received opinion).  As I hope to show through an 
examination of the Prologue, for Athens the importance of knowledge to the political life lies in 
endoxa.  Socrates contests the role of endoxa with his particular practice of paideia, a practice that 
gives Socratic ignorance as the grounds for knowledge, knowing that you know not. 
 
 
Cristina Ionescu, The Catholic University of America 
ionescu@cua.edu 
“The Dialogue Between Pleasure and Knowledge throughout Plato's Philebus” 
 
When discussing the Philebus, scholars have typically chosen to explore either the account of 
pleasure or that of knowledge, while the connection and interrelation between these two throughout 
the dialogue has remained rather underexplored. The present paper attempts to address this lacuna. I 
hope to show that as we go through the text, following every major instance in which pleasure is 
spoken of in relation to knowledge, we notice a gradual progression from the initial absolute 
unbridgeable distance between pleasure and knowledge towards a more and more intimate 
collaboration between the two that culminates in the personified dialogue between them, whereby 
species of pleasure welcome the relevant types of knowledge and knowledge in turn invites pleasure 
in the good human life. I thus hope to show that after the opening remarks set pleasure and 
knowledge as diametrically opposed poles of human experience, we move towards passages that first 
set them side by side, and then, gradually, towards arguments that indicate an intimate relation, 
whereby pleasure is causally dependent on and structured by knowledge. I argue that we owe this 
shift to the transition from the Phileban conception of pleasure as thoughtless thrill or sensation to 
the Platonic understanding of pleasure as intentionally and cognitively structured experience that 
depend on our beliefs not only about factual situations but also about the meaning and value of such 
situations and of life generally. The passages that I will be analyzing and discussing in this sequence 
are: 11b-13c, 15e, 21c-d, 33c-35d, 36d-39d, 39d-44d, 51a-53b, 63b-64a. 
 
 
Jolanta Jaskolowska, Westwood College, Chicago IL 
jolaj@att.net 
“How Reasonable is the Practical Syllogism?” 
 
In the De Anima, De Motu Animalium and the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle describes the process of 
practical reasoning using the same vocabulary of universal major premise, particular middle term and 
particular conclusion that he uses elsewhere regarding logical reasoning. In what sense though is the 
reasoning of the practical syllogism like that of logical inference?  Nicomachean Ethics VI .2 
(1139a21ff.) suggests that the relation between logical and practical reasoning is merely analogical:  
pursuit and avoidance in desire correspond in some unspecified manner to affirmation and denial in 
thought (dianoia).  However, De Anima III.3 (431b10ff.) states that distinctions between what is true 
or false and good and bad are in the same genus, differing only in that the former are distinguished 
unqualifiedly, while the latter are distinguished in relation to someone.  This passage strongly 
suggests that the processes of theoretical and practical reasoning are generically the same, even if the 
specific content is different in category in some way. I argue that Aristotle understands both 
practical and theoretical reasoning to be syllogistic because the part/whole relations he distinguishes 
in terms of affirmation and negation in the square of opposition in De Interpretatione are generically 
the same as those made regarding desirability/undesirability in practical reasoning.  As the passage 
from De Anima III suggests, statements that function semantically simply as references to things and 
their attributes with respect to logic can also function semantically to refer simultaneously to 
dispositional relations.  For example, to state, "Grizzly bears are dangerous to human beings," is a 
universal statement which, when combined with a particular, "That is a grizzly bear," induces a 
desire to flee.  The conclusion in this case is not a statement of fact but a change in disposition 
towards a particular based on syllogistic or logical relations that induce an action.  I find support for 
my understanding of Aristotle in his accounts of language and emotion in the Poetics and in the 
Rhetoric, and in the late antique commentator Ammonius' summary of De Interpretation and his 
citation of a fragment from Theophrastus.  Finally, I argue that Aristotle’s understanding of practical 
reasoning in terms of a cognition or judgment producing emotional states ties Aristotle more closely 
than is usually taken to be the case to the Hellenistic focus on the causal association of proper 
argument with the emotions and ethics. 
 
 
David Jennings, University of Antwerp 
davidleejennings@gmail.com 
“Friendship and Intellectual Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics” 
 
For Aristotle, friendship and moral virtue are codependent: each needs the other for its highest 
manifestation: the morally good person needs friends, and friendship exists only between such 
persons.  But can the same be said about the relation between friendship and intellectual virtue?  I 
argue that it can.  First, I consider some reasons to think that friendship and intellectual virtue are 
independent: the contemplative life has the least need of external goods, such as friends, and 
friendship depends on the dispositions of its members, which sit outside the scope of the intellectual 
virtues.  After responding to these worries, I then argue that friendship and intellectual virtue also 
depend on one another for their highest manifestation: friendship involves loving another for who 
one really is and the contemplative part of us is, above all, who we really are, and intellectual virtue 
needs friendship for increasing its activity and pleasure. 
 
 
Erik Jensen, Michigan State University 
jensen82@msu.edu 
“Moving Beyond Opinion: Barnes, Burnyeat, and the Jury Passage in Theaetetus” 
 
Myles Burnyeat (1980) and Jonathan Barnes (1980) disagree as to whether the epistemological 
commitments espoused in Meno and Theaetetus license or prohibit the transmission of different 
forms of knowledge. Burnyeat holds that the jury could not come to an understanding of the events 
of the case, even when considering an experientially-laden version of 'understanding' he claims is 
latent in Plato's treatment of knowledge (episteme) in the Theaetetus (179, 185). Barnes claims that 
propositional capture of the experiential component of understanding is possible, and so, in 
principle, the jury could come to have understanding of the testifier's perceptual experiences without 
any of them sharing those experiences. I show that the approach Burnyeat uses to resolve an alleged 
paradox in the Theaetetus by reference to the epistemology in the Meno can likewise be used to 
motivate Barnes' claim that understanding could be transmitted to the jury. 
 
 
Erick Jimenez, University of Navarra 
erickraphael@gmail.com 
““Deliberation and Authority in Aristotle’s Politics”” 
 
Deliberation is an idea key to Aristotle’s political theory: Having the power to deliberate is a 
qualification of citizenship (Pol. III.1); the several distributions of that power are creative of the 
several forms of government (Pol. IV.14); and in general for Aristotle the deliberative element in 
political life is authoritative or sovereign (kurios) (ibid.). Given the centrality of deliberation to 
contemporary theories of government scholars have naturally looked to Aristotle’s prioritization of 
deliberative practice in political life as a precursor to and model of ideas relating, above all, to 
deliberative democracy. Whether by emphasizing its combativeness (Tercheck and Moore), its lack 
of appeal to external moral criteria (Yack), its role in the shaping of character (Nieuwenberg, Smith), 
or its liberal or democratic tendencies (Taylor), scholars have therefore praised various aspects of the 
Aristotelian theory. However, as I argue in this presentation, such comparisons are limited in one 
fundamental respect, namely that for Aristotle political authority consists in the power to deliberate 
and not in any purported legitimacy achieved through deliberation; for Aristotle political authority is 
pre-deliberative. In developing this thesis, I begin by sketching certain Aristotelian limitations: Only 
certain things admit of being deliberated about (NE III.3); deliberation is required because legality 
cannot be determined at certain levels of specificity or detail (Pol. III.16); and finally not all human 
beings are capable in fact of deliberating—natural slaves cannot, children cannot, and, though they 
can, for women the deliberative power is not “authoritative” (Pol. I.13). I then argue that in 
Aristotle’s political theory these ontological dimensions are intended to serve as a basis for the 
political dimensions. Thus the ends of deliberation must be given beforehand (for deliberation can 
only be about means); and moreover, as a specification of this idea, political deliberative practices, 
because practices of a state, are oriented by state interest—questions predominantly, as I interpret 
the matter, of order (taxis). I then show that Aristotle’s conception of political deliberation has 
nothing immediately to do with attaining consensus, which is central to deliberative-democratic 
ideas, but rather fundamentally with the inadequacy of law for governing. Deliberation thus has to 
do with consensus only to the extent that consensus is a matter of establishing order, and avoiding 
sedition, and order a matter of state interest. But this relation is not an essential one for Aristotle. 
Thus, for example, he seems to endorse the view that those who live near borders should not be 
allowed to deliberate in border wars (Pol. VII.10). Aristotle’s theory of deliberation may therefore 
have much to recommend it, first of all, as a description of political authority, and perhaps, secondly, 
as a prescription for its distribution, but in the second respect it is closer to classical republican ideas 
than to democratic ones. 
 
 
Brian Johnson, Fordham University 
brjohnson@fordham.edu 
“Rescuing Aristotle’s Art of Living” 
 
From the Hellenistic era forward, philosophy has often been characterized as the art of living.  And 
yet, despite the poetical power of that image, Aristotle would have rejected it.  Although he draws a 
number of important parallels between art and virtue, he surprisingly concludes that moral reasoning 
cannot be a craft.  As a way of analyzing Aristotle’s striking claim, I will argue against him and show 
that he, in fact, provides good grounds for concluding that practical wisdom is a kind of craft-
knowledge.  Aristotle should have accepted the claim that practical wisdom is the master craft. 
 
 
Anton Kabeshkin, Johns Hopkins University 
akabeshkin@gmail.com 
“Philosophical Activity and Unreflective Life in Pyrrhonian Skepticism” 
 
In this paper I will consider tensions between the defining characteristic of a Pyrrhonian skeptic, 
namely, her ability to create oppositions of appearances and arguments, and the skeptic’s own 
criterion of action. In the Outlines of Pyrrhonism Sextus defines skepticism as “an ability to set out 
oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way at all, an ability by which, 
because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of 
judgment and afterwards to tranquility” (PH I.8). A skeptic is, primarily, someone who is skillful at 
setting up oppositions of perceptions and arguments and achieving equipollence between them. On 
the other hand, as a response to the apraxia objection Sextus offers the fourfold criterion of action 
for the skeptics. On his account skeptics “live in accordance with everyday observances” (PH 1.23). 
Sextus then elaborates on the nature of these everyday observances. I will argue, first, that the 
proper way to interpret this skeptical criterion of action is that the skeptic, insofar as she is a skeptic, 
lives her life passively, unreflectively and without being governed by understanding explanatory 
relations between phenomena. I will further argue that such a life is not compatible with acquisition 
and even moderately efficient exercise of the skeptic’s ability to oppose perceptions and arguments 
to each other. In effect, this second argument constitutes a version of the apraxia objection which, 
to my knowledge, was not considered either by ancient rivals of skeptics or by contemporary 
scholars. 
 
 
Kevin Kambo, The Catholic University of America 
kkambo3@gmail.com 
“Socrates in the City” 
 
An enduring focus of debate in Plato’s Phaedrus concerns its theme.  Different interpreters have 
identified various themes for the dialogue such as love, rhetoric, madness and persuasion.  Others 
altogether deny that there is such a comprehensive theme, a distinction that may be a defect in the 
work or an aspect of a more elaborate Platonic ploy. 
The lack of consensus about the theme stems from the structure of the Phaedrus which falls into two 
distinct parts difficult to join with a unifying thread.  The first ‘half’ consists of three speeches given 
on the nature of love and its role in human life.  The second is a discussion about rhetoric.  The 
seemingly irreconcilable differences separating these sections is especially curious because Socrates 
explains that an essential characteristic of artful composition is that parts fit the whole and are in 
harmony with each other (264c).  The unity and integrity of the whole explains the role of the parts 
and their relation to each other.  Taking either love, the topic of the opening speeches, or rhetoric, 
the theme of the closing discourse, as the consistently dominant theme distorts the reading of the 
other part.  What is needed is a theme that respects each part’s contribution.  If the parts are to be 
properly understood, then it is important to have a view of the whole.  I argue for taking 
conversation as the unifying theme of the Phaedrus. 
There are two kinds of reasons on which I rely.  The first, and less important, are situational, viz. 
taking the setting or backdrop as a clue or indication of Plato’s intent.  I argue that the interaction of 
the characters is choreographed in a manner that stresses the informal conversation of the 
interlocutors; that the ‘speeches’ of the first part are actually excerpts from conversations; and that it 
is significant that both interlocutors are identified as lovers of logoi (228b). 
The second, more important class of reasons concern Plato’s philosophical aims: the theme of 
conversation explains the development of the technique of collection and division, which appears 
for the first time in the Platonic corpus in the Phaedrus.  The dialogue is an extended reflection on 
the nature of conversation, a transcendent activity which unites souls in common action.  It is 
through conversation that human minds are able to meet, by the communication of intentions.  
Socrates thus does not leave city because it is the locus for interacting with other minds (230d).  In 
this light the Socratic turn can then be seen as a movement from impersonal speculation to personal 
conversation.  Through the interrogation of other people’s articulations, viz. collections and 
divisions, of their beliefs and perceptions, the question of truth can be raised.  The philosophical 
mind is aware that reality is what measures our beliefs and perceptions, and therefore seeks to collect 
and divide according to how things are, viz. according to natural kinds.  Through the theme of 
conversation, I argue, we can see the method of collection and division as the fruit of the Socratic 
elenchus. 
 
 
David Kaufman, Transylvania University 
dhkaufma@princeton.edu 
“Galen on the Therapy of Distress and the Limits of Emotional Therapy” 
 
In my talk, I will discuss the contribution of Galen’s recently discovered consolation letter, On the 
Freedom from Distress, to both ancient consolation literature and the ancient philosophy of the 
emotions. In this work, Galen appeals to three prominent and, in their original contexts, opposing 
methods of consolation. Nevertheless, despite its apparent eclecticism, I will argue that Galen adapts 
these distinct and incongruous methods of therapy into a cogent and innovative, multi-tiered 
method of consoling distress.  
 Galen’s therapy of distress is based on his distinction between appropriate and inappropriate 
instances of the emotion. According to him, someone may be inappropriately distressed on account 
either of being distressed over the wrong sorts of objects – for example, at being deprived of her 
surplus wealth – or on account of being moved excessively by the right objects – for instance, by 
physical pain and hardship or mental incapacitation. Galen recommends two distinct sorts of 
therapy corresponding to these two kinds of inappropriate distress: first, he argues that the only 
method of consoling people experiencing distress over the wrong objects is to persuade them that 
the merely apparent bads over which they are distressed are, in fact, not bad; second, he argues that 
people who have more or less the right conception of what things really are good and bad, but are 
prone to be affected excessively by them should habituate themselves to misfortunes, by vividly 
imagining such things happening to them. As I will show, Galen adopts these two lines of therapy 
from two opposing kinds of Stoic emotional therapy: the belief-based method proposed by the 
classical Stoics and the revisionary method proposed by the 2nd/1st Century BC Stoic, Posidonius.  
 In addition to these Stoic methods of emotional therapy, Galen also recommends the 
Epicurean therapy of distress, which consoles people experiencing distress by redirecting their 
attention from the source of their distress, say, their impending exile, to other more pleasant 
subjects. Although Galen rejects the Epicurean view that this method of consolation is capable of 
treating any instance of distress at all, however violent, I think that it plays an important role in his 
own therapy of distress. For of the methods of emotional therapy he discusses only the Epicurean 
method is useful for consoling people in the grip of occurrent distress over an appropriate object, 
such as extreme poverty or extreme physical pain.  
 Galen’s own therapy of distress thus combines three distinct and, in their original contexts, 
competing methods of emotional therapy. Nevertheless, I hope to show that far from simply 
stitching together distinct and incongruous methods of therapy, he adapts each of these methods so 
as to develop a sophisticated and cogent theory of his own. 
 
 
Anna Lannstrom, Stonehill College 
alannstrom@stonehill.edu 
“On behalf of Euthyphro: A less rationalistic understanding of piety” 
 
Like other early dialogues, the Euthyphro ends in aporia.  Many scholars believe that the aporia is 
only apparent and that the dialogue contains clues about what piety is.  In particular, they say, it 
makes clear that we cannot understand piety as pleasing the gods by sacrifices or by other means.  
This paper questions this claim.  I first examine 14d-e where Euthyphro proposes understanding 
piety as performing sacrifices.  Socrates dismisses this idea by reducing sacrifice to trading skills and 
by pointing out that this definition is just another way of saying that piety is what pleases the gods.  I 
argue that sacrifice plays a more respectable role in Greek piety than what Socrates suggests, that 
Socrates knew that this was so, and that there are some reasons to believe that Socrates even agreed 
with that view.  Then, I argue that scholars dismiss Euthyphro’s definition of piety as doing what 
pleases the gods much too quickly because (1) a definition which does not reference pleasing the 
gods departs too sharply from common usage; (2) Socrates’ criticism of the pleasing the gods 
definition (e.g., the Euthyphro dilemma) is inadequate; and I argue that Euthyphro was on the right 
track in defining piety in this way. 
 
 
Joseph Lemelin, The New School for Social Research 
lemej459@newschool.edu 
“Epistēmē as hexis apodeiktikē” 
 
In book six of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines epistēmē (knowledge) as a hexis 
apodeiktikē (an active capacity having to do with demonstration).  In this essay, I aim to explicate 
the role of hexis in Aristotle’s formulation of epistēmē by bringing the Nicomachean Ethics account 
of epistēmē as an intellectual virtue into dialogue with the discussion of first principles (archai) in the 
opening and closing chapters of the Posterior Analytics. My claim is that in taking into account the 
role of hexis in epistēmē, as the way toward understanding the underlying causes of things, the 
conception of knowledge that arises must be approached as an active condition of the soul: what is 
known shows itself as inseparable from the manner in which that knowledge is achieved. 
 
 
Glenn Lesses, College of Charleston 
lessesg@cofc.edu 
“Socrates the Stoic: Moral Psychology in Plato's Symposium” 
 
The Stoics regard themselves as Socrates’ intellectual successors.  Zeno, for instance, is reported to 
have wondered where someone like Socrates is to be found (D.L. 7. 2).  Epictetus (Discourses 4.5.1-
2) maintains that the life of Socrates should be adopted as an exemplar.  Commentators often refer 
to Plato’s early dialogues, e.g., the Euthydemus and Gorgias, to explain the appeal of Socratic 
philosophy for the Stoics.  No doubt that such positions as the sufficiency of virtue for eudaimonia, 
the identification of virtue with knowledge, and the denial of akrasia influenced Stoicism.   
     The Symposium receives little notice as a resource for the Stoic version of Socratic doctrine.  Yet, 
as Vlastos reminds us, Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium highlights the strangeness of Socrates: 
“Such is his strangeness (atopia) that you will search and search among those living now and among 
men of the past, and never come close to what he is himself and to the things he says (221d).”  
Socrates’ strangeness is reflected both in the presentation of his character and in his philosophical 
doctrine.  Fundamental aspects of the moral psychology ascribed to Socrates in the Symposium 
depart from other middle period dialogues such as the Republic.  Irwin, Rowe, and other critics have 
recognized that the psychological theory of the Symposium is close to the position of Plato’s early 
dialogues and, arguably, philosophically Socratic.  In this essay, I propose a Stoic reading of some 
central features of Socratic moral psychology in the Symposium.  If the Stoics are as familiar with 
the Symposium as they are with other works of Plato, they can embrace the strangeness of Socrates 
for their own ethical and psychological theorizing. 
 I first look very briefly at aspects of the Symposium’s eudaimonism as well as its failure to 
mention the divided-soul-doctrine of other middle dialogues.  Although somewhat imprecise about 
both issues, the Symposium is consistent with the Stoics’ stringent eudaimonism and their 
psychological monism.  Next, I develop several features of the Socratic analysis of emotion found in 
the dialogue.  Socrates maintains that beliefs about value are directly related to emotional responses.  
Formulating truthful beliefs lead to the authentic emotion of love, a kind of rational affect.  The 
Stoics agree that mistaken beliefs are, in part, the cause of irrational, emotional impulses that ought 
to be eliminated.  They also attribute a kind of rational affect (i.e., eupatheiai) to ideal agents.  
Alcibiades explains Socrates’ strangeness partly in terms of his rational, affective impulses.  Finally, 
in her portrayal of love, Diotima describes a process in which an agent’s becoming more rational 
modifies the objects of his desire as well as his corresponding motivations.  This ascent anticipates 
in some ways the Stoic theory of moral development and rational agency (e.g., Cicero Fin. 3.20-23).   
     This reading of the Symposium is a preliminary attempt to show its attractions for the Stoics.  
Even though the dialogue is not an early work of Plato’s, the Symposium’s moral psychology can 
serve the Stoics well as they extend and put their own gloss on Socratic doctrine. 
 
 
Donald Lindenmuth, The Pennsylvania State University 
DCL1@psu.edu 
“Plato's Lysis: The Beginning of Socratic Philosophizing” 
 
Plato's Lysis presents the beginning of Socratic philosophizing.  The pre-Socratic inquiry into nature 
is replaced by a new kind of wisdom requiring the existence of human friendship.  But friendship 
rests on the need for goodness and the presence of human goodness in the friends.  Eros, which is a 
force of nature, provides a principle of attraction within nature but Socrates turns to friendship, the 
source of human community, which attempts to address our needs, desires and wants for a life that 
is truly good. 
  The Lysis is the fullest explanation in Plato's dialogues because it both criticizes the definitions of 
eros given in the Symposium and the Phaedrus and also shows how a more complete understanding 
of eros and philia by means of their similarity and their difference.  The transformation of eros into 
philia, which is referred toin the Symposium and Phaedrus, is presented in the Lysis both dramatically 
and argumentatively. 
  The difference between the two earlier dialogues and the later Lysis lies in the emphasis being 
placed in the Lysis on how humans befriend one another rather than the ascent to either the 
beautiful itself or the hyperouranian realm of the beings.  The Lysis, unlike the other two dialogues 
is devoid of myth.  it focuses on the necessary conditions for a community of friends to arise and 
that includes the presence of philosophy in wood and deed. 
  The failure of his interlocutors to be persuaded of Socrates' final conclusion that they had yet to 
reach a conclusion which would be final is rooted in the limits of the kind of friendship present in 
Lysis and Menexenus and the failure of Hippothales to comprehend the movement of the soul from 
eros to philia.  That comprehension is prefigured in the motion from the discussion of eros outside 
the palaestra to the inner exhibition of Socrates' seeking for friend which takes place inside the 
palaestra. 
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“Aquinas on free judgment as self-motion” 
 
Crucial to Aquinas’s action theory is his claim that human beings possess the power of “free 
decision” (liberum arbitrium). In some of his writings he explains that our ability to freely decide is 
our ability to “freely judge” (liberum iudicium) (DV, q.24, a.2, c./ SCG II, c.48, n.3). Aquinas’s 
account of free judgment is fairly brief. However, three things are clear. First, the ability to freely 
judge consists in the ability to reflect (reflectere) about one’s practical judgments. That is to say, free 
judgment consists in the ability to form what Scott MacDonald calls practical “second order 
judgments” about one’s practical first order judgments, which latter are about what one wants to do. 
Second, agents form practical second order judgments in light of their conception of the good (ratio 
boni). Third, by forming these second order judgments, agents are “causes of their judging” (causa 
sui ipsius in iudicando). 
In recent decades, many scholars debated about how to adequately classify Aquinas’s account of 
freedom (whether it is e.g. libertarian or compatibilist, intellectualist or voluntarist). But only few 
suggestions have been made as to how to understand the structure of free judgment. Since free 
judgment is essential to Aquinas’s account of human freedom as such, I shall endeavour to expand 
upon these already existing suggestions.  
First, I shall explore how the higher order status of practical second order judgments ought to be 
understood. Since Aquinas has little to say about this, I shall look at what Aquinas has to say about 
another class of reflective judgments, viz., introspective judgments, so as to gain some insight on the 
higher order status of practical second order judgments.  
The second issue that I shall deal with is how to understand Aquinas’s claim that free judgment is 
‘free’. My contention is that the key to understanding the freedom of free judgment is Aquinas’s 
claim that free judgment is a kind of “self-motion” (in iudicando seipsa movent) (SCG II, c.48, n.3) 
For, as Aquinas frequently says, a ‘free agent’ is a “cause of her own motion” (causa sui motus) (DV, 
q.24, a.1, c.). ‘Self-motion’, understood in the strict sense, only applies to self-imparted locomotion, 
and in fact requires that what is moved is a body (In Phys. l.12, n.1074). Since on Aquinas’s view, 
intellectual processes such as judging are immaterial he must, therefore, use the term ‘self-motion” 
as applied to practical reflection in a metaphorical sense. This metaphor, however, is quite revealing. 
For, with it, Aquinas suggests that free judgment is structurally similar to self-imparted locomotion. 
And so we may conclude, I shall suggest, that just as an animal is the efficient cause of its bodily 
motion by virtue of its soul, so we are the efficient causes of our lower order judgments by virtue of 
our higher order judgments. And it is the fact that a judgment is efficiently caused by us, I shall 
argue, that makes it free. 
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“"Very Useful and Realist":  Pseudo-Campsall's Response to Ockham's Summa Logicae” 
 
During the 1320’s and 30’s, Ockham’s _Summa logicae_ became sufficiently well known to provoke 
a series of responses from Thomist and Scotist realists.  The main point of contention was SL 14-16, 
which Ockham devoted to the problem of universals and in which he deployed several arguments 
against common natures and Scotus’s formal distinction.  One of the Scotist responses, credited to 
Pseudo-Campsall and dubbed _valde utilis et realis contra Ockham_ (“very useful and realist against 
Ockham”), engages in a chapter-by-chapter rebuttal of the _Summa logicae_, with Pseudo-Campsall 
answering some thirty paragraphs’ worth of arguments and constructing his own defense of the 
formal distinction’s logical coherence. 
An examination of Pseudo-Campsall’s interpretation of and response to Ockham’s arguments 
reveals several implicit assumptions that underlie both scholars’ treatments of common natures.  
While the surface disagreement is over universals, Pseudo-Campsall’s answers to Ockham arise from 
more fundamental incompatibilities in the two scholars’ metaphysics and logic.  For example, 
Ockham and Pseudo-Campsall implicitly invoke different definitions of substance, which in turn 
lead them to hold contradictory views on what sorts of things can be substances, whether substances 
must be numerically singular, and whether a less-than-numerical-unity can be a substance.  Ockham 
and Pseudo-Campsall also parse the relationship between actuality and “completeness” in the 
intellect in different manners, resulting in divergent positions on whether something can exist 
“actually” in many things even if it is made “complete” only in the mind.  They go head-to-head in a 
lengthy section over questions of logical form and valid inference patterns for syllogisms involving 
formal distinctions.  Finally, the two scholars have contradictory intuitions about the relationship 
between logic and Trinitarian theology.  Pseudo-Campsall affirms the universal validity of logic, 
asserting that a valid syllogism which yields formal distinctions when applied to the Trinity must 
yield formal distinctions when applied to creatures.  But Ockham implicitly restricts Trinitarian logic 
to the Trinity itself, quietly insisting that the problem of universals be discussed _in creaturis_—
where, he argues, formal distinctions are illogical and nothing can really be common to more than 
one thing. 
In this paper, I uncover the logical and metaphysical assumptions that inform Pseudo-Campsall’s 
response to Ockham.  I discuss points where Scotus’s, Ockham’s, and Pseudo-Campsall’s arguments 
seem to miss one another, as well as points where they meet obliquely and address unspoken 
assumptions.  I conclude with a brief evaluation of how "utilis et realis" Pseudo-Campsall’s response 
really was to the critique of universals in Ockham’s Summa logicae. 
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“the bhagavadgita as a (frontis) piece of tragedy” 
 
In this paper, several theoretical approaches, definitions and insights concerning Greek and 
Shakespearean notions of ‘tragedy’, ‘the tragic’ and ‘the tragic genre’ will be applied to the 
Bhagavadgita as an integral part of the Mahabharata epic in order to determine the nature of the 
similarities and differences  between this classical Indian text and classical Western tragedies.  A 
number of aspects of tragedy will be discussed by briefly referring to the scholars who have raised 
these issues as typical of or prominent in tragedy, and by then explaining in some detail how these 
aspects or issues are dealt with in the Bhagavadgita: tragic subjects, plot patterns (incl. reversal and 
ending), conflicts, mood, world view, irony, audience expectations, dialogues, dealing with values, 
moral grounds and the linking of human actions to human intentions, tensions between human 
freedom and cosmic necessity or divine fate, and functions of tragedy. 
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“Law and Morality in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Bhagavad Gītā” 
 
This effort concerns the relationship of the law to morality in the Nicomachean Ethics and the 
Bhagavad Gītā. In relation to the Ethics, it will take the form of showing how Aristotle’s conception 
of virtue is intimately connected to the law of the state, both in terms of conceiving the law and 
conforming to it (which has interesting implications for those who think his virtue theory is based 
only on character). In relation to the Gītā,  it will attempt to work out how the content of morality 
(which is to be undertaken with detachment) is related to dharmic law, and what one is to do when 
one's dharmaic obligations are not obvious  (conceived in terms of the principle of world welfare). I 
will then reflect on the implications of both these attempts to walk a fine line between over and 
under defining moral action. 
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“Plotinus’ Doctrine of Reincarnation – Distributive Justice and Mystical Ascent” 
 
One of Plotinus’ most urgent exhortations to the particular soul is for it to ascend out of the 
incarnate state and return to the One. Plotinus’ doctrine of reincarnation is of significance to this 
urging. The hypostasis soul – a real being which remains in the noetic realm and is not the soul of 
any particular thing – moves in a moving circle of aspiration around the Good. It therefore 
transcends altogether the transmigratory cycle. But the incarnate particular soul, which Plotinus tells 
us is liable to be forgetful of its transcendental origin, is subject to the rounds of reincarnation. 
Plotinus often exhorts this individual soul to return to its divine origin – an ascent, which can be 
understood only within the context of Plotinus’ doctrine of reincarnation. The incarnate soul, must 
ascend out of this state altogether, if it is to ascend beyond embodiment, time, and becoming, and 
gain the self concentration it needs to complete its ascent to the Good. The purpose of 
reincarnation in Plotinus’ Enneads therefore cannot lie only in the dispensation of distributive 
justice. Rather, it must be tied as well to this highest exhortation from Plotinus –  to “‘escape’ to the 
upper world ... rise to the intelligible and intellect and God” (III.4(15).2). 
Although, Plotinus’ doctrine of reincarnation has been explored by many scholars (Inge, Pistorius, 
Gerson,  Rich),it has not been studied in the light of the mystical ascent of the particular soul. Nor 
have the respites (temporal and eternal) from reincarnation suggested by Plotinus – through death 
and mysticism – been explored in the light of the moral prerequisites for the ascent of the particular 
soul. In this paper I hope to make a modest attempt at understanding Plotinus’ doctrine of 
reincarnation, its moral purpose (distributive justice and mystical ascent), and the respites from 
rebirth. 
 
 
Joel Mann, St. Norbert College 
joel.mann@snc.edu 
“A slave to the truth: Antiphon’s first tetralogy and the value(s) of testimony.” 
 
This paper attempts to construct an interpretation of Antiphon’s first tetralogy as a carefully crafted 
and substantial contribution to certain issues in the philosophy of law and philosophical 
epistemology more generally, particularly to the epistemic value of testimony. The tetralogy centers 
around a fictional case of assault and murder. Its basic elements are assumed by both prosecution 
and defense: the victim was attacked and killed while walking through the city at night. There were 
no witnesses to the murder save the victim’s slave, who also died from wounds sustained in the 
attack, but not before identifying the defendant as the perpetrator. Thus, there is little in the way of 
evidence, and the credibility of the available testimony is called into question by Greek legal 
conventions, which generally regard slave testimony as unreliable unless given under torture. 
The first tetralogy is usually treated as an exercise in argumentation based on probability (eikos), as 
contrasted with more secure forms of argumentation (e.g., arguments that proceed deductively from 
established fact). The received view of the first tetralogy understands it as a meditation on the 
ultimate unreliability of eikos argumentation, to which facts are epistemically, and so legally, 
superior. However, this assumes, first, that such facts exist and, second, that they can be accessed by 
the members of a jury. Both prosecution and defense appear to accept that facts can be accessed via 
eyewitness testimony, and further that such testimony supplies the jury with an account of what 
“really” happened. Thus, eyewitness testimony is deemed superior to mere eikos argumentation 
about the relative probability that the accusation is accurate. 
The underlying puzzle of the first tetralogy, I will argue, depends on the realization that, while direct 
perceptual acquaintance may be a reliable way to attain knowledge of facts (putting the “eye” in 
“eyewitness testimony,” as it were), the jury members themselves have no such acquaintance with 
the facts in dispute. All “facts” are transmitted to the jury via testimony. But the responsible 
evaluation of testimony requires judgments to be made about whether, e.g., a witness is trustworthy, 
i.e., is the kind of person whose testimony can be trusted. And indeed, such concerns force one to 
advert to eikos argumentation. The result, I will argue, is that Antiphon has generated in an ancient 
legal context a problem central to contemporary discussions of testimony. Either testimony stands 
on its own authority (the so-called “non-reductionist” view), or it must depend on other modes of 
knowledge-acquisition (e.g., sense-perception) for its authority (the so-called “reductionist” view). If 
the former, then it would seem as though knowledge claims are extremely vulnerable to skepticism 
(especially in legal contexts, where the truthfulness of witnesses cannot be assumed). If the latter, 
then it seems as though most of the beliefs in which we are most confident will fall short of 
knowledge, mired in probability and “muddled” by questions of value. 
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“Anomalous Order: The Dynamic Function of Law in Plato's "Laws"” 
 
While Plato’s Statesman presents a critique of the rule of law as unable to cope with the diversity of 
political circumstance, the Laws, though recognizing the force of this critique, nevertheless defends 
the rule of law in the strongest terms. I argue that the Laws can do this because it develops an 
account of law (nomos) as not merely a static rule but as itself a force that shapes and partially 
orders the diverse field of political experience. Law as rule or measure attempts to overcome the 
unevenness (anōmalotes) of things or to reduce to a minimum the exceptions to its own rule. A 
variety of specific laws proposed in the dialogue can be understood as aiming at this end, from those 
regulating commerce the accumulation of wealth, which aim at an “even distribution of property 
(homalotēta tais ousiais, 918c3) to practice of choral dance, which unites the different members of 
the community in harmonious motion. Most importantly, law attempts to reconcile the various 
forces within the city, and within the human soul, that pull individual and  community toward 
disorder and license. The famous preludes to the laws are meant to complement the pure command 
of law with rational persuasion. This activity of law fulfills the task of the third kind of legislator, 
who reconciles the better and worse parts of a city without eliminating either of them (627c-628a). 
By proposing such a reconciliation the one of law wit the many of political reality, the Laws can be 
seen as attempting to solve what could be called the political manifestation of the chōrismos 
problem. 
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“Aristotle Domesticates Protagoras: Charity and Dialectic” 
 
This paper examines Aristotle’s engagement with the measure doctrine of Protagoras, with a 
focus on one striking episode thereof and its implications for Aristotle’s view of truth, meaning and 
human reason. 
 While discussing “measure” in book 10 of the Metaphysics, Aristotle takes Protagoras’ 
measure doctrine to mean something different from the standard subjective relativism. Knowledge 
and perception are measures, he says, because they are means by which we come to recognize 
things. Therefore, when Protagoras asserts that a person is the measure of all things, what he really 
means is that the person who knows or perceives is the measure, because knowledge and perception 
are measures.  
 The result is a “relativism” Aristotle can accept, as when he argues in the Nicomachean 
Ethics that people with practical wisdom are measures of the good. He even says in Metaphysics 10 
that, while Protagoreans might seem to offer an astonishing view, in fact they are “saying nothing 
surprising.” Aristotle does interpret other philosophers in his own terms. This situation is unique, 
however, because he juxtaposes his own reading of the doctrine with the apparent intended meaning 
and then insists on his own. Moreover, Aristotle is well aware in other contexts that the “doctrine of 
Protagoras” is some form of global subjective relativism. So what is going on? 
 Aristotle employs what we would call a principle of charity. He takes words and assigns 
meaning to preserve truth: anthropos, for instance, actually refers to a person who knows or 
perceives. Interpretive charity is a going philosophical concern, and most agree that apparent 
intended meaning should constrain interpretation. Not Aristotle, though.  
 Compare how Plato reconstructs Protagoras’ view in the Theaetetus, on which Aristotle 
bases much of his own treatment. One must, says Socrates, reply as Protagoras himself would, 
preserving intended meaning in the course of rational reconstruction. This hews to a contemporary 
notion of interpretive charity. Plato uses such a method again in the Protagoras when discussing 
Simonides’ poem. Socrates makes fine distinctions in the meanings of key terms to save the poem 
from apparent contradiction. The constraint is therefore well-established, but Aristotle still ignores 
it. 
 He does so, I argue, because the measure doctrine is a special case with foundational 
implications. Aristotle claims in Metaphysics 4 that intersubjective significance is necessary for 
meaning. Interpretation is impossible if no interpretation could assign the proper meaning to the 
statement. If a view entails that mutual signification is impossible, it is therefore necessarily false. 
Dialectic sets the limits of thought.  
 Subjective relativism, however, has this consequence, because it entails a denial of the 
principle of non-contradiction, which itself entails, according to Aristotle, that words cannot have 
intersubjective significance. Aristotle therefore deploys charity that privileges truth over apparent 
intended meaning; Protagoras need not mean what he thought he meant. As interpreted by Aristotle, 
Protagoras speaks the truth, but this has its cost, as it means he can no longer tell us anything we did 
not already know. 
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“The unity of inner sense powers: Avicenna and Suárez” 
 
What is the distinction between touching a knife, imagining it, and reckoning it to be painful? An 
underlying concern in the part On the soul of Avicenna’s The healing (al-shifa: fi l-nafs) is to 
systematize which forms of post-sensory cognitive capacities there are, and to state on what basis 
they are distinct from one another. Avicenna answers that, as a counterpart to the five external sense 
modalities, there are five internal senses—that is: common sense, imagination, estimation, 
imaginative or cogitative power, and memory—and the criterion of their distinction is an object-
function based on: to each there is a specific combination of an object it is of, and a cognitive role it 
performs with that object. While for authors in the Latin West Avicenna’s answer has been 
influential, it has also attracted criticism. This paper focuses on the correction to the individuation of 
the inner sense powers proposed by Francisco Suárez in his De Anima VIII. Although Suárez agrees 
in principle with Avicenna that sense powers must be individuation on the basis of a unique object-
function pair, he comes to a radically different conclusion. Instead of identifying five inner senses, 
Suárez contends that there is in effect only one inner sense; otherwise put, there is no real 
distinction between inner sense powers. What is going on here? I argue that, while both Avicenna 
and Suárez take the object-function based criterion of individuation seriously, their concerns are 
different. The core focus for Avicenna is to capture the specific contributions that distinct powers 
make to overall cognition, together with an awareness that a single power cannot be assigned 
conflicting characteristics. For example, if a power, in order to be able to receive sensible forms, 
must have a humid disposition in its part of the brain, it cannot at the same time have the dryness 
that a retentive power requires. For Suárez, on the other hand, the central concern lies with 
accounting for the dependency and interaction between (or within) one or more capacities. Suárez 
emphasizes that in order for, say, what is at one point sensorily apprehended actually to be retained 
in cognition, the differentiation in object and function cannot be of such kind so as to merit a real 
distinction between powers. Hence, all inner sense powers are really just one. I bring out how the 
origin of this divergence between Avicenna and Suárez lies in a tension between acknowledging the 
unity and simplicity of the soul on the one hand, and a genuine diversity in acts and object of 
cognition on the other. I demonstrate how, in endorsing their respective options for the 
individuation of the inner sense powers, both authors seize on two different extremes already 
contained in this tension. 
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“Reexamining Augustine on Time:  Psychology, Realism, and Antirealism in Confessions X and XI” 
 
Reexamining Augustine on Time:  
Psychology, Realism, and Antirealism in Confessions X and XI 
AUGUSTINE’S THEORY OF TIME, most explicitly given with the context of Book XI of his 
Confessions, is widely regarded as a subjective, or psychological, view of time.  The relative position 
of time’s discussion in the text is significant when compared to the previous ten books that offer an 
autobiographical account of Augustine’s conversion to Christianity.  As such, Augustine’s 
formulation of time within the opening chapter of the second half of the Confessions can be read as 
a significant theological starting point linking the previous ten chapters. Augustine’s account of time, 
however, is not without some significant difficulties.  The aim of this paper is to elaborate the 
notion of time that Augustine presents within the context of Book XI of his Confessions and 
contrast it to the overall project of the Confessions and to understand the various problems that are 
implicit in Augustine’s discussion of Time. Primarily of interest will be the question of man’s 
association to eternity, held by Augustine as being the province of God alone, the status of time’s 
reality within his subjective psychological account, its relation to realism and antirealism, and the 
problem of change and movement.  Implicit in my examination is an engagement with Sorabji’s 
reading of Augustine’s on  time and asking the question that if we remove a conception of God 
from Augustine’s general outline of an experience of time, and thus not connected to eternity, we 
are presented with a series of three different and potentially overlapping problems (following 
Sorabji) and that time for Augustine may be one or more of the following, (1) a successively static 
series of tenseless ordered events, (2) unreal or nonexistent, or (3) merely a mental phenomenon 
which must be somehow overcome. For various reasons Augustine will reject at least (1) and (2) and 
the question remains, as to whether Augustine’s conception will force us to accept the third option. I 
depart from Sorabji’s interpretation that the mental model of time may be overcome and argue that 
we must account (as Augustine suggests) for the epistemological argument from Augustine’s 
concept of memory and the ontological status of time must both be addressed in a connected way. 
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“Conjectural Knowledge and Metaphor: Implications of Nicholas of Cusa's De coniecturis” 
 
In this paper I explain that for Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) almost all human knowing amounts to 
conjectural knowledge.  I begin by examining what Nicholas means by “conjecture,” then discuss its 
presuppositions and implications for our knowing.  His definition of coniectura as “a positive 
assertion that participates in truth as it is, but in otherness” makes it clear that Cusanus never doubts 
that our thought attains some measure of truth, particularly in our ordinary perceptual judgments 
that recognize and identify what is perceived.  Nicholas does not hesitate to invoke both original and 
traditional proposals that he sees as conjectural when he turns to more philosophical conceptions 
about the natures of perceptible things and what transcends them, as well as about the nature of 
human knowledge,   In the last part of the paper, I argue that such theoretical conjectures are 
typically metaphorical no less than the notion of conjecture itself.  This implies that all our 
conjectural knowing and speaking about what we know may well be metaphorical. 
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“Comparing Socrates' Digressions in the Theaetetus and in Republic 5-7” 
 
This paper attempts to call in question certain aspects of Sandra Peterson’s readings of the 
digressions of the Theaetetus and Republic in her 2011 book SOCRATES AND PHILOSOPHY IN 
THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO, by providing sketches of alternative readings that better explain 
some important connections between the two digressions not explained by her readings.  Peterson’s 
view of the Theaetetus digression is that Socrates there articulates views that belong to Theodorus, 
that no part of the digression is endorsed by Socrates or Plato, and that, when we realize this, we can 
dissolve the discrepancies between Socrates’ characterizations of the philosophic life in the 
digression and his characterizations of the philosophic life in the Apology. Socrates’ sequence of 
apparent pronouncements about philosophy and becoming like to God, according to her, is 
“Socrates’ invitation to the young Theaetetus, and Plato’s invitation to the reader, to examine those 
pronouncements,” and nothing more (86).  But in response to Peterson’s view, the paper recalls that 
Plato depicts Socrates in the Phaedrus as embodying and expressing a dialectical method of searching 
for the truth, a method that Socrates also to some extent explicitly articulates in his “collection and 
division” of the term ‘rhetoric’.  It argues that the second part of the Theaetetus digression invites 
examination of the pronouncements about philosophy and likeness to God in such a way as to 
contain hints and suggestions toward a monotheistic reinterpretation of the notion of likeness to 
God. On such a reinterpretation Socrates (and Plato) would be recommending a view of the 
philosophic life as a Basilike techne, in which living in likeness to God is living as a selfless and 
generous craftsman of goodness, imitating the “maker and father” God of the Timaeus rather than 
the Olympian gods as portrayed in the theogonies.  Finally, the paper discusses how the 
monotheism of the Theaetetus digression echoes monotheistic suggestions to be found in Socrates 
comments during the Republic digression from 471c until the end of Book 7, taking issue with some 
of Peterson’s remarks about the middle sections of the Republic. 
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“Herodorus on Heracles the Philosopher” 
 
Among the ten earliest records uses of the word “philosophize” is the mythographer Herodorus’ 
stunning claim about the hero Heracles, that he “philosophized until death” (φιλοσοφήσας μέχρι 
θανάτου fr. 14 Jacoby, ca. 400 BC). This use—practically ignored by historians of philosophy—helps 
establish the original meaning of the term, a meaning soon lost behind the playful etymologizing in 
Plato’s dialogues, stories about Pythagoras’ self-appellation by Heraclides and his contemporaries, 
and Aristotle’s technical definitions. The association of a mythical champion and philosophizing 
unsettles received views that “philosophizing” in the fifth century meant either “intellectual 
cultivation” (e.g., Nightingale, Cooper) or “loving or seeking after wisdom” (e.g., Guthrie, Barnes, 
Hadot). In other words, the compound term’s meaning neither comes transparently from a 
supposedly stable pair of meanings (of phil- and soph-), nor follows a simple history of 
specialization, from a general term meaning “curious” or “thoughtful” to the narrowly demarcated 
name of a discipline. It has instead a complex evolution, initially identifying people who appeared to 
aspire to the elite social class of sophoi, the panhellenically-notorious sages; later self-applied by 
various circles historically and figuratively linked to Pythagoras’ lineage; and still later becoming 
generically related to certain self-consciously developed intellectual and ethical-maturation practices. 
At some point in his at-least-17-book study of Heracles, Herodorus says that Heracles’ philosophy 
“conquered the much-variegated reasoning of poignant emotion” and won him “the three virtues: 
non-anger, non-avarice, and non-hedonism” (τὸ μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι, τὸ μὴ φιλαργυρεῖν, τὸ μὴ φιληδονεῖν). 
Thus “philosophizing” may mean, in this period near the end of Socrates’ life, the exercise of self-
control. Whether this exercise involves rational argument, we cannot easily tell; the fragment uses 
only the metaphorical verb ἐνίκησε/νικήσαντα. Herodorus may mean that Heracles literally argued 
against the “reasoning” his emotion put forward; but he might instead mean that whatever 
equanimity philosophy amounts to silences the clever rationalization passion encourages. There is no 
assertion here, at any rate, that Heracles exercised dialectical skill. Philosophy also preempts 
common vices. This suggests that philosophizing means successfully acknowledging the really 
valuable things in life; these exclude getting angry, lusting after money, and seeking inordinate 
pleasures. That Herodorus says, perhaps famously, that Heracles philosophized “until death” 
suggests that the process of focusing on the right values takes great constancy and does not depend 
on any particular discovery or ability. Elsewhere in his book, Herodorus said that Herakles became a 
phusikos (an inquirer into phusis) having “learned by having passed on to him the knowledge of the 
heavenly bodies” (fr. 13), but we have no evidence about the way this knowledge relates to Heracles’ 
philosophizing (although Servius wrote that this knowledge helped him complete his labors, ad 
Aeneidem 1.741). All the same, it is notable that Herodorus draws no direct connection between 
“philosophizing,” on the one hand, and “wisdom,” “love,” “curiosity,” or “seeking the truth,” on 
the other. This is contrary to what the traditional accounts would predict, and consistent with the 
trend of usage mentioned above. 
A portion of this paper addresses the authenticity of fr. 14; Detienne and others have wondered 
whether all but the end is a late paraphrase, given its strongly Stoic imagery. How much can be dated 
to the fifth century determines how much can provide evidence for pre-Platonic picture of 
philosophy. I argue that even a cautious appraisal preserves the findings above. 
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“Zhuangzi's Trees: Insubordinate Joy and Heavenly Becoming” 
 
In this paper, I locate the points of contact in the Zhuangzi that deal with the interrelated 
problematics of perspectivalism, teleological subordination, and givenness, by threading together the 
stories within it that involve the image of the tree. I show that the tree figures as something which 
eludes being subordinated to ends, giving the lie to the supposed metaphysical authority of teleology, 
by becoming useless; this evasion constitutes a kind of paradox, the usefulness of the useless, the 
importance of which Zhuangzi argues for throughout the text. The paper is a reflection on this 
paradox and the ethical ramifications implied by the radically immanent metaphysics that Zhuangzi 
espouses, an ethics summed up by the enigmatic phrase ‘becoming attuned to the heavenly’. I argue 
that this is a principled approach to producing harmonious interaction which, grounded in an 
epistemological finitude and a recognition of the univocal status of real difference, produces a space 
in which flourishing becomes possible for social beings. I contend that this model for becoming, 
ecstatically revolutionary and singular in its time, can only be exemplary in our own, marked as it is 
by increasingly violent subordination and tracing a dangerous trajectory toward the impossibility of 
human coexistence with nature. 
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“Politeia in Aristotle, Pol. VI:  An annotated Catalogue” 
 
 Aristotle’s Politics contains 522 occurrences of the expression politeia, and Book VI 
contains 36 of them.  Modern English-language translators have rendered by ‘constitution’ in almost 
every case; but few have made clear which sense or senses of ‘constitution’ they have intended their 
translations to mean.  And in English, as the OED shows, ‘constitution’ is an expression with a 
variety of senses, some of which may not match up exactly with the senses of politeia in Aristotle or 
in other Greek authors. 
 Following indications in Bonitz, Newman, Rhodes, Bordes, and others, I have undertaken an 
annotated catalogue of all the occurrences of this expression in the Politics one book at a time, 
having already completed a trial run with the Politeia of the Athenians, which contains 62 
occurrences and which was one of the preliminary studies on which the Politics was based.*   The 
Politeia of the Athenians recognizes several senses of politeia, and I propose here to show how the 
different senses are distributed in Book VI of the Politics. 
 Where the sense of politeia can be divined from the immediate context in this book, the 
sense often is regime and occasionally polity. This distribution is consistent with the book’s being 
devoted largely to how the oligarchy and democracy might be saved, where these are construed most 
often as regimes.  That they are construed as regimes rather than as arrangements of offices 
(constitutions) is clear where Aristotle speaks of saving the oligarchy (1321a1-2) and of changing the 
arrangement of offices to approximate the mixture known as the so-called polity (1320b22).  The 
arrangements of offices (constitutions) themselves are not being saved.  They, in fact, are being 
changed rather than saved.  Aristotle devotes considerable attention to listing offices in VI.8, even 
though he has done so elsewhere earlier.  In this book the contrast of the oligarchy and the 
democracy with the polity recalls the Laws, and the oligarchy and the democracy are treated as 
exclusive regimes—those that pursue their own interests as they see them, mainly or wholly. 
   *This trial-run material was presented in two conference papers:  “Politeia in the Aristotelian 
Politeia of the Athenians:  A Catalogue of Uses,” Annual Meeting, Northeastern Political Science 
Association, Philadelphia, November 18, 2011; and “Politeia as Citizenship in Aristotle,” Annual 
Meeting, American Philological Association, Philadelphia, Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy 
Panel, January 7, 2012. 
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“Changing ideals of Arête in portrayals of Odysseus during the Peloponnesian War” 
 
In this paper, I would like to analyze the way Odysseus was portrayed in plays written principally by 
Sophocles and Euripides during the Peloponnesian War. I believe that Athenians, or at least some 
Athenian playwrights began to rethink popular ideals of manly virtue or Arête while prosecuting the 
war. I will begin analyzing traditional heroic ideals embodied in Achilles and Ajax, and then consider 
how and why the wily cunning Odysseus formed a new ideal.  Athenians were very proud of their 
ability to outwit forces that were physically larger than them beginning with the Greeks in the Trojan 
War and Athenians in the Persian Wars. While they were fighting and defending themselves, and 
then while losing the war, in revising the character of Odysseus, they seemed to begin to re-evaluate 
the values they had lived by. 
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“Arts, Characters, and Morals in Aristotle” 
 
Although Aristotle’s division between the noble (spoudaioi) characters of tragedy and the vulgar 
(phauloi) characters of comedy in the Poetics is both well-known and memorable, his account of 
character-types, their morality, as well as ability to transmit morals, appears to be much more 
complex at closer examination. In this paper, I explore Aristotle’s classification of characters, in 
accordance to genre, within the same genre, and in relationship to other forms of art (especially 
painting and music). The examples from the Poetics will be put in a broader perspective by looking 
at the Politics and On the Poets.  
Artistic imitation of people in action regards various types of characters in the Poetics (1448a1-8): 
these can appear better, worse, or such as we are, just as painters represent them (Polygnotus 
superior people, Pauson inferior, and Dionysius like us). Poets too imitate in a similar way (Homer 
better, Cleophon like us, Hegemon of Thasos and Nicochares worse, 1448a9-15; for a comparison 
between painting and poetry, see Zanker 2000). After an account of how arts, particularly music, 
represent character and emotions in the Politics (1340a), Aristotle notes that, though visual arts do 
not represent character directly but only give indications (semeia) of character through colors and 
forms (while melodies contain in themselves such representations), the young should not look at the 
works of Pauson but at the works of Polygnotus. I am interested in exploring several matters here. 
(1) How exactly do arts represent character and emotions? In the Poetics drama and painting were 
linked as very similar, but they seem to have different imitative abilities in the Politics. Where does 
music stand as an art, and more broadly in relation to tragedy? (2) While Aristotle abstains from any 
moral judgment in how types of poetry and their characters may influence the young in the passage 
from the Poetics, this is not the case in the Politics. Then, perhaps, ethical value can be ascribed to 
epic and tragedy, based on the type of representation alone.  
 Finally (3) if generally Aristotle attaches epithets to characters in accordance to types of 
actions and to genre (epic and tragedy—better than us; parody—worse than us, etc), sometimes he 
seems to acknowledge differences within the same genre (e.g. tragedy). For example, wondering 
whether poets should be criticized when they represent things that are not true, Aristotle suggests 
that perhaps they ought not be criticized for representing matters as they should be (rather than as 
they are). He adds that Sophocles said that he himself represented people as they should be whereas 
Euripides portrayed them as they were (Poet. 1460b33-5; perhaps something of the sort is implied in 
On the Poets 3.7). 
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“"By the Goose, By the Rooster." Socrates' Other Unusual Oaths” 
 
“By the goose, By the Rooster.”  Socrates’ Other Unusual Oaths 
                                           David J. Murphy 
     Beginning in the Roman imperial period, we find reports that Socrates swore, not only “by the 
dog,” as Plato has him do, but by seven other natural entities:  goose, plane tree, rooster, ram, goat, 
oak, and even “by any random stone” (Augustine, De vera religione 2).  Antiquity credited the hero-
king Rhadamanthys with the invention of such conversational oaths, as a device to reserve oaths by 
gods’ names for formal use.  Many later reports also present Socrates’ unusual oaths as a ground of 
his indictment for impiety.  Reports that Socrates swore “by the plane tree” may be careless 
inferences from the Phaedrus, but it seems a stretch to derive “by the rooster” from Socrates’ last 
words in the Phaedo, and no Platonic passages support reports of Socratic oaths by other natural 
entities.  Xenophon’s Socrates swears only by Olympian gods.  Reports of Socrates’ 
“Rhadamanthine” oaths, then, pose several problems.  What was their genesis?  By what route did 
they reach Roman and Byzantine writers?  Why are Socrates’ purported oath-witnesses attested in 
such varying proportions (e.g. goose in 21 sources, rooster in three)?    
     Socrates’ oaths have been the subject of three recent studies, of which the most useful for us is 
by Andreas Patzer (“Beim Hunde!  Sokrates und der Eid des Rhadamanthys,” in Festschrift Werner 
Suerbaum [Stuttgart 2003] 93-107).  Patzer argues that it was in Polycrates’ display piece, the 
Accusation of Socrates, that all Socrates’ “Rhadamanthine” oaths known to us were collected and 
presented as evidence of impiety.  Patzer postulates further that Polycrates had no other source than 
Socratic dialogues.  Patzer’s thesis deserves scrutiny, not least because the attempt to uncover traces 
of lost Socratic literature is attracting renewed scholarly interest. 
    In the present paper I undertake, first, to refine Patzer’s conclusions by assessing his assumptions 
critically and subjecting the ancient reports to analysis by individual oath formula.  I argue that 
besides dog, only goose and rooster present strong claims to have stood in Polycrates;  goat, oak and 
stone almost certainly appeared neither there nor in Socratic dialogues.  Second, diachronic analysis 
of reports of Socrates’ oaths has much to teach about scholarly methods from Hellenistic times to 
the Renaissance.  I shall hypothesize that:  1. “the oath of Rhadamanthys” is an invention of 
Cratinus;  2. at least one lost Socratic dialogue a.) portrayed Socrates as promoting deisidaimonia, lit. 
“fear of the divine,” through such oaths, and b). linked him to oaths by goose and, probably, 
rooster;  3. Didymus Chalcenterus in two works on comedy, and perhaps also in his collection of 
proverbs, compiled information about Socrates’ and Rhadamanthys’ oaths;  4. an ancient scholar 
compiling material about Socrates' trial wrongly located Polycrates’ invective against Socrates’ oaths 
in a speech given at the trial.  Later tradition draws on these compilations. 
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“Cultivation of African-asian philosophical relationship” 
 
So far, in Africa today, what passes as professional academic philosophy is largely a product of 
Western teaching. African academic philosophers are primarily nourished by philosophy texts 
written by Western philosophers or by their teaching. It is also the case that African professors of 
philosophy have been taught by the Western professors of philosophy or by African professors of 
philosophy who have been taught by them. Even the history of philosophy they teach is largely a 
product of Western historians of philosophy and is primarily the history of Western philosophy. 
This trend in philosophy is increasingly being challenged by some philosophers who seek to 
diversify orientation in philosophy. I make a contribution to this end by cultivating an African-Asian 
philosophical relationship. In part, the contribution also seeks to loosen the dependence of African 
philosophers on Western philosophical tradition and on Western professors of philosophy. The 
dependence has inhibited a dialogue between African philosophers and their Asian counterparts. 
The paper prepares the ground for such a dialogue and highlights some of the obstacles that need to 
be overcome. And because the relationship is intended to be philosophical, the dialogue invites 
participation not only from Africans and Asians but from all philosophers 
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“How Socrates Misleads Phaedrus: Falsehood and Fallacy in the Palinode” 
 
Socrates’ palinode reads like a condensation of those doctrines most characteristic of middle Plato. 
The theory of the forms, recollection, and the tripartite soul play an integral role in Socrates’ account 
of philosophic love. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the palinode has long been considered the 
“centerpiece” of the Phaedrus.  
Nevertheless, a number of scholars have noticed that the palinode presents somewhat distorted 
versions of these characteristic views. In particular, commentators have pointed to a passage early on 
in the speech, where Socrates claims that philosophical love is a form of mania akin to prophecy, 
religious possession, and poetry (249c4-250b1). Often known as “the paradox of philosophic 
madness”, many have wondered why Plato, the “ultra-rationalist”, should come so suddenly and 
unexpectedly to describe philosophy as a kind of divine madness. 
Others have noticed that the palinode contains a strange account of the immortal soul. It is generally 
agreed that, at this point in the dialogues, the mortal soul (the soul in its living, embodied form) is a 
composite entity, comprised of the intellect, the emotions, and the appetites (Rep. 439). By contrast, 
the immortal soul (that part of us which lives on even after the death of the body) is taken to be a 
non-composite entity, consisting in reason (nous) alone (Phd. 80d; Rep. 611a-b). But the soul of the 
Phaedrus is different in this respect: Socrates adopts the chariot metaphor—a composite image—in a 
tale describing the immortal soul. This is the first time in all the dialogues that the immortal soul 
appears as a composite entity.  
Whereas many have taken these puzzles as straightforward philosophical developments, this paper 
presents an alternative account. I argue that Plato has not so much changed his mind, as he has put a 
number of insincere claims in the mouth of Socrates. My argument rests largely on the often-
overlooked discussion of rhetoric from the second half of the dialogue. Here, I argue, Socrates 
doubts the sincerity of his earlier speeches. He claims that his speeches demonstrate the art of 
misleading (262d) and that the palinode was delivered partially “in jest” (265e). It very likely, I argue, 
that Socrates doubts the palinode in these later passages because he recognizes that he has 
misrepresented both the nature of philosophy and the nature of the immortal soul. 
On my view, the purpose of the palinode is to disabuse Phaedrus of a potentially harmful belief. 
Recognizing at the outset of the dialogue that Phaedrus thinks that it is always better to favor the 
non-lover, and that this will drive him into the arms of men like Lysias, Socrates aims to persuade 
Phaedrus to favor to the lover—especially if he be a lover of wisdom. I conclude that the palinode 
misleads in a way that has often been overlooked in the dialogues; Socrates defends a number of 
false claims in the service of convincing his interlocutor of something that he will do well to believe. 
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“The Neopythagorean Backdrop to the fall (σφάλμα/νεῦσις) of the Soul in the Gnosis and its Echo 
in the Plotinian Treatises 33 and 34” 
 
When speaking of the fall or decline of the Soul (Sophia) within the context of the Gnostic 
cosmogonic narratives, Plotinus, in addition to the term νεῦσις, resorts to the substantive σφάλμα (or 
the corresponding verb σφάλλεσθαι), as if it were a synonym of νεῦσις. The following investigation 
demonstrates the validity of this usage, as the term σφάλμα is, in fact, used by the heresiologists to 
describe, in a language inherited from Neopythagoreanism, and therefore structured by number, the 
fall of Sophia, which embodies both the twelfth aeon of the Dodecade as well as the thirtieth and 
final aeon of the entire Pleroma. Related back to the Pythagorean metaphysics whence it is stems, 
the Gnostic narrative loses any appearance of arbitrariness and finally reveals its true structure, 
ordered from start to finish by number. It is reasonable to think that the rival arithmology of 
Plotinus’ Treatise 34 was created in order to undermine this very narrative. 
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“Wisdom, Goodness, and Rulership: Soul’s Divinity in Plato” 
 
In the Phaedo’s Affinity Argument for soul’s immortality, Plato gives three reasons to think that 
unlike the body, soul is not the kind of thing that can scatter and cease to exist. First, like Forms but 
unlike bodies, soul is invisible to the human eye. Second, unlike bodies soul can cease changing at 
least while it contemplates the unchanging Forms. Finally, soul is like the gods and unlike bodies 
insofar as it is a natural ruler. Some readers find the last reason—if not the others—mysterious, 
unmotivated and even ad hoc. How is soul supposed to be a natural ruler and how does that make it 
like gods? In this paper I argue that Plato’s reasoning in the Affinity Argument is not exceptional but 
that, in fact, Plato consistently defines divinity in terms of rulership throughout the dialogues and he 
consistently defines rulership in terms of wisdom, goodness, and a genuine concern for the well-
being of the ruled. Moreover, Plato consistently maintains that soul is divine, akin to the divine, or 
resembles the divine insofar as it features understanding, goodness, and authority to rule. Although 
there are more passages I could discuss in a longer paper, I will confine myself to discussing Phaedo 
61c-64a; Alcibiades I 133b-135b; Gorgias 507e-508a; Republic 341c-343a, 589b-591d, 611e-612a, and 
379b-383c; Phaedrus 245d-247d; and various passages in Timaeus. I will argue that in these 
passages—especially when interpreted together thematically—present an overall understanding of 
the divine such that gods are, by definition, good and wise rulers who care about the good of their 
subjects. Gods are truly rulers in the precise sense. But insofar as souls, and human souls in 
particular, can themselves become good and wise and can rule over subjects simply for the good of 
those subjects, human souls are themselves divine. Such is not merely a possibility, however, but 
what we should all strive for. Becoming like god is becoming a ruler in the precise sense. But being a 
ruler in the precise sense is impossible for Becomers, so soul must not be a Becomer and so must 
not scatter and cease to exist when it separates from the body at death. 
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“Suárez on the Evil of Death” 
 
In Disputation XI of Suárez' Disputationes metaphysicae, Suárez makes the controversial claim that 
death is not, strictly speaking, evil for the one who dies.  He points out that while dying (the gradual 
corruption of a living being) is indeed evil for the individual, death causes an individual to cease to 
exist and therefore cannot be considered an evil for the non-existent individual.  In this paper, I 
show both how Suárez's claim is rooted in his metaphysical system and how his claim is not 
necessarily entailed by his metaphysics.  I conclude that Suárez could consistently have held that 
death is evil in several ways. 
The first part of this paper summarizes Suárez's definition and classifications of evil.  The second 
explains his claim that death is not evil; and the third elaborates upon three ways in which Suárez 
could have classified death as an evil.  While Suárez claims that death is not “properly and strictly” 
evil for the one destroyed by it, and evil “broadly speaking” only since it destroys something good, I 
explore three more approaches to death allowed by Suárez's philosophical framework.  First of all, 
we can examine death as it is evil for others: the death of his parents is an evil for the orphaned 
child.  In a related way, we can suffer even from the deaths of those that do not deprive us of a 
relation that ought to exist: for instance, we can suffer from the death of a friend, or any living being 
which was important to us in some way.  Here, the privation is not of a proper relation, but of 
agreeability to us.  A second way in which death can be considered an evil—and in this case, an evil 
for the one who will undergo it—is to understand that in the Christian tradition, death is a penalty 
for sin.  Penalty, for Suárez, is the form of evil distinguished theologically from fault; if death is 
indeed a penalty, it must be considered an evil, at least in a theological sense.  Finally, death can be 
considered evil for the immortal soul of the human person who dies, since death reduces the soul to 
the state of an incomplete substance.  Here, death is the privation of the proper union of soul and 
body.  Suárez could therefore have claimed that death is an evil either for the person undergoing it 
or for others.  By recognizing that Suárez' premises do not rule out claim that death is evil, we may 
be better suited to reconcile Suárez' philosophy with that of other medievals and the tradition of 
Christian philosophy as a whole. 
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“The Dynamics of Dunamis” 
 
Abstract: The Dynamics of Dynamis 
Witt, Beere, Ide and others have each recently called attention to the metaphysical importance of the 
dual concept of dynamis in Aristotle’s account of being in Metaphysics Θ, and to it’s conceptual 
independence from the two preceding books. None take note (as Rosamond Sprague aptly 
complained in her review of Witt’s book) of the conceptual developments in Aristotle’s other works. 
An account of those developments will make clear how they made this treatment in Θ possible. The 
story begins in Plato’s Sophist with the Eleatic Stranger wrenching from the giants the concession 
that it is “a mark to distinguish real things that they are nothing but dynamis.” (247e) Aristotle 
implicitly gave answer to this challenge already in the Protrepticus with his introduction of energeia 
as the correlate reality to dynamis, and he laid down his own challenges in Metaphysics Α that it is 
necessary to give an adequate account of individuals and of motion for us to understand being. He 
gave his account of motion in terms of dynamis in Physics III, but it was not until he developed his 
two-tiered accounts of potentiality in Physics VIII and On the Soul II that he was able in turn to give 
an adequate account of the ousia of dynamis. This is paired with a dual account of actuality in Θ-7, 
which establishes the discrimination of constitution and activity as two senses of actuality. These 
developments may not only lead us to reevaluate the standard grouping of ΖΗΘ in the Metaphysics, 
but also give some insight into how these conceptual developments were necessary antecedents for 
arriving at the concept of the unmoved mover in Λ. 
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“Aristotle on Sleep (ὕπνος), Phantasmata (φαντάσματα)  and Dreams (ἐνύπνια)'” 
 
''Aristotle on Sleep (ὕπνος), Phantasmata (φαντάσματα) and Dreams (ἐνύπνια)'' 
What is sleep? Why do we sleep? Why do we dream? Who we are when we are asleep? What is the 
relation between sleep and dreams? Are dreams meaningful? From antiquity until today, humans 
wanted to know what is going on during the process of sleep. They wanted to understand and 
explain the reason why we spend one-third of our lives in this periodic state of rest or seemingly 
inactivity. 
Ancient Greeks compared to other ancient populations dealt systematically with sleep and dream 
function. Τhey believed that dreams were: (a) divinely inspired, (b) messages sent by the deity, (c) 
predictions for the future, (d) means of communication between the living and the dead to convey 
messages. (e) In addition, dreams had therapeutic powers. But besides all these, they attempted to 
approach and interpret sleep and dreams in a rational way. 
In this paper I will attempt to show that Aristotle’s rational interpretation on the nature and function 
of sleep/hypnos (ὕπνος) and dreams/enupnia (ἐνύπνια) is intriguing and important. 
Aristotle examines the function of sleep and dreams in relation to the biological and psychological 
phenomena. He asserts that sleep «is a sort of privation of waking» («φαίνεται στέρησίς τις ὁ ὕπνος 
τῆς ἐγρηγόρσεως» (De Somno, I, 453 b 25-26). It is an affection (πάθος) of the sensitive part 
(αἰσθητικὸν μόριον) of the soul, while dream/enupnion is a kind of phantasma, namely a 
representation or image («τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φάντασμα ἐνύπνιον λέγομεν, εἲθ᾽ ἁπλῶς εἴτε τρόπον τινὰ 
γινόμενον» op.cit., I, 459 a 19-20).  
The present paper has two aims. The first and foremost aim is to explore the Stageirite’s views on 
dreaming, since these views, as I shall try to present and analyze, are developed out of his concepts 
of sensation (αἴσθησις), imagination/phantasia (φαντασία), memory (μνήμη) and mind or intellect 
(νοῦς).  
The second aim is to show that today’s speculations about the nature of dreams are not much 
different from the ones of the Stageirite philosopher. I shall argue that his philosophical and 
psychophysical interpretations concerning these issues have influenced in some respect the 
Freudian, the Post-Freudian and the Contemporary theories of dream analysis and dream imagery. 
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“The Method of Collection and Division as a Predecessor of Aristotle’s Formal Logic” 
 
The method of division is a mode of inference that plays an important role in Plato’s later dialogues. 
However, in Prior Analytics 1.31, Aristotle argues that Platonic division is a “weak syllogism” 
because it assumes what should be proven (46a32-3). Unlike division, a valid syllogism establishes 
the correct relations of its terms and thereby provides a proof. However, modern historians of logic 
such as Anton Dumitriu argue the reverse: the method of division precedes and forms the basis of a 
syllogism. I will present a similar argument: division is part of a larger method, closely associated 
with Plato’s dialectic, which subsumes the syllogistic. 
According to Plato, collection and division together form a unified method that comprises two 
operations. In collection, seemingly disparate elements that share a common characteristic are 
collected together into a unified eidos (‘class’ or ‘kind’; also referred to as ‘genos’). Division, on the 
other hand, operates by separating an eidos into sub-classes. Thus, to collect is to unify into one 
class, to divide is to separate into multiple sub-classes. To use an Aristotelian example, plant life that 
shares a common characteristic can be collected into the eidos ‘tree,’ and this eidos can be divided 
into the sub-classes ‘deciduous’ and ‘non-deciduous.’ To use a Platonic example, the natural 
numbers can be collected into the eidos ‘number,’ which can be divided into ‘odd’ and ‘even.’ 
A key concept of Aristotle’s syllogistic is the universal (‘katholou’; also referred to as ‘genos’ or 
‘eidos’). Arguably, the relation between a universal and the subject of which it is predicated is 
analogous to a Platonic eidos and its sub-classes. According to Prior Analytics 1.1.24b28, a term 
contains another just as a universal is predicated of a subject. Containment and predication in the 
Analytics are basic relations that are established by the method of division. To use a well-known 
Platonic illustration, that a ‘sophist’ is a ‘hunter’ is analogous to the claims that (1) ‘hunting’ 
“contains” ‘sophistry’; (2) ‘hunting’ can be predicated of ‘sophistry’; and (3) part of ‘hunting’ is 
‘sophistry.’ These relations are defined through division, and they form the basis of a set of premises 
in a syllogism. In short, the individual terms of a syllogism are defined through collection, while the 
interrelations of these terms are determined through division. In this sense, collection and division 
precede and delineate the elements of a syllogism.  
That collection and division form the basis of the syllogism shows that Aristotle’s system of 
deduction rests on a conceptual foundation that precedes the Organon. Furthermore, Plato admits 
in several passages that the method of collection and division is a legacy that was practiced before 
the Greeks. In this sense, the foundations of the syllogism were articulated long before Aristotle. 
Studying the method of collection and division is useful for showing the roots of Aristotle’s system 
of deduction and the syllogistic’s relations with earlier forms of reasoning. 
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“Reconciling Theoretical Virtue as the Final Good in the Nicomachean Ethics” 
 
There has long been debate over whether Aristotle’s conclusion in Book X of the Nicomachean 
Ethics that theoretical contemplation is the best and most complete good is inconsistent with the 
importance he places in the rest of the text on the other goods in life, and more specifically, with the 
role that moral virtue is given in the Ethics. I argue here that contemplation being the final good 
does not entail the maximization of theoretical contemplation at the expense of other goods, and 
thus the prominence of theoretical contemplation in Book X is not inconsistent with Aristotle’s 
general ethical account. 
The importance of the moral virtues in Aristotle’s text suggests that maximization of contemplation 
at the expense of moral virtue is not what is intended. Although contemplation is divine, we are 
human, with composite natures, not divine. Since we have needs the gods do not, moral excellence 
is important for us in addition to contemplation. Excellent moral acts are indispensible for the 
excellent human life, even though they fail to be as self-sufficient as contemplation, and thus 
Aristotle rejects a life devoted entirely to contemplation. As the texts explicitly acknowledge that 
more than one complete good may exist, this is not surprising. Aristotle does not claim that 
contemplation is the only complete good, only that it is the best and most complete good, and thus 
the difference between contemplation and the moral virtues is in degree, not in kind. 
Furthermore, friendship is quite important for Aristotle’s conception of the good life, and a life 
devoted to maximizing contemplation is incompatible with maintaining the sorts of friendships that 
Aristotle lauds. Aristotle’s character friendships involve ongoing and significant commitments, since 
the friends live their lives together and help one another practice virtuous activity. It may be thought 
that since contemplation is said to be even better when in the company of other people, Aristotle 
can acknowledge the good of friendship while still maintaining that contemplation ought to be 
maximized. This thesis would imply that friendship, along with all other goods, is desired 
instrumentally, for the sake of contemplation. 
This response, however, misses how fundamental friendship is to Aristotle’s conception of living 
well. While contemplation is better with friends, it is not the primary goal of friendship on 
Aristotle’s account. Aristotle argues that no one would live without friends, even if he possessed all 
of the other goods, rejecting the notion that the blessed, self-sufficient person has no need of 
friends. Were Aristotle’s goal to maximize contemplation, friendship should not play the role that it 
does in his ethics, since friendship requires too much time and effort to be taken away from 
contemplation. If contemplation were important enough to minimize other activities, it would be 
more effective to spend less time with friends. Since friendship is clearly quite important to Aristotle 
and any interpretation of the role of theoria must take those prior commitments of Aristotle’s into 
account, this offers a strong reason to think that contemplation need not be maximized for 
Aristotle. 
 
 
Natalia Pietrulewicz, University of Warsaw 
natalia.pietrulewicz@gmail.com 
“The problem of donkey sentences – why medieval resolution is the right one?” 
 
When in 1934 Walter Burley was unconsciously introducing the problem which we now call ‘donkey 
sentences problem’, he aimed to make his contribution to supposition theory, presenting the 
following sentence:  
(1) Omnis homo habens asinum videt illum. (Every man that owns a donkey sees it.)  
Burley has never suspected that in XXth century thanks to Geach, who has a little strangely 
translated the original medieval piece as:  
(2) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.  
 donkey sentences will attract the pertaining interest of philosophers and linguists. Contemporarily, 
the main problem of the sentences shifted to the problem of first order predicate logic translation of 
the sentences - that is which one from two readings to choose: 
(3) general reading, when all farmers beat all donkeys they own. 
(4) existential reading, when every farmer beats at least one of his donkeys.  
Of course, when Burley were formulating the sentence, first order logic predicate calcus had not 
existed yet, but philosophers have no doubt that interpretation which Burley proposed for sentences 
is consistent with existential reading. Contrarily, the only reading Geach proposed for sentences was 
general reading.  Since Geach lot of research on donkey sentences has been done, it seems that the 
majority of academics forgot about the Burleys resolution and are taking the ambiguous view – they 
simply state that reading depends on various factors like ie. the lexical properties of words like static, 
episodic etc. The aim of my talk is to present the conceptual and experimental work of Geurts 
(which is groundbreaking and inspired us) and of mine and Mieszko Tałasiewicz which rehabilitates 
original medieval resolution, dismissing the problem of ambiguity. 
 
 
Marcin Podbielski, Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie 
marcin.podbielski@ignatianum.edu.pl 
“Anastasius Sinaita on individual, substance and nature” 
 
The proposed paper presents preliminary results of the collaborative project “Re-introducing the 
Early Byzantine Metaphysics,” which concentrates on the process of transformation of key 
metaphysical notions that took place in the works of Byzantine theologians of post-Chalcedonian 
period. 
Anastasius Sinaita followed in his writings the path marked by his predecessor, Leontius Byzantinus. 
Namely, he took over the terminology of Leontius, which was formulated on the basis of Ancient 
Greek and Hellenistic philosophical notions. Anastasius sought to underpin orthodox dogmatics 
with philosophical methodology, thus using philosophy to the advantage of theology and as a 
weapon in his polemics against adversaries of orthodoxy. Still, he did not merely use the already 
existent terminology and notions. He continued to transform the Greek metaphysical notions into 
conceptions not only conform with Christian theology, but also allowing further development of the 
conception of individual being as such. 
Similarly to Leontius, Anastasius made an extensive use of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic 
traditions. But in contrast to his predecessor, who concentrated on understanding the essence of 
universal realities, such as substance or nature, Anastasius started to pay more attention to the 
notion of individual, undervalued in Greek philosophical tradition, and engaged in discussions of 
essence and existence of individuals. In the paper, I shall present Anastasius’ reading of the notion 
of individual in its relation to the notions of substance and nature. Special attention will be paid to 
the Neoplatonic roots of Anastasius interpretation of those notions. 
 
 
Tiberiu Popa, Butler University 
tpopa@butler.edu 
“Early Theories on the Emergence of Powers” 
 
Theories about the nature of material and mental dispositions (elasticity, toxicity, beliefs, sense of 
humor etc.) and about the emergence of powers or dispositions lie at the heart of current debates in 
philosophy of science, metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Some of their underlying questions 
(albeit largely motivated by a different set of concerns) can be traced back to some of the 
philosophically minded Hippocratics.  
We can find quite a few passages and even entire treatises (such as Regimen II) that deal with the 
nature of powers: the powers of foods, drinks, drugs, exercises, therapeutic techniques, cold 
weather, damp winds etc. to produce some effect or other in the human body. Indeed most 
Hippocratic works which are more or less concerned with dunameis inquire into the nature and 
manifestation of powers or dispositions, but do not explicitly investigate how dispositions arise in 
the first place. This is precisely why I find e.g. the first book of Regimen or De victu so intriguing. It 
pointedly explores the very process through which capacities of the soul and of the body come 
about. While basic material dunameis cannot tell the whole story about why someone is prone to, 
say, fall ill in spring or why someone is modest or intelligent, those material dunameis can still 
supposedly tell us a great deal. How, then, can one appeal effectively to elementary powers (i.e. the 
powers of irreducibly simple stuffs constituting the human body) – and cognate notions – when 
trying to explain the emergence of capacities and propensities such as courage, resistance to disease 
or being prone to sickness under certain conditions? This topic is usually approached obliquely by 
scholars and is examined mostly in so far as it is intertwined with other topics. Here I would like to 
mount a frontal attack on it, chiefly within the confines of Regimen I and of Airs, Waters, Places. 
Most of my talk is meant to elucidate the causal explanations for the emergence of complex mental 
and temperamental dispositions in these texts. I will make a few clarifications with respect to the 
orders of dunameis discussed there and will go over several key passages. In the concluding section 
of my paper I will evaluate what I take to be some of the more significant theoretical consequences 
of the story about the emergence of dispositions in Regimen I and in Airs, Waters, Places. 
  
Tony Preus, Binghamton University 
apreus@binghamton.edu 
“Aristotle and Theophrastus on Food” 
 
Aristotle was a foundational philosopher of biology who wrote extensively on the natural history of 
animals, and seems pretty clearly to have been an omnivore, not resistant to eating meat. At any rate 
he says in Politics I.8 that plants exist to provide food for animals and that animals exist for the sake 
of human beings, “the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all, at least the greater part of them, for 
food, and for provision of clothing and various instruments.” (1256b15) Theophrastus was 
Aristotle’s student and associate, writing extensively on the natural history of plants, and was 
famously vegetarian, as reported to us in Porphyry’s “On Abstinence from Killing Animals.” How 
do these differences between the two Peripatetic philosophers influence their ethical, political, and 
social philosophy? What are the implications of the differences between omnivorous and vegetarian 
for the remainder of a philosopher’s views? 
 
 
Marta Przyszychowska, Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie 
przymarta@gmail.com 
“Human Nature as an Indivisible Monad According to Gregory of Nyssa” 
 
Gregory of Nyssa is undoubtedly not the first Father of the Church who considered humanity as 
unity. Already in the first serious Christian faith treatise, i.e. Adversus haereses of Irenaeus, we do 
find the belief in the unity of all human beings. But it was Gregory of Nyssa who created the first 
theory of human nature considered as an indivisible unit/monad. We find his very precise definition 
in his small work To Ablabius: “Nature is one, at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible unit, 
not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction, but in its essence being and 
continually remaining one, inseparable even though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and 
not divided with the individuals who participate in it.”  
In my paper, I will show how Gregory of Nyssa’s view of human nature permeates his entire work 
and informs his discussions of other subjects. Alongside, I will retrace various philosophical 
influences, sometimes non obvious, which may be discerned in his approach to human nature. 
 
 
Jean-Phlippe Ranger, St. Thomas University 
jpranger@stu.ca 
“Epicurean Epistemology and lessons from Plato's Theaetetus” 
 
One of the fundamental and famous theses of Epicurean epistemology is that sense perception is 
the first step to scientific knowledge (episteme). To be more precise, sense perception is the 
foundation and first principle of scientific knowledge. Epicurus goes so far as to claim that if sense 
perception is unreliable, scientific knowledge is impossible (RS XXIV). 
While it would be useful to understand how Epicurus justifies this first principle of knowledge, we 
only possess a few fragments from his Canon and these fragments are in the form of assertions 
rather than in the form of arguments. To reconstruct an Epicurean argument that justifies his theory 
of scientific knowledge, I propose the following starting point: Epicurus constructs his theory of 
scientific knowledge as a reply to a series of objections that suggest on the one hand that knowledge 
from sense perception leads to relativism, and on the other hand that sense perception cannot be a 
foundation to knowledge. Yet the most detailed treatments of such arguments are developed in 
Plato’s Theaetetus. My thesis is not necessarily that Epicurus had an intimate knowledge of this text, 
but more fundamentally, that Epicurus must develop his epistemology by taking the objections of 
the Theaetetus into account. A confrontation of these two authors will allow me to find a 
justification of Epicurean first principles of knowledge. In a certain sense, I will be asking Epicurus 
the very question that Socrates asks Theaetetus: what is scientific knowledge (145e)? 
I develop my argument in two steps. First I examine Epicurean epistemology in light of the theory 
of koina of the Theaetetus (184d-187a). Such an analysis will show that for Epicurus, scientific 
knowledge is discursive. Second, I analyze the foundation of Epicurean scientific knowledge in light 
of the aporia Socrates develops in response to his dream theory that we find in the third part of the 
Theaetetus (201d-206c). In this second section of my paper, I will show that Epicurus responds to 
this aporia by appealing to the notion of evidence (enargeia). 
 
 
Christopher Raymond, Vassar College 
christopherc.raymond@gmail.com 
“Shame and Virtue in Aristotle” 
 
Few concepts can claim a greater importance to ancient Greek morality than aidôs—“a sense of 
shame”, “a sense of respect”, or simply “shame”. In Hesiod’s myth of the races, the collapse of 
human society is marked by the flight of the goddesses Aidôs and Nemesis (“Moral Indignation”) 
from the earth to Olympus. At the end of the Iliad, Achilles regains his humanity when he is moved 
by pity for Priam and aidôs before the gods to release Hector’s body. Though by the fourth century 
BCE the status of aidôs had diminished, Aristotle still saw fit to include it in his systematic account 
of the virtues. But in his main discussion of aidôs, which concludes Book 4 of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, he argues that it is not a genuine virtue. The two arguments of NE 4.9 have puzzled 
commentators: both passages seem to conflict with things Aristotle says elsewhere in the treatise, 
and neither is fully persuasive in its own right. The primary aim of this paper is to reconstruct 
Aristotle’s view of aidôs and argue that he does have good grounds for excluding it from his list of 
virtues.  
 I begin by analyzing the opening argument of NE 4.9, in which Aristotle suggests that aidôs 
is not a virtue because it is the wrong sort of “condition of the soul”. The standard objection is that 
he fails to distinguish between occurrent and dispositional senses of the emotion term. I show that 
in spite of this weakness the argument points to a more persuasive line of thought, which can be 
pieced together from other passages in his ethical works. After offering some ideas for what such a 
restoration might look like, I turn to the second, more substantive, argument of NE 4.9, and 
consider an objection that has its roots in antiquity. Here the central complaint is that Aristotle fails 
to distinguish between the prospective, or inhibitory, and backward-looking varieties of shame. This 
has led commentators to claim that the prospective kind of aidôs does play a central role in the 
virtuous person’s motivations. In the final part of the paper, I draw on other aspects of Aristotle’s 
ethical theory to demonstrate that, in his view, shame has no significant role to play in the 
psychology of virtue. The key text for my purposes is his discussion of “civic” courage in NE 3.8, 
which I analyze in the light of two passages from the Iliad (both cited by Aristotle), that represent 
heroes acting from aidôs without true virtue. I conclude by contrasting Aristotle’s account of shame 
with the more positive view advanced by Bernard Williams in Shame and Necessity. 
 
 
Brian Reese, University of Oxford 
brian.reese@philosophy.ox.ac.uk 
“False Statement in the Sophist: A New Proposal” 
 
In this paper, I examine Plato’s treatment of false statement in the 'Sophist' and develop a new 
reading against the three most widely supported interpretations. Each of the three main 
interpretations understands the referent of the false statement “Theaetetus flies” as a sensible 
particular; ‘Theaetetus’ is thus understood as undertaking various actions in time. I argue that the 
referent should instead be taken formally, and so atemporally—as ‘Theaetetus qua man.’ This 
reading not only respects the final aporia of the 'Theaetetus,' but is also more philosophically faithful 
in context. 
 
 
Heather Reid, Morningside College 
reid@morningside.edu 
“Aristotle on Fairness” 
 
Fairness is an important ethical concept, especially in sport where the concept of “fair play” seems 
to function as the universal arbiter of what is right and wrong.  Some philosophers have argued that 
fairness as an ethical concept actually derives from sport.  I believe that it comes from the criterion 
of to kalon (beauty) found in ancient Greek Philosophy.  In this paper I argue, based on Aristotle’s 
use of to kalon in the Nichomachean and Eudemian Ethics, that fairness is the ethical-aesthetic 
sense that motivates the activity of the kaloskagathos (good and beautiful person).  Fair actions on 
Aristotle’s account are (a) virtuous (b) autotelic (c) civically-minded, and (d) pleasant.  This account 
may seem to be at odds with the more rule-based understanding of fairness current in ethics and 
philosophy of sport, but it by incorporating an aesthetic dimension it better reflects the ideal and 
practice of fairness by athletes, officials, and even institutions. 
 
 
Daniel Restrepo, New School for Social Research 
restrepo.dan@gmail.com 
“Different Causal Frameworks for Plato and Aristotle” 
 
In Aristotle’s Metaphyscis, he explores how earlier philosophers utilized causes (aitia) and what 
causes they had discovered. This is a heuristic method to see if there are any more than his well-
known four causes. What he found was that no philosopher had discovered all four causes, not even 
Plato. Despite Aristotle’s claims, many scholars nevertheless impose his causal framework onto 
Plato’s so-called natural philosophy. While Aristotle is often unfair to his predecessors, he is right 
that Plato simply does not have the same conception of causes as he does. Building on the work of 
Carlo Natali, I want to argue that while Aristotle’s sees the causes as principles or constitutive of 
things, Plato, especially in the Timaeus-Critias, sees the causes as generative. This is because the two 
do not share the same natural project. For Plato, the project of Timaeus’ cosmology is not a natural 
science as such but in many ways a theodicy. He begins with the assumption of divine architect and 
works from there to explain in what ways the cosmos is ordered towards the good. In this respect, it 
is a response to Socrates’ concern in the Phaedo when he reads Anaxagoras—why is it best that the 
world is ordered as such. Aristotle’s own project is less concerned with justifying goodness in the 
world and more focused with explaining the world as it is. To be sure, there are still moments of 
normativity in his physical inquiry (the assumption that the world is in principle intelligible), his 
project is mostly scientific at its basis. Thus, though both philosophers utilize cause as explanatory, 
what each is trying to explain and how they explain it is radically different. 
 
 
Benjamin Rider, University of Central Arkansas 
brider@uca.edu 
“Living in Agreement:  Stoicism and Daoism on the Sage” 
 
Although arising in very different historical and cultural contexts, Stoicism and the Daoism of the 
Daodejing characterize the life of their wise man, or Sage, in surprisingly similar ways.  For both 
traditions, the Sage—who represents the highest form of human life and activity—seeks to live, in 
some sense, in accordance or harmony with the world (Diogenes Laertius [DL] 7.87; Daodejing 3, 5, 
25).  Both see persons as integral parts of the world, who realize themselves as individuals by 
harmonizing their experiences, thoughts, and actions with the natural or cosmic context in which 
they are embedded (DL 7.87-8; Daodejing 16, 64).  Another striking feature the philosophies share is 
their warnings against human attempts to control the events and circumstances of life (Epictetus, 
Enchiridion 1; Daodejing 29, 57).  For both, the Sage succeeds because of a carefully cultivated 
quality of the self, or virtue—aretê in Greek, de in Chinese—that enables him to respond 
appropriately and fruitfully to circumstances, working to promote positive outcomes while accepting 
what he cannot control.   
 My essay compares how these two philosophical traditions understand the Sage and his 
actions and explores the implications of the differences for the central questions of ancient ethics.  
On the one hand, the Stoics pursued to its logical extreme the Greek ideal of rationality, imagining 
the Sage as a perfected rational actor who makes maximally wise decisions from a firm and infallible 
virtue.  This ideal, however, creates puzzles about the possibility of human virtue—is it possible for 
a human to realize their ideal?  The problem arises because of three claims about the Sage’s wisdom 
and action to which Stoics are committed:  First, that wisdom consists in a systematic understanding 
of the fundamental truths of the cosmos (about god, Fate, value, etc.), an understanding which 
enables a Sage to choose actions which are befitting in terms of the larger cosmic order.  Second, 
Stoics hold that a Sage’s judgments and choices are infallible.  The Sage assents to an impression 
only if he recognizes it to be adequate or kataleptic, such that it carries its own guarantee of truth—
he holds no mere opinions.  And third, the Stoics embrace particularism about ethical judgments.  
The Stoics insist that there are no exceptionless general principles, but that befitting actions must be 
determined situationally and holistically.  But is it possible to gain an infallible and systematic 
understanding of the cosmos?  And even if it were possible, would such an understanding enable 
one to engage with the concrete particularity of real life decision making? 
 Laozi’s Daoism, by contrast, begins by acknowledging limits to human knowledge and 
positing the rational unintelligibility of the concrete (Daodejing 1, 2).  For Laozi, any concrete 
experience is of complex particulars embedded in unique and changing webs of interrelationships.  
Such complexity defies rational analysis.  Therefore, having cultivated openness to concrete 
experience and unmediated feeling (wuzhi) of the unique things and events in the world, the Daoist 
Sage acts non-coercively (wuwei), collaborating with the world in the co-creation of reality. 
 
 
Nicholas Riegel, University of Brasilia 
nicholas.riegel@utoronto.ca 
“Beauty and Mathematics in Aristotle:  Metaphysics M 1078a31-b6” 
 
One of the most important passages in Aristotle’s works for understanding what he thinks about 
beauty, to kalon, is in Metaphysics M, where he makes a connection between goodness, beauty, and 
mathematics. At 1078a31 he states, 
Now since the good and beautiful are different (for the former is always in action, while the 
beautiful is found also in motionless things), those who assert that the mathematical sciences say 
nothing of the beautiful or the good are in error. For these sciences say and prove a very great deal 
about them; for it is not the case that if they do not name them but prove their results and accounts, 
that they do not speak about them. The chief forms of beauty are order, proportion, and 
definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate most of all. And since these (e.g. order 
and definiteness) are causes of many things, evidently they mean that such a cause as the beautiful is 
a cause in a way. But we shall speak more plainly elsewhere about these matters.  
The promise in the last line is not fulfilled in any of Aristotle’s remaining works. But this passage is 
exceedingly difficult to understand for many reasons. First, there are what might be called the 
“external” questions, questions having to do with the relation of the passage to its context. 
Metaphysics M seemed to be about the ontological status of numbers and geometrical objects. But 
then why does Aristotle go into the question of the relation of beauty and goodness to mathematics 
at this point? Additionally, who are these individuals who claim the mathematical sciences say 
nothing about goodness or beauty? Commentators point to the first aporia in Metaphysics B, where 
Aristippus is mentioned as one of the sophists who ridiculed mathematics because it makes no use 
of the good. But what was Aristippus’ argument, and why should Aristotle have taken it seriously? 
And how is this passage any answer to these critics? For Aristotle does not say that goodness is in 
mathematics, only that beauty can be found in it. 
Then there are internal questions, having to do with the meaning of the passage itself. For instance, 
what is meant by the claim that the mathematical sciences “prove their results (erga) and accounts 
(logoi)?” And in what sense are order, proportion, and definiteness the “causes” of many things, and 
how does this make beauty a cause in a way? In what sense can beauty be thought of as a cause? 
In this paper I would like to address all these questions with a hope of finding out more about how 
Aristotle thinks of beauty. And I would like to connect what he says here in the Metaphysics with the 
famous claims in his ethical works that moral virtue should be performed for the sake of beauty, to 
kalon. It is my belief and will be my thesis that Aristotle differed from Plato on the question of the 
relation of beauty and goodness, and that this shows that while their understanding of beauty was 
fundamentally the same, they had different notions of what goodness is. 
 
 
Jan Maximilian Robitzsch, University of Pennsylvania 
janro@sas.upenn.edu 
“Political Order in Heraclitus” 
 
In a 1994 paper, Jean Frère notes that “up to now, the question of Heraclitus’ political ideas has 
been neglected” (231; my translation). Almost twenty years later, not much has changed: while 
Heraclitus’ metaphysics and epistemology have been much discussed, Heraclitus’ political and ethical 
thought has received considerably less attention. Paradigmatic for this neglect is the – otherwise 
excellent – study by G.S. Kirk on Heraclitus’ cosmic fragments, which completely leaves aside 
Heraclitus’ ideas on politics. This is despite some direct evidence that Heraclitus attributed a high 
value to his political thinking. According to Diogenes Laertius (Lives IX.5-6), for instance, 
Heraclitus’ treatise On Nature was divided into three parts, one of which was politics. And 
according to Diodotus, a 1st century B.C. Stoic, On Nature was really about government and the 
section on nature was just added as a means of illustration (ibid., IX.15).  
In this paper, I want to take these ancient clues seriously and will examine Heraclitus’ political 
thought. In doing so, I will be mainly concerned with the question what type of political order 
Heraclitus supported. This question is somewhat anachronistic as political vocabulary is just 
evolving at the time that Heraclitus is writing: a shift from nomistic vocabulary that stresses good or 
bad order (as in Solon’s eunomiê and dusnomiê) to kratistic vocabulary that stresses which group is 
in power (demo-kratia, aristo-kratia, etc.) falls into Heraclitus’ lifetime. Nevertheless, during the 
Ionian Revolt and its aftermath, Heraclitus, himself an aristocrat by birth, was certainly also 
confronted with different ideas of political organization. Was Heraclitus consequently a politically 
conservative supporter of aristocratic ideas or a proponent of newer, democratic ones? 
In “Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies”, Gregory Vlastos’ argues for the latter view 
and this has been more recently supported in Boudouris. However, I think that such a reading of 
Heraclitus is mistaken. After an examination of the case that Vlastos and Boudouris make in favor 
of a ‘democratic reading’ of Heraclitus, I argue that Heraclitus cannot have been a proponent of 
democracy by stepwise refuting their arguments. Given (1) Heraclitus’ rejection of all egalitarian 
ideas in the political sphere, (2) his attitude towards the many, and (3) what we know about him 
from Diogenes Laertius. Instead, the more likely reading of the political fragments, I argue, identifies 
Heraclitus as a conservative and a supporter of an aristocratic political order. 
 
 
David Roochnik, Boston University 
roochnik@bu.edu 
“Teleology as Death Wish:  A Nietzschean Critique of Aristotle” 
 
Teleology as Death Wish:  A Nietzschean Critique of Aristotle 
In Book I.10 of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle grapples with a saying attributed to Solon:  “deem 
no human being happy while he is still alive.”  A careful reading of this chapter will disclose why the 
Philosopher thinks this perplexing and perhaps even morbid statement is worth serious 
consideration, and his complex and at times even ambiguous response to it.  Doing so will not only 
shed light on central elements of his teleological ethics, but will also open the door to a line of 
fundamental critique, one which, as will be argued in the closing section, Aristotle can withstand.   
Part One will offer a translation of NE I.10 and a brief commentary.  Aristotle’s Greek is terse and 
sometimes elliptical. As a result, translators are often tempted to assist the reader by adding material 
(usually but not always putting it in brackets) in order to clarify the meaning of the text.  Of course, 
doing so risks imposing the translator’s interpretation of the meaning of the text upon the reader.  
For this reason I will by and large resist this temptation.    
Because NE I.10 presupposes material from earlier in the text—most notably, the definition of 
happiness developed at different stages of NE I.1-7—Part Two will digress in order to supply the 
background necessary for the discussion to proceed.  
Part Three will resume and complete the translation-commentary.   
Part Four, which is inspired by Nietzsche, will formulate a severe criticism of the Aristotelian 
position that emerges in NE I.10.  Part Five will argue that, despite its seriousness, Aristotle can 
defend himself against the Nietzschean assault. 
 
 
ALIREZA SAATI, NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS 
saati.philosophy@gmail.com 
“The Concept of Being, Where there is no pertinence between Avicenna and Aristotle’s  ‘’live dog 
better than dead king’’” 
 
Vindicating such an intriguing title asks quite enough tact audacity, of knowing how far we may go 
without going too far. In his ground – breaking masterpiece  ‘’قطن م لا نی ی قرش م لا‘’  , Avicenna 
points out to Farabi’s essay ‘’ هی ب ط لادع بام  ی ف ضارغا ‘’   by the reading of which an end was put in 
his deep - rooted struggle with Aristotle’s Metaphysics.   Until now, this adventure has always been 
interpreted in a way which somehow curries Aristotle’s favor against Avicenna. In this paper, in 
contrast I wish to argue that Avicenna’s different frame of reference does not allow us having such 
conclusion. 
     The central concept of metaphysics, namely the concept of being is the first glancing reference 
by which Avicenna separates from Aristotle, and in continues the Iranian Muslim world stands 
versus the Greek world. The main sources with which I am going through in this paper are 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, books VII and XII (Z and Λ), in addition to the 4th chapter of Avicenna’s 
تاراش لاا و تاهی ب ن ت لا  , titled: on Being and its causes and the تای ه لا of اف ش . 
     The provocative point is laid down in Avicenna’s expansion of Farabi’s distinction between 
essence and existence and the lack of this innovation in Greek philosophy. The milestone of this 
point could be surveyed exactly around the meanings of substance in Greek and Islamic philosophy.    
     Aristotle’s notion of substance known as ουσία is crucial to his metaphysics; though due to using 
the term in different interrelated ways it is absolutely complicated insofar as unmasking the term in 
Aristotelian philosophy has always been the subject of interests and disputes in order to understand 
on what this notion indicates!  
     The main drawback might be considered concern this is the different accounts of substance all 
through the Aristotelicus Corpus   which has always puzzled the scholars.  In short, Aristotle’s own 
words are not clear enough. The curtail account of substance proposed at the beginning of 
Metaphysics Z introduces the substance as ‘’that which ‘is’ in the primary sense’’.   As we see, Aristotle 
quite unequivocally, declares that the question of ‘what substance is?’ is rendered to the ‘question of 
‘what being is?’. For Aristotle what actually exists is the world of substance, because to be is to be 
existent. It deserves already to see if any of either ontological or epistemological bounds support this 
idea? As a remark, at the outset, I would like to say that the answer is abruptly negative. Let examine 
why Aristotle’s account of substance leads us towards such an upshot. 
      The referenced block – quoted passage of Metaphysics   is involved in different circumstances 
each of which advocates Aristotle’s not discerning of substance different from essence and existent. 
This idea is bound by a key passage of Μetaphysics Γ  in which Aristotle expressly asserts that ‘’one 
man and a man is the same thing and an existent man and a man are the same thing’’.   What 
Aristotle means by this is that ‘’the duplication in the statement ‘he is a man and an existed man’ 
gives no fresh meaning’’.   Aristotle not only does not reject being, but also he ignores it in getting 
joined with essence. 
     Though never Aristotle marks off any difference between essence and existence, most of the 
commentators and scholars have always tried to justify Aristotle by giving manifold senses   to 
substance. But the evasive aporia concern defining substance as what exists still insists. No narrow 
squeak, however, is provided because defining substance as that which ‘is’ is explicitly begging the 
question,   a kind of fallacy which was discovered by Farabi and had been opened by Avicenna. 
What I want to do here is to be more involved in doing a slightly different angle, on the subject.  
     Aristotle’s account of substance was found by Avicenna as an unsustainable trajectory. In the 
تای ه لا of اف ش  at the end of the third article – chapter two he states that ‘’One is entirely equal to 
being, in the sense of being predicated of any of the categories, as [when] they are predicated of 
being, but their notions as you knew are different from each other, [though]   both concepts are 
united and concurred in the direction of having no indication on the essence and substance of any 
of the categories’’. This emphasize can be seen all throughout Avicenna’s philosophy. From his 
standpoint it is stipulated that two concepts of the One and Being are not any of ten categories, thus 
they are neither accident nor essence and even nor substance. In this extent, the concept of being 
stands in contrast to essence because essence including substance and accidents is the divisional 
point of ten categories.  
     In sum, this elegant point shows why Avicenna was not able to understand Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
even after 40 times reading the book completely. The discussion of substance is a disturbed and 
disheveled controversy in Aristotle. Though Aristotle himself believes that ‘’live dog is better than a 
dead king’’. 
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“Anger, Justice, and Injustice in Aristotle” 
 
My paper reconstructs an Aristotelian treatment of anger as a psychological, moral, and political 
phenomenon, drawing primarily on The Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, the Politics, and the 
Rhetoric.  For Aristotle, anger is an emotional response uniquely situated in moral life.   
It has to do in particular with (right or wrong) perceptions about justice and injustice, and it orients 
responses, not only of emotion but also of action, to rightly or wrongly) perceived injustices.  Anger 
does by its nature involve seeking retribution, and Aristotle thinks that in many cases, rightly 
oriented and limited anger will be a necessary component n the workings of justice.  So, in simple 
terms, anger, both in terms of emotional response and in terms of characteristic action and motives, 
can often be a good, even necessary response, an insight not recognized by many modern theories 
or perspectives on violence and justice. 
At the same time, Aristotle is very wary of human tendencies to go wrong with respect to anger, and 
for potentials of badly oriented anger to lead to violence that contravenes justice, to subvert the 
workings of justice, to generate further anger as a response, and to stand in the way of forgiveness 
when it ought to occur.  He also provides us resources, however, for developing better 
understanding and capacity for judgment about the workings of anger and its interplay with justice. 
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“Anaximander's Cosmic Justice and the Apeiron” 
 
Thanassis Samaras 
Anaximander’s Cosmic Justice and the Apeiron 
Anaximander puts forward a clear concept of cosmic justice, based on a process of reciprocity that 
leads to the perfect balance of the “so-called elements” over time. This process appears to be self-
sustaining: Anaximander suggests that the universe is this way without explaining why it is so. On 
the basis of the existing fragments we can say that apeiron, being primarily conceived as material and 
impersonal, does not fit the role of a principle that guarantees the cosmic order. On the other hand, 
it is indisputable that the order that Anaximander describes could not possibly be sustained without 
apeiron. Is an interpretation of Anaximander possible that makes apeiron a first archē not only in 
the sense of a spatial and/or temporal beginning, but also in the sense of an Aristotelian “first 
principle?” 
 The other issue addressed here is to what extent Anaximander’s cosmological postulations 
shed light on his political beliefs. The correlation between the two has long been noticed by 
commentators such as Vlastos, Vernant, Lloyd, Naddaf and Sassi. The language of the famous 
fragment preserved by Simplicius (DK12A9) leaves no doubt that Anaximander thinks of the 
distribution of cosmic justice as a normative process analogous to the dispensation of justice in 
human communities, and thus argues for a social and political order that will be corresponding to or 
reflecting the cosmic one. But the insufficiency of our information about Miletian politics in the 
mid-sixth century BC, the most likely time of the composition of Anaximander’s book from which 
at least part of the fragment comes, makes it difficult to say more about his political views. It seems 
certain that they can be understood only in the context of a new set of ideas connected with the 
emergence of the classical polis. It is plausible, even if impossible to prove on the basis of the extant 
evidence, that Anaximander expresses, in some form, the political ideas of the people in the middle, 
the mesoi. But one should be cautious about thinking of Anaximander as a proponent of isonomia 
and the equality of all citizens, as Vernant does. Simplicius’ fragment, though not necessarily 
incompatible with this interpretation, demonstrates a concern not with citizen equality but with 
power and its sharing between two social groups. Identifying these groups, the one which attempts 
to unjustly monopolize power and the one who is asking for a share in it is the key to interpreting 
the political Anaximander and a tentative identification will be attempted in this paper. 
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“The Communicability of Knowledge in Aristotle’s Metaphysics” 
 
Aristotle is optimistic about the ability of human beings to attain knowledge about the mind-
independent world and attests to his own optimism by remarking that “it is owing to their wonder 
that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize”[ 982b13-14].  But what criteria does 
Aristotle set up for epistemic certainty? I believe Aristotle’s reliance on human language as an 
instrument of knowledge, together with the intellective capacities from which the capacity for 
language stems (in Aristotle’s model), allows us to formulate at least one criterion. I here argue that 
this criterion for epistemic certainty, the communicability-criterion, can be gleaned from Aristotle’s 
exposition of the starting-point and objective, foundational principles of the “First Philosophy” and 
the science of  Being in Metaphysics Alpha and Gamma.  
 My concept of the communicability-criterion is partly derived from Modrak’s 2000 
discussion: she states “the ability to communicate understanding is central to Aristotle’s conception 
of knowledge,” and, additionally, the “transmission of information from teacher to student depends 
upon the existence of a vocabulary containing terms, the reference of which…is accessible to both 
student and teacher.”  I am partly concerned with the transmissibility of knowledge in the 
Metaphysics of Aristotle. But the primary interest is specifically how, for Aristotle, communicability 
contributes to epistemic certainty and the process of knowledge acquisition in his ontological 
inquiry, rather than the outcome of these processes.  
First, I define the communicability criterion as 1) cogency and intelligibility to oneself and 2) 
cogency and intelligibility to others. Then I briefly examine a passage from Chapter 1 of De 
Interpretatione, which illustrates a structural correspondence between natural language and reality. I 
then attempt to show that this correspondence underpins his program in the Metaphysics, 
specifically articulated in select, passages of Alpha and Gamma.  
In Alpha, Aristotle seems to suggest that a greater degree of epistemic certainty is attained once we 
understand the causes and principles of mind-independent objects and states of affairs. The 
communicability-criterion, I believe, is implicit in his brief, comparative discussion of art and 
experience. The artist more reliably imparts knowledge because he or she deals with universals. In 
turn, we attain epistemic certainty because art is more teachable than experience. Universals are 
more teachable than particulars. Causes, principles, and the knowledge acquired by the artist, as a 
whole, are more communicable in ways that experiences are not. In reaching the “highest degree” of 
universal knowledge, human beings attain greater epistemic certainty because the objects of this 
universal science are communicable.  
Finally, I attempt to show that Aristotle’s exposition of the Principle of Non-Contradiction not only 
provides us with a logical and ontological starting-point, but that it most clearly delivers the 
communicability-criterion. More specifically, PNC gives us the following : 1) that there are extra-
linguistic, extra-mental objects in the world (ontological-realist criterion) 2) our apprehension of 
these objects are communicable to others (communicability criterion) such that 3) some things can 
be articulated of these extra-linguistic and extra-mental objects that are definitive of them (e.g. that 
X is either y or –y). 
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“Politike, Self-Sufficiency and Freedom in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics” 
 
We are moved to seek a more precise understanding of what, exactly, Aristotle means by politike, if 
only because “a wide range of social theorists...claim to have found in Aristotle’s discourse of 
politike the correct foundation, or at least proper point of departure, for a new and more satisfying 
kind of ethical and political thought.”  (Wallach 1992, 613)  When we turn to the Nicomachean 
Ethics, however, we notice ambiguities in the presentation of politike that make it hard to pin down 
(or even to translate!).  Most importantly, it seems to undergo a shift in meaning between the first 
and second times Aristotle discusses it.   When politike is first introduced in Book I, Aristotle uses 
the term to refer to his own activity, the pursuit of knowledge of the highest good for human beings 
(1094b10-11).  While this activity is referred to as architectonic, the utility of such knowledge 
remains ambiguous.  After Book I, politike is not mentioned again until Book VI, where Pericles 
rather than Aristotle--the statesman rather than the political philosopher--is presented as the model 
of politike.  Here, the practical side rather than the theoretical side of politike is emphasized, which 
is striking in light of the fact that this occurs in the context of a discussion of intellectual virtue.  
This raises questions about Aristotle’s view of the relationship between practical statesmanship and 
political science. In this paper, I will explore the ambiguities,  and connect my discussion of politike 
to Aristotle’s exploration of the possibility of self-sufficiency (on both the level of the individual and 
the community or polis).   Specifically, I will consider the implications for Aristotle’s understanding 
of what it means for human beings to initiate something new, and hence for his understanding of 
human freedom. 
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“Harmonia Kai Rhuthmos' as Music and Dance in Plato and Aristotle, and the Ramifications for the 
Poetics” 
 
The phrase harmonia kai rhuthmos is almost always transliterated as “harmony and rhythm,” as 
mere musical terms, in various works by Plato and Aristotle, especially the Republic and Laws for 
Plato and the Poetics and Politics for his student.  However, I argue, the phrase should typically be 
translated as “music (or song) and dance,” not only because there was no such thing as musical 
harmony in our sense of the word, at least for these two Greeks, but because of how Plato explicitly 
defines the terms in an apparently little-read part of the Laws II, at 665a.   
The correct translation has, perhaps surprisingly, significant ramifications for the Poetics, helping 
show that its scope is not poetry in our sense of the word (and that its purpose is not any systematic 
classification of literary forms) but instead only dramatic musical theater, primarily tragedy and 
comedy (the third and final form, epic, is derivative or secondary but is said in Ch 23 in its quasi-
definition to have plots that should be dramatic).   
I demonstrate all of this by analyzing Ch 1 afresh:  Traditionally, translators with very rare exception 
have been not sure how to treat harmonia and rhuthmos, too often thinking that rhuthmos only 
means “rhythm” in our musical or abstract sense, when it should be clear that Aristotle is using it to 
denote “ordered body movement” (or dance for short) at 1447a26-28.  (By “dance” here, I mean 
dance in a broad sense, that is, any designed movement that involves purposefully ordered 
movement, not a narrow sense of highly stylized vocabulary such as classical ballet or tango.)  Those 
translators also always, or almost always, merely transliterate harmonia. 
 The primary reason that perhaps the translators have been puzzled stems from the sentence 
“For music and rhuthmos alone are employed in oboe-playing and kithara-playing and in any other 
arts which have a similar function, as, for example, pipe-playing.”  Translators have seemingly taken 
a modern view about the playing of instruments and have not fully realized that the Greek musicians 
were more like rock-and-roll guitarists, “strutting their stuff” while playing and singing, than they 
were like symphonic musicians glued to a chair (with possible apologies to the Greeks for such a 
comparison!).  The instruments that Aristotle picks to make his point about harmonia and rhuthmos 
are, out of dozens of Greek musical instruments, the ones used by performers in the theater as they 
were “dancing”.  Once we see this, rhuthmos becomes consistent and the rest of the chapter, and 
indeed of the treatise, as I shall show, becomes clearer. 
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“Philosophy and the Struggle Between Poetry and Expertise” 
 
In the Ion Socrates argues that unlike doctors and generals who have knowledge (epistemē), there is 
no domain of which poets are the master, and therefore they speak of things of which they do not 
have real knowledge. They are instead inspired by the god and draw others toward them 
magnetically.  
Socrates assertion of this new technical paradigm and criterion for knowledge is perhaps the most 
trenchant criticism of poetry emerging from the dialogues, and Socrates uses it often. I draw the 
question of this paper from the Ion: there we do not see Socrates assert unequivocally the inferiority 
of poetry. Instead the dialogue leaves us to face a dilemma about which is superior, the masterful 
knowledge that characterizes expertise (technē), which we can choose seek and to exercise, or the 
inspiration that characterizes poetry, which is not entirely under our control, but is given by the 
gods.  
By drawing on the Ion, Phaedrus, and Republic, I show that each has a claim to determining what has 
authority over human affairs. The aim of this paper is to clarify and heighten the difficulty of this 
dilemma, and what is at stake in how it is cast and decided.  
Socrates seems to propose that the edifice of culture and human action move its foundation from 
poetry to knowledge modeled on expertise. In the Republic, for example, he seems to propose that 
knowledge like this is necessary to create a just city, that this latter kind of knowledge take over the 
domain of ethics that formerly belonged to poetry.  
And yet though they certainly criticize it, Plato and Socrates do not abandon the use of poetry at all, 
neither in the allegories of the Republic nor in the speeches in praise of divine madness in the 
Phaedrus, nor in praise of Eros in the Symposium. There, and in the Sophist, the idea that human 
technical mastery is complete, sufficient and primary in the pursuit of truth is dismantled.  
I argue that the introduction of technē as a model for knowledge is strategic: it mounts a powerful 
and intuitive criticism of poetry to which poetry cannot respond, at least not on its own terms. But 
neither poetry nor expertise can on its own decide which is superior: it appears that only 
philosophical discourse can do this. 
Having argued for the superiority of technical expertise and criticized poetry on behalf of 
philosophy, it turns out that Socratic philosophy is not a form of expertise. Technical expertise often 
appears in the dialogues as something already completed and perfect: the general, doctor or 
philosopher king knows for certain what the truth is and what it is best to do. Yet the philosopher 
does not match this description: he lacks precisely the knowledge he seeks. Not having this 
knowledge, he cannot know that having it would be superior to inspiration.  
On the other hand, what would persuade someone to take up philosophy? It seems as though the 
goal of philosophical activity must be presented poetically, as something enchanting or inspiring. 
Poetry—problematically—orients, motivates, and shapes philosophical activity, even as philosophy 
pursues an ideal of expertise. 
 
 
Boanrae Seok, Alvernia University 
Bongrae.Seok@alvernia.edu 
“Moral Psychology of Negative Virtue” 
 
Moral dispositions such as humility, poverty, and shame are rarely discussed in Greco-Roman 
schools of virtue ethics (i.e., Stoic and Aristotelian schools of virtue ethics). Unlike typical Greco-
Roman virtues such as courage and wisdom, these moral dispositions are typically characterized as 
negative and deprived states of the mind: they are passive, accidental, and reactive states that do not 
reflect positive inner excellence and flourishing life of a moral agent. Despite the impoverished 
characterization, these negative dispositions play very important roles in many non-Western 
philosophical and religious traditions. Poverty, humility, and shame are not just ordinary dispositions 
but major virtues of Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. In this paper, instead of describing 
negative virtues as failure of inner excellence or re-interpreting them as virtues with hidden positive 
characteristics, I will embrace their negativity and analyze them as a special form of excellence. 
Specifically, I will analyze shame as a genuine moral disposition, i.e., a Confucian virtue. In contrast 
to Greco-Roman virtues that are characterized as positive power (virtus) and inner excellence (arête), 
Confucian virtues are understood as balanced, interactive, and spontaneous dispositions of a moral 
agent. I will analyze shame as an example of this interactive excellence to explain the moral 
psychological integrity and philosophical significance of negative virtues. 
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“Unmoved Movers in Aristotle’s Sub-Lunar World” 
 
That Aristotle’s God first causes natural motion in the universe as an unmoved mover is well 
known.  However, most scholars limit the significance of such an unmoved and unmoving cause of 
motion to the heavens, not finding much relevance of this motive force to sub-lunary motion.  
Movement of Animals develops the joint in animal limbs as a relatively unmoved source of motion, 
but one which itself is clearly always in motion from different perspectives.  This project examines 
two other Aristotelian texts that contain discussions of an unmoved source of motion: On 
Generation and Corruption I.6-10 and De Anima I.3-5.  The account of a grieving person from GC 
I.6 will be compared to the inquiry regarding the unmoved character of the soul in DA I.  The 
investigation seeks a coherent account of an unmoved source of natural motion that, while operating 
in a manner similar to the prime mover, inhabits the sub-lunar, rather than heavenly, realm 
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“Choosing Between the Political Way-of-Life and the Philosophical Way-of-Life: The Interplay of 
Theoria and Praxis in Aristotle” 
 
Pierre Hadot and others have reinvigorated the ancient conception of philosophy as a way-of-life, or 
a bios.  Yet, this reactivated conception poses the problem of having to choose which way-of-life is 
the best; the hedonistic, the political, the philosophical, etc.  Interpretations of Aristotle’s treatment 
of this issue in the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics are often off the mark due to a casual, and 
overly hasty, conflation of the political way-of-life with praxis and the philosophical way-of-life with 
theoria.  This paper focuses on disentangling the dynamic and complicated interplay between theoria 
and praxis as activities, which is contradistinguished from the political and philosophical as ways-of-
life.  By this analysis, I conclude that theoria and praxis are both mutually dominant and inextricably 
linked.  For this reason, the philosophical way-of-life is not merely theory and, therefore, the 
argument for the superiority of theoria over praxis does not translate into an argument for the 
superiority of the philosophical way-of-life over the political.  I conclude that the staunch either/or 
choice between philosophy and politics as ways-of-life is a false dichotomy.  This conclusion 
reopens the larger question of what, exactly, is the relationship between philosophy and a way-of-
life.  In other words, if philosophy and politics are not mutually opposed, then what is the 
distinction between a philosophical and a non-philosophical way-of-life? .  I give a sketch of an 
answer to this which relates to Aristotle’s treatment of friendship as the essential synthesis of the 
philosophical and the political. 
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“The Sun and the Good” 
 
What place does the Good occupy in Plato’s ontology? A careful reading of the Platonic corpus may 
suggest that that the Good is a Form just like any of the other Forms and that Plato’s metaphysical 
account of it does not vary dramatically from the account he gives of Form in general. Many fine 
scholars interpret Plato in this deflationary way, but the Platonists of late antiquity come to quite 
another conclusion. The traditional Neoplatonist interpretation is that the Good stands in relation to 
the other Forms as their ground and source. As that which gives rise to the sphere of the Forms, the 
Good cannot itself belong to that sphere. The metaphor of the sun in Republic VI plays a crucial role 
in adjudicating this dispute. Many Neoplatonists cite the famous phrase at 509b that the Good is 
“beyond Being” as though it straightforwardly supports the traditional reading. Upon reading the 
entire sentence, however, we find the important qualifier that the Good is beyond Being “in dignity 
and power.” In order to understand the precise force of this passage and therefore to understand a 
most important clue to Plato’s middle metaphysics it is necessary to examine closely the details of 
the sun metaphor. This essay attempts to determine what support both the deflationary and the 
traditional readings can gain from this passage. I begin by giving a brief exposition of the role the 
Good plays in Neoplatonism so that we may become clear on what it would take for the sun 
metaphor to support that reading. I expend the bulk of the essay in a careful exposition of the 
passage, and I conclude with a brief analysis of the data. Ultimately, I find that the passage does 
support the traditional understanding of the Good as metaphysically beyond Being, but not as 
unambiguously as it may at first appear. 
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“How the Prior by Nature Comes to Light in Categories 12” 
 
What looks like a compositional oddity in Categories Chapter 12 – that Aristotle promises four 
senses of “proteron”, but then adds as a seeming afterthought a fifth sense, which is none other 
than “the prior by nature” – is better understood as a phenomenological sign of a dianoia: the 
beginning of the quest for what is first in itself.  As such, the Categories contains within itself the 
beginning of its own overcoming: the conversion from a merely logical and nominalistic 
understanding of ousia to a dialectical and metaphysical inquiry into the question of being.  
Heidegger’s discussion of the distinction between the first for us and the first by nature helps us see 
the outlines of this conversion, but does not bring to light its fundamental feature: an education of 
desire premised on an orientation toward the good. 
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“Friendship and Justice in Plato's Republic” 
 
In Republic IX, Socrates claims that the citizens of his ideal city are friends (590d).  Indeed, as I shall 
argue in this paper, three of Socrates’ most striking political proposals aim at inculcating friendship 
between the citizens: the early education, the noble lie, and the communal family.  But this raises a 
host of important and under-explored questions.  What, according to Socrates, is friendship?  And 
why is it such a great good?  In this paper, I argue that the citizens are friends because they 
recognize one another as akin, and so have a non-instrumental concern for one another.  I argue 
that Socrates is at pains to inculcate this attitude because it is required for the citizens’ virtue; 
accordingly, it motivates the citizens to do the work of the city for which they are best suited.  Thus, 
inculcating the attitudes involved in friendship is both good for the citizens who have these 
attitudes, and good for the community as a whole. 
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“Four Routes Toward Understanding Parmenides” 
 
In this paper, we assess four interpretations of the Way of Truth and its relation to the Way of 
Opinion. We show that there are significant difficulties associated with three better-known 
interpretations: first, if we take Parmenides to be a numerical monist (positing a monism of things), 
the cosmology of the Way of Opinion becomes untenable and we are left without an adequate 
account of Parmenides’ manifest commitment to Physics and astronomy: second, if we take 
Parmenides to be a predicational monist (positing that any fundamental material token - however 
many tokens might exist and however many types might obtain - must be deathless, pure, and 
unchanging), we are left with both a problem of external negation and the difficulty that light and 
night – the fundamental material types within Parmenides’ Physics – are not predicational monads; 
and third, if we take Parmenides to a generous monist (positing the existence of a uniform, 
necessary, and unchanging being that coexists with non-substantial and mutable items), we are 
confronted with an insurmountable problem of co-presence (a problem of two things existing in the 
same place at the same time). The better-know interpretations are highly problematic, but a 
promising lesser-known approach comes to us from Parmenides’ immediate successors in natural 
science. We show that both Anaxagoras and Empedocles understand Parmenides under the rubric 
of a fourth interpretation: they consider him to be a liberal monist (positing, in the Way of Truth, a 
pre-comic arche from which, or out of which, the dynamic world of the Way of Opinion comes to 
be formed). We go on to examine key passages in Parmenides’ poem with an eye toward assessing 
the tenability of Anaxagoras’ and Empedocles’ interpretation. Contrary to initial expectations, we 
conclude that Parmenides may well be a liberal monist. At the very least, we show the fourth route 
toward understanding Parmenides merits further study. 
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“Carneades’ Pithanon and Sextus’ Isostheneia:  Is There Really a Conflict?” 
 
In PH 1.226−31, Sextus explains the crucial differences between Pyrrhonian skepticism and the 
skepticism of, as he calls it, the New Academy of Carneades and Clitomachus. According to Sextus, 
the chief distinction lays in the fact that “we say that, as far as the argument goes, appearances are 
equal in respect to persuasiveness or unpersuasiveness, while they say that some are persuasive 
[pithanas] and others unpersuasive”. Sextus’ statement obviously refers to Carneades’ proposal that 
one who suspends judgment about the truth of one’s appearances could still use those that are 
persuasive as a practical criterion of action (SE M 7.166−89; cf. Cic. Acad. 2.99−101). Apparently, 
Sextus dissents from Carneades by rejecting the idea that appearances differ in respect to 
persuasiveness, so much so that he promotes an opposing principle, equipollence (isostheneia) of 
conflicting appearances, as one of the crucial elements of the Pyrrhonist’s skeptical method (PH 
1.8−10). In this essay, I will argue that Sextus’ rejection of pithanon in favor of isostheneia is either 
intellectually dishonest, or based on a major misinterpretation of Carneades’ philosophical method. 
 As many scholars have argued recently, it seems that Carneades’ idea that there are 
appearances that are more persuasive than others has been used by some of his followers to imply 
that persuasive appearances are, at least in most cases, indeed true, i.e. correspond to reality. Given 
that Sextus’ Pyrrhonist suspends judgment on how things really are, it is not surprising that he would 
reject any such alleged link between persuasiveness of an appearance and its truth (cf. DL 9.94). 
What is baffling, however, is that with his principle of isostheneia Sextus seems to reject not only the 
alleged link between persuasiveness and truth, but also the very fact that some appearances seem 
more persuasive than others. There are at least two reasons why this is extremely problematic. First, 
the concept of persuasive appearance, as something Carneades clearly took over from the Stoics (SE 
M 7.242−3; DL 7.75), should be understood as referring to an appearance that, in virtue of certain 
phenomenal properties it possesses, causes the subject to accept it, whether in the form of 
“assenting” (sunkatatithesthai) for the Stoics or “approving” (adprobari) for Carneades. In other 
words, persuasive appearance is whatever appearance—as a matter of psychological fact—causes the 
subject to accept it. But, it seems that Sextus grants that the Pyrrhonist too entertains appearances 
that cause his acceptance (in a form of non-dogmatic assent). In PH 1.13, Sextus says that 
Pyrrhonists “assent to pathē forced upon them by appearances—for example, they would not say, 
when cold or warm, ‘I think that I am not cold (or warm)’.” Therefore, in so far as some 
appearances cause the Pyrrhonist to accept them, there is no reason to assume that they do not seem 
persuasive to him in the original Stoic/Carneadean sense, and indeed, more persuasive than certain 
other appearances.  
Second, contrary to Sextus’ suggestion in PH 1.229−30, it does not follow that the fact that some 
appearances seem to the subject more persuasive than others would jeopardize the Pyrrhonist’s 
proclaimed aim of achieving freedom from disturbance (ataraxia) in matters of opinion and 
moderation of feeling (metriopatheia) in matters forced upon him. As Sextus explains in PH 1.30 
and M 11.141−61, unnecessary disturbance (tarachē) comes from accepting certain things as being 
truly or “by nature” good or bad. But, if Carneades did not assume that there is a link between the 
persuasiveness of an appearance and its truth, then accepting persuasive impressions does not lead 
to unnecessary disturbance. In fact, it seems that all practically relevant persuasive appearances fall 
into the category of Sextus’ necessary pathē. Therefore, when he rejected it in favor of isostheneia, 
Sextus was either dishonest towards or ignorant about Carneades’ conception of the pithanon. 
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“Creation as Emanation in Aquinas” 
 
In light of Aquinas discussion of God’s creative act in terms of efficient causation in the Summa 
Theologiae, it is somewhat surprising to discover that Aquinas also speaks of God’s creative act in 
terms of emanation. Within this paper, I will explore the passages in which Aquinas speaks of God’s 
creative act as an emanation. When describing creating as emanating, Aquinas uses some but not all 
of the features of Neoplatonic emanation. So, the next task I undertake is to show what Aquinas 
means by emanating in the context of his discussion of creating. Aquinas does not adopt wholesale 
the Neoplatonic conception of emanation. Aquinas presenting creation as emanation (but not of a 
strictly Neoplatonic sort) is likely related to a distinction he wished to draw between God’s 
generative acts of creating the world and of the procession of the Son and the Holy Spirit, the 
members of the Trinitarian God in addition to God the Father. Finally, I argue that Aquinas thinks 
of emanation as producing an effect via efficient causation without a patient, and that the emanator 
acts voluntarily (rather than acting by its nature) when performing this act.  
It is my contention that Aquinas does not subscribe to the Neoplatonic model of emanation when 
he describes creating as emanating. Aquinas’s account of God’s emanation does not align with the 
central aspects of Neoplatonic emanation. He rejects the principle that from one simple being, only 
one simple being can be produced, even within the context of the necessary emanations within the 
Godhead. He rejects the notion that God can only create a multiplicity of diverse things through 
mediation; in fact, he rejects the notion that created beings have the capability to produces 
something from nothing. He rejects the notion that God creates necessarily. Though the emanations 
within the Godhead are necessary, creation, which is the emanation outside of the Godhead, is 
voluntary. The one similarity between Aquinas’s account of creation by emanation and the 
Neoplatonic account of emanation is that God produces being. 
 
 
Mary Elizabeth Tetzlaff, The Catholic University of America 
mtetzla@gmail.com 
“Self-Knowledge and False Pleasure in Plato's Philebus” 
 
This paper studies the question of what makes false pleasure false according to Plato’s account of 
pleasure in Philebus 36c-50e.  After considering a general account of pleasure, it examines carefully 
the specific account of false pleasure and proposes that false pleasures are false because they are 
imitations of true pleasures.  The ability or inability to discern between true pleasures and imitations 
of true pleasures is then shown to rely on self-knowledge.  Finally, two implications of this positions 
are briefly considered.  The first concerns the possibility of a holistic reading of Plato’s Philebus 
guided by an aporetic hermeneutic; the second, the possibility of a cogent response to the so-called 
akrasia problem. 
 
 
Allison Thornton, Baylor University 
allison_thornton1@baylor.edu 
“The Socratic Solution to the Meno Problem” 
 
In the Meno, Socrates raises an interesting problem, now known as the Meno Problem.  It centers 
around the question: is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief?  Socrates says that it is, and 
he tells the story of the statues of Daedalus to illustrate his answer.  Some contemporary 
epistemologists have thought that this story shows that the relevant difference between true belief 
and knowledge is justification.  Alternatively, in the Theaetetus, Socrates argues that knowledge is 
not true belief plus justification (logos).  In this paper, I will argue with Theaetetus’ Socrates that 
justification does not make the difference between true belief and knowledge.  I’ll do so by arguing 
that the Daedalus story does not in fact support the thesis that justification is the difference-maker.  
I’ll then argue for what I think the Daedalus story does illustrate, which is different from what many 
contemporary epistemologists take it to show. 
 
 
Zita Toth, Fordham University 
ztoth@fordham.edu 
“Scotus on Modality and the Argument for God's Existence” 
 
Duns Scotus’s concept of modality has been, for the last few decades, a quite much debated issue, 
yet without any apparent consensus. Briefly put, the question is this: does Scotus regard possibility as 
ultimately dependent on God (either on divine power or on the divine intellect), or does he regard it 
as logically prior to, or independent of God? Moreover, if the latter, does this mean that Scotus’s 
notion is the modern, “minimalist” notion of logical possibility (expressible in terms of non-
contradiction alone)? 
Regarding the first question, on the one hand, Calvin Normore has argued that for Scotus there is 
no possibility without the divine intellect; even if Scotus sometimes describes the broadest kind of 
possibility as the non-repugnance of terms, these terms (or notae) must be formulated in the divine 
mind, and so we cannot speak about possibility as entirely independent of actually existing things. 
On the other hand, however, Simo Knuuttila has made some effort to show that we should regard 
the concept of the possible as prior to any actual existence (including the divine intellect), and that 
Scotus’s concept, after all, is basically equivalent to our modern concept of logical possibility. 
  
Unfortunately, the majority of places where Scotus explicitly addresses the question, most notably in 
his Metaphysics commentary, can be interpreted in support of either of these positions. Therefore, 
in this paper, instead of engaging in the interesting but seemingly non-decisive philological debates 
about these passages, I examine the issue in a different context: in the context of Scotus’s modal 
argument for God’s existence in the treatise De Primo Principio. The De Primo Principio offers five 
arguments for the existence of a first cause. The fifth, which is the most interesting one from the 
present point of view, aims to give a proof by proving first the possibility, then the actuality, and 
only finally the necessity of a first agent. Although in this text Scotus does not explicitly deal with 
the meaning of modal terms, the question immediately arises whether there is a sense of possibility 
in which his argument in the DPP is not obviously fallacious, and which does not contradict what he 
says about possibility elsewhere. I argue that the answer to this question is affirmative, and the 
concept that emerges here can help us to evaluate the debate about Scotus’s concept of logical 
possibility in general. 
Details aside, according to this interpretation, logical possibility neither depends on some actually 
existing power, nor is it reducible to mere non-contradiction: something is possible, in this sense, iff 
it does not involve a contradiction, and the power that can bring it about, although need not exist, 
does not involve a contradiction either. Interpreted this way, Scotus’s account -- if his DPP is 
consistent with his other writings -- neither claims that possibility is determined by the divine power 
(as Normore would put it), nor is it the same as our modern concept of possibility (in Knuuttila’s 
sense). 
 
 
Lewis Trelawny-Cassity, Antioch College 
lewcassity@hotmail.com 
“Sumplokē as a stylistic and structural element of Plato’s Laws” 
 
Sumplokē as a stylistic and structural element of Plato’s Laws 
 In Greek Prose Style (1952), J. D. Denniston notes the focused attention that Plato pays to 
word order, especially in his later works like the Laws. One device that Plato uses is hyperbaton, 
defined by Smyth as “the separation of words naturally belonging together” (Greek Grammar, 
1920).   Dennison describes the stylistic effect of “interlacing” as occurring when “one hyperbaton 
gives rise to another: two logically connected but spatially separated words in turn divide the word 
or expression, which divides them, from its natural fellows.” Describing interlacing, Denniston 
writes, “Often, however, and particularly in the Laws, the effect of interlacing is strongly marked, 
and it is difficult to resist the impression that the formation of word-arabesques had a certain 
fascination for Plato at the close of his life” (Compare also Holger Thesleff’s Studies in the Styles of 
Plato, 1967). 
 In this paper, I will first review a few instances of sumplokē (Smyth’s term for a device akin 
to Denniston’s interlacing) at the level of the sentence structure of the Greek text of the Laws. Next, 
I will examine whether or not the stylistic principle of sumplokē occurs in larger sections of Laws at 
a thematic-structural level. As Voegelin has suggested, it may be that accusations claiming that the 
Laws is “garrulous and rambling” and that “it is poorly organized” stem from a misunderstanding  
of the Laws’ “external” and “internal” organization (Order and History, Vol. 3, 1957).  Taking Book 
1 of the Laws as a test case, I will argue that Plato’s argument in the Laws has an interlacing 
structure that parallels Plato’s stylistically efforts at the sentence level. The appropriate 
acknowledgement of this argumentative and structural interlacing provides a clearer appreciation of 
the artistry of the Laws as well as a more nuanced understanding of philosophical content of the 
Laws. 
 
 
Dana Trusso, Duquesne 
dana.trusso@gmail.com 
“Plotinus’ Intellectual Unconscious and Philosophical Erōs” 
 
Psychic health is related to the soul’s ascent insofar as it desires the good. Psychic illness is the 
descent of the human soul away from human good. The question thus arises, what is the human 
good? What is the human function? Seeking the answer to these questions is in itself an activity that 
leads to the best possible human life, but what fuels this striving? I claim that Plotinus' intellectual 
unconscious is the hinge between Plato's account of ascent towards Beauty Itself and philosophical 
erōs as the vehicle culminating in human flourishing.  
For Plotinus, yearning to return to the Source, the rational human soul, also known as the 
intellectual unconscious, works to shuffle off the material world by a turn inward closer to unity with 
the One. Love makes possible both emanation and return, descent and ascent. Starting from mere 
matter, emanations desire to return to their source, and do so by contemplation.  Just as in Plato’s 
Phaedrus, the wings of the soul are nourished through participation in the Forms, so all emanations 
are nourished by contemplating the One. Perfection is found through contemplation, which is also 
the productive function. One reason why emanation overflows into lower forms of reality, starting 
with the three hypostases, is that perfection implies production. The One contemplates itself, 
overflowing into Intellect , which contemplates the forms and itself, overflowing into the third 
hypostasis Soul. 
In the section on Plato I will highlight the tripartite structure as explained in the Republic, Phaedrus, 
and Phaedo. The Republic explains how the best soul is ruled by reason, where spirit functions as 
reason’s auxiliary in order to control the appetites.  The Phaedrus provides an intricate mythology that 
relates the nature of the soul to the Forms and an explanation of how visible beauty sparks 
recollection of Beauty Itself. The Symposium’s “ladder of love” is a correct guide for the education 
of the beloved’s soul. Socrates uses this allegory to describe how the soul ascends via dialectic within 
the nurturing relationship of a moral education. Ascent ensures eudaimonia, that is, the flourishing, 
rational, and productive life.  
In the section on Plotinus I will examine Ennead IV.8 “The Soul’s Descent into the Body,” V.1 “On 
the Three Hypostases,” and V.3 ”The Knowing Hypostasis and the Transcendent.” I will explain the 
idea of the intellectual unconscious in the text and how it diverges from Plato’s theory of the soul. I 
will use the contemporary scholarship of such thinkers as John Rist and Lloyd P. Gerson to clarify 
Plotinus’ philosophical theory, while also pointing to problems in the scholarship that will arise later 
when examining how the nature of the soul corresponds to the role of love. 
 
 
Andrea Tschemplik, American University 
atschem@american.edu 
“Painting the Republic” 
 
Much has been written about Socrates’ critique of poetry; but fewer works analyze the role of 
painting in Plato’s philosophy.  I will examine what philosophical work is accomplished by Plato’s 
discussions of painting.  My paper will focus on the discussion of painting in the Republic and 
investigate the ways in which painting is the model for “mindful imitation.”  I will pick up on and 
develop R.G. Collingwood’s suggestion that the images created by a painter cannot be considered 
mere copies, but are rather windows into a new metaphysical space. 
 
 
Katherine Tullmann, City University of New York Graduate Center 
katherine.tullmann@gmail.com 
“Art & the Inner Light:  Augustine on Artistic Creativity and Aesthetic Experience” 
 
This paper attempts to situate Augustine’s views on aesthetics within the historical traditions of this 
field. One suitable way to accomplish this is by discussing the rationality of both artistic creation and 
an audience’s aesthetic experience, a topic that has gained much attention in recent aesthetic debates. 
For example, Berys Gaut (2012) asks whether artistic creativity is essentially rational (pertaining to 
reasons) or irrational (based on feelings and impulses). In this paper, I will interpret Augustine’s 
aesthetic theory in light of the rational creativity debate. Throughout the paper I will also consider 
various challenges to Augustine’s aesthetic work, including the possibility of a secular understanding 
of his aesthetic theory. 
I begin by contrasting Augustine’s views with those of two predominant historical figures in 
aesthetics: Plato and Kant. Plato appears to have held a view that both artistic creativity and the 
audience members’ engagement with artworks are fundamentally irrational. Kant’s view is more 
complicated; the audiences’ engagement with beautiful things, including artworks, is both a rational 
and irrational process. However, artistic creativity (the artistic genius) is irrational in Gaut’s sense.  I 
do not argue that there is a direct causal connection in ideas between Plato, Augustine, and Kant. 
However, certain important ideas pertaining to artistic rationality can be found in all three, 
particularly in the works of Plato and Augustine.  
The second half of my paper delves into three themes of Augustine’s aesthetic theory: the world as 
created according to number and wisdom, the world as a symbol of the divine, and aesthetic 
experience as a means of delight and joy. The first two themes suggest a primarily rational stance in 
the creativity debate, but the third promotes an irrational stance. Thus, I argue that Augustine's 
position is best understood as necessarily comprised of both rational and irrational components. I 
end this section with a brief discussion of the relevance of Augustine’s thoughts in the 
contemporary debates on artistic intention and  aesthetic appreciation.  
My goal in this paper is not to defend Augustine’s views, but rather to place them in context with 
other historical figures in the philosophy of art. Nor is this essay intended as a complete exegesis of 
Augustine’s aesthetic theory. Rather, I wish to examine one particular area of Augustine’s thought—
his stance on the rationality/irrationality debate. Ultimately, I argue that an Augustinian position in 
this debate occupies a complex middle ground that is more plausible than either a Kantian or 
Platonic position. I conclude the paper with a brief overview and discussion of the relevance of 
Augustine’s thought to contemporary debates. 
 
 
Chris Tweedt, Baylor University 
christweedt@gmail.com 
“A New Interpretation of Plato's Republic” 
 
At the beginning of book 2, Socrates agrees with Glaucon to answer two questions: 1) What is 
justice? and 2) Is justice the best kind of good—that is, is justice both good for its own sake and for 
the sake of other things? By the end of book 4, supposedly Socrates has answered both the first 
question and the first part of the second, viz. that it is good for its own sake for each part of the soul 
to do its proper work. You would expect Socrates to start answering the second part of the second 
question at the beginning of book 5, but he doesn’t do that until the beginning of book 8. Before 
answering the second part of the second question, Socrates proceeds to answer Adeimantus’ 
question about the communal ownership of wives from the end of book 4 until the end of book 7. 
Given only what precedes book 5, Adeimantus’ question seems irrelevant and dismissible by 
Socrates. To the contrary, I’ll argue for an interpretation of the Republic according to which Socrates’ 
answer to Adeimantus’ question is central not only to what Socrates thinks about justice but also to 
the overall structure of the Republic. 
 
 
Sara L. Uckelman, Ruprecht-Karls Universität Heidelberg 
sara.uckelman@asia-europe.uni-heidelberg.de 
“The Relationship Between Epistemic Logic and Epistemology in Paul of Venice” 
 In recent decades, epistemic logic, in both its static and dynamic guises, has become an important 
field in contemporary mathematical logic, with many advances occurring each year.  But one thing 
that has been lost in all the technical developments is a clear connection with epistemology and 
philosophical theories of knowledge; for example, in the idealized setting of multi-agent epistemic 
logic where all agents are logically omniscient and have perfect recall, there is no room for the 
concept of justification, or even of proof.  As a result, contemporary epistemic logic is unfortunately 
of limited use for discussion epistemological problems. 
In the Middle Ages, the connection between epistemology and epistemic reasoning is much closer.  
Treatises "De scire et dubitare" ("On Knowing and Being Uncertain"), philosophers and logicians 
investigate epistemological problems in tandem with logical rules governing inferences using 
epistemic modalities (know, believe, doubt, understand, cognize, etc.).  However, these rules are 
often implicit, and must be reconstructed from the examples in which they are applied.  In this 
paper, we investigate rules for reasoning about epistemic concepts in Paul of Venice's "De scire et 
dubitare", paying particular attention to the examples that he gives using the language of 
obligationes. It is in these dynamic contexts that the roles of proof and justification play the most 
significant roles, as the introduction of new proofs and justifications into the disputation causes the 
Respondent's knowledge to change.  This change of knowledge requires sophisticated logical 
machinery, which we can make explicit and precise using the tools and techniques developed in 
contemporary research on mathematical epistemic logic, marrying yet again the epistemic and the 
epistemological. 
 
 
Monica Vilhauer, Roanoke College 
mvilhauer@mac.com 
“Sickness and Rehabilitation in Plato’s Timaeus: Retrieving the Value of the Body and Pursuing the 
Holistic Good Life” 
 
In Plato’s Phaedo, we hear a story about the good life that has influenced, in the most pervasive ways, 
our Western understanding of human life, the peculiar kinds of sickness from which human beings 
suffer, and the strategies we should use to regain health and achieve happiness.  The broad strokes 
of the story put forth by Socrates in the Phaedo suggest that the body – as the seat of sensation and 
all the affections -- is the source of human ills. The philosopher must treat the sickness of the body 
by “purifying himself,” or by despising and disassociating from the body as much as possible.  Only 
then can he pursue truth unhindered and achieve psychic health.  The “good life” in the Phaedo is 
conceived as the one that is, as much as possible, disembodied and closest to death.  These broad 
strokes, passed down as Plato’s highest wisdom about the good life, are at the root of a 
philosophical tradition which conceives of the human being as soul or mind, as distinct from body, 
which separates the “rational” human from supposedly unintelligent nature, and which envisions the 
philosophical life as a pursuit of pure reason and a denial of the body.  As a result, aspects of life 
that are intimately intertwined (soul-body, intellect-sensation, human-nature) have been severed, 
leaving the modern world suffering from several forms of deep alienation.   
In this paper, I want to call into question the notion that Plato offers such a univocal, crudely 
dualistic story about human life, and such a simplistic account of human sickness and the way to 
regain health.   To do this I will turn in this paper to Plato’s Timaeus, which offers a picture of 
human life as a psychosomatic whole, in which intelligence and sensation are intertwined, and a 
picture of human life that is intimately linked with the rest of nature.  The Timaeus offers a story of 
the value of sensation, which it depicts as the root of our philosophizing, our self-ordering, and our 
ability to maintain health.  It provides an account of human sicknesses that occur, not because of the 
existence of our bodies, but because of a disharmony between body and soul.  And, finally, it offers 
strategies for healing these sicknesses that do not prescribe disassociating from the body, but 
attending to the needs of both soul and body and cultivating balance between them.  The Timaeus, 
thus, provides us with a picture of the good life that is achieved by emphasizing, rather than 
severing, the deep connections between soul, body, and world, and offers a prescription for living as 
a harmonious whole. 
 
 
Suresh Vythylingam, Tarrant County College, South Campus 
forgivenandjustified@yahoo.com 
“Philosophy of the Ancient Church” 
 
This paper will review the philosophy of the early Church in terms of how it developed doctrine, 
applied the teachings of Jesus Christ, survived persecution etc. 
 
 
Mélanie Walton, Belmont University 
melanie.walton@belmont.edu 
“Self Knowledge for Divine Knowledge in al-Ghazzali and Attar” 
 
Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali’s Alchemy of Happiness and Farid ud-Din Attar’s The Conference of the 
Birds cast faith as the quest to divine knowledge and both command it to begin with and be enacted 
through a coming to know the self.  After commanding that “you must seek out the truth about 
yourself,” for “the key to the knowledge of God … is knowledge about one’s own self,” al-Ghazzali 
denominates the human attributes as composed of those of the beasts of burden, predatory animals, 
demons, and angels, describing them rigorously so that their recognition can lead to their control, 
rendering the self as well-ordered and a source of divine knowledge (al-Ghazzali, Kimiya-yi Sa’adat).  
Al-Ghazzali’s text is rich with imagery (often hearkening Platonist themes), but still a treatise whose 
spiritual exercise is prompted by philosophical exegesis.  Attar’s Conference of the Birds, on the 
other hand, works through the poetic to command self-knowledge and culminates (nearly 4,500 lines 
in) in the philosophic revelation that the divine, the Simorgh, is one’s self: “(Who sees the Lord?  It 
is himself each sees) …” (Attar, Mantiq al-tair).  Distinctly blending the literary and philosophic and 
similarly merging Neoplatonism with Islam, both texts emphasize the power of the heart and warn 
of faith’s trials, both instrumentalize self-knowledge as self-purification, and both guide us to the 
ecstatic realization of divinity. 
While al-Ghazzali’s Alchemy of Happiness is infrequently read philosophically with Attar’s 
Conference of the Birds, they are uniquely compatible texts.  Both were eleventh to twelfth century 
Sufi mystics who lived about 95 miles apart in what is today Iran, with Attar’s birth only one to five 
decades after al-Ghazzali’s death.  Al-Ghazzali’s poetic philosophy and Attar’s philosophic poetry, as 
emblematized in these two texts, bear further notable similarities: both are demonstrably preeminent 
introductions to Sufism, both engage Aristotelian philosophy read heavily Neoplatonically, both use 
lush imagery (most notably the personification of animals), and both entwine love and suffering, 
ecstasy and asceticism.  Read together, they reveal the depth of the Greek inheritance in medieval 
Sufism and demonstrate a fascinating interpretation of faith. 
The focus of this paper is how both reveal the epistemic quest for divine knowledge as an ethical 
and religious command to self-knowledge and thereby transform faith into a journey and passage 
into self-reflection wherein what is reflected is the divine in each of us who undertake the journey.  I 
will argue how the Neoplatonic theory of emanation aids our understanding of divine knowledge’s 
prerequisite of self-knowledge, where we can see this theory illustrated in each text, and how the 
theory can help us to better understand their frequent, intricate mergers of the contradictions of love 
and sorrow, ecstasy and tranquility. 
 
 
Kelsey Ward, Duquesne University 
wardk1@duq.edu 
“Hylomorphism in the De Anima and its Sources” 
 
Matter and form are united as one thing in the De Anima where Aristotle writes, “there is no 
need…to inquire whether soul and body are one, any more than whether the wax and its stamp are 
one, or more generally the material of each thing and that of which it is the material” (DA 412b7).  
He seems to employ a hylomorphism that Sean Kelsey (2010) argues for in the context of the Physics.  
On this view, form and matter are together as one type of thing rather than standing as two types of 
entities in one divisible thing.  And yet at DA 429a10 Aristotle turns our attention toward intellect.  
Though the intellectual function is the characteristic activity of human beings, intellect must be 
unmixed with body (429a24).  This apparent conflict exemplifies the tension between Kelsey’s view 
of hylomorphism and the dualistic view explicated in Bernard Williams (2007).  Thinking is clearly 
distinctive from other functions of soul for Aristotle.  Does the status of the intellectual part of the 
soul threaten the hylomorphism that Kelsey proposes for the Physics in favor of a dualistic 
hylomorphism?  To address this question, my paper examines the content of the De Anima through 
the lens of Aristotle’s treatment of substantial being and parts of form in Metaphysics Z10-11. 
 
 
Damon Watson, Marquette University 
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“The Role of Teleology in Aristotle's Account of the Unity of Definition” 
 
There would appear to be an inconsistency between Aristotle's account of the unity of definition 
from Metaphysics Z.12 and his understanding of definition as we find it in Parts of Animals 1.2. In 
Metaphysics Z.12 it seems that Aristotle's account of the definition's unity will work only for 
definitions possessing a single specific difference. However, in Parts of Animals 1.2 Aristotle 
explicitly criticizes and rejects an account of definition in which definitions are to possess only a 
single specific difference. In contrast to this notion of definition involving a single specific 
difference, biological definitions would seem to be derived from the several specifications of the 
various heterogenous organs out of which an animal is composed. In this paper I attempt to show 
that the account of the definition's unity from Metaphysics Z.12, despite appearances, is consistent 
with Aristotle's understanding of biological definitions in Parts of Animals. To show this I first look 
at the context in which the account of the unity of definition in Metaphysics Z.12 is introduced. There 
we see that Aristotle is well aware that the essential parts of an animal must be included in the 
definition of that animal. I read Metaphysics Z.12 as working with an unrealistically simple type of 
definition (definitions having only a single specific difference) so as to make Aristotle's account of 
the unity of definition more easily transparent. Therefore it is still an open question as to how we are 
to make the core account of the definition's unity from Z.12 work with the definitions that would be 
used by Aristotle as a biologist. To answer this open question I use an interpretation of the organic 
mereology out of Metaphysics Z.17 in tandem with Aristotelian teleology. Even though a definition of 
an animal will include several heterogeneous parts and so several specifications of these parts, 
nonetheless, by Aristotle's organic mereology, this total set of specifications of each organ must 
itself constitute a unity, for the ontological correlate to this total set of specifications is just the form 
of the animal under consideration. The specifications of the heterogenous organs will be imitative of 
the functional unity of the form insofar as each specification will be an account of the way the organ 
it names contributes to the entire functioning of the whole animal; this functioning of the animal is 
just the internal telos of the animal. In this way we can still hold that there is a single specific 
difference insofar as the total set of specific differences must constitute a unity as it reflects the telos 
of the animal, but also maintain that there are several specific differences insofar as the total set of 
specific difference has more than one element. Thus, with qualifications, we have an account of  
definition for animals for which the Z.12 account of a definition's unity will be applicable, and also 
an account of definition that will work with Parts of Animals' rejection of a single specific 
difference. 
 
 
Michael Wiitala, University of Kentucky 
mwiitala@gmail.com 
“Normativity and Being in Sophist 255e3-256d10” 
 
In the Republic, Plato has Socrates claim that the things known “owe their being and essence (to einai 
te kai tēn ousian)” to the good (509b7-8).  This paper examines the way in which Plato further 
develops the relationship between being and the normativity of the good through the Eleatic 
Stranger’s discussion of the five greatest kinds in the Sophist.  I argue that the Stranger’s account of 
the communion of kinds in Sophist 255e3-256d10 shows that something’s being a discrete, 
countable, individual presupposes a higher order, and therefore uncountable, normative principle. 
Lesley Brown calls the Stranger’s arguments in 255e3-256d10 “Plato’s ‘four quartets’” due to how 
systematically and similarly Plato structures the four four-line arguments which the Stranger presents 
in that section.  The four arguments presuppose the Stranger’s claim at 255e3-6 that all things 
“participate (metechein) in the form of difference.”  The four arguments can be formulated as 
follows:  
I. (1) Motion is different from rest (255e10). 
(2) So motion is not rest (255e14). 
(3) But motion is (256a1). 
(4) Because motion participates in being (256a1). 
II. (1) Motion is different from the same (256a3). 
(2) So motion is not the same (256a5). 
(3) But motion is the same (256a7). 
(4) Because motion participates in the same (256a7, b1). 
III. (1) Motion is different from different (256c5). 
(2) So motion is not different (256c8). 
(3) But motion is different (256c8). 
(4) Because motion participates in different (255e3-6). 
IV. (1) Motion is different from being (256d5). 
(2) So motion is not being (256d8). 
(3) But motion is being (256d8-9). 
(4) Because motion participates in being (256d9). 
The general structure of each argument can, thus, be formulated as follows: 
(1) K is different from E (on the basis of participation in different, 255e3-6). 
(2) So K is not E (on the basis of (1)). 
(3) But K is E (on the basis of (4)). 
(4) Because K participates in E. 
A striking feature of these arguments is that the specific nature of motion is irrelevant.  Motion 
could be replaced by any form other than one of the other five kinds and the each of the arguments 
would function in the same way.  For example, replace “motion” with “greatness” in the arguments 
and the results do not change.  I submit that this is because Plato has constructed these four 
arguments in order to define and reveal the preconditions for not only motion, but for the being of 
any countable something, any individual thing.  The arguments claim that any countable individual is 
a being, is the same as itself, and is different from others because it participates in the nature (phusis, 
255e5, 256e1, 257a9) of being, same, and different.  Hence the nature of being, same, and different 
in which all things participate is prior in explanation to any being’s countability and individuality, and 
thus is itself uncountable and not “a being.”  “Being,” “same,” and “different” in line (4) of the 
arguments name the normative principle which explains why countable individuals are countable 
individuals 
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“Beginning at the Beginning: The Introduction to Plato's Timaeus” 
 
This paper explores the ways in which the introductory scenes to Plato's Timaeus provide a guide to 
the interpretation of the works as a whole.  
First I show how the opening scenes with Socrates, Critias, Hermocrates and Timaeus serve to 
demononstrate the sort of person who can properly perform the work of the phusikos. The clues 
given in Timaeus' characterization are developed into an account of the kind of wisdom that must 
be possessed by the phusikos. Key in this reading an account of the relationship between character 
virtue and knowledge, the former serving as a necessary condition of the latter. Timaeus, the 
character, is 
who he is because no one else could give this account of the cosmos. Finally, these conclusions 
are generalized to paint a portrait of the Platonic phusikos. 
Second I address the puzzling inclusion of the Atlantis narrative. Whereas the dramatic introduction 
serves to show what sort of person is capable of physical inquiry, the Atlantis story serves to indicate 
method. The Atlantis story demonstrates the limits of mythopoeic explanation while at the same 
time showing the necessity of narrative in historical inquiry. 
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“Action and Evaluation in Albert the Great” 
 
I intend to examine two different ways of evaluating actions. In the late 12th and early 13th 
centuries, it became common to divide a large class of action types into two groups: generically bad 
acts, and generically good acts. Generically bad acts can be done well, and generically good acts can 
be done badly; but we have a reason to value generically good acts, and a reason to disvalue 
generically bad ones. This reason is only pro tanto, however; an overall reason to value an action 
attaches only to these action types considered along with their moral circumstances. 
 However, this way of evaluating actions changes in the mid-to-late 13th century. Aquinas 
transforms it to suit his purposes, while Godfrey of Fontaines omits it altogether. Albert the Great is 
a transitional figure here. In his early works, generic goodness is an important part of his moral 
theory. In his two early moral treatises, both of which focus on the cardinal virtues, he prefaces his 
discussion of the virtues with an account of the generic features of actions. Further, he treats the 
topic of generic goodness in his first commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences (the standard 
textbook of theology at the time). By the time he writes his second commentary on the Sentences 
(the Summa theologiae) much later in his life, however, he seems to have lost all interest in the 
concept, and makes no mention of generic goodness. 
 I argue that Albert abandons his preferred method of evaluating actions in terms of their 
generic goodness or badness, along with their moral circumstances, for two reasons: first, because he 
has trouble formulating the principle in such a way that it will do real work and his theory; and 
second, because it is in tension with a second way of evaluating actions, which he also employs: what 
I will call the Dionysian principle. According to the Dionysian principle, an action is good overall 
only if it is good in each of a number of different morally relevant ways of being good, whereas it is 
bad overall if it is bad in any one of those ways. This doctrine fits uncomfortably with the doctrine 
of generic goodness, and also seems to be free of the problems that beset Albert's early theory of 
generic goodness. It seems that Albert eventually abandons his early attempts to make them fit 
together, rejecting the one in accepting the other. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, manages to 
keep the Dionysian principle only by radically altering the doctrine of generic goodness. 
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“Leontius of Byzantium’s Philosophy — a quest for individual” 
 
The proposed paper presents the preliminary results of the project “Re-introducing the Early 
Byzantine Metaphysics,” which concentrates on the process of transformation of metaphysical key 
notions that took place in the works of Byzantine theologians of post-chalcedonian period. This 
conceptual process is of special interest as a possible origin for theory of individual and 
individuation that was formulated at the late Patristic period and developed in the Middle Ages 
philosophy. 
In the paper I shall retrace and elucidate the broad lines of the process in which, in Leontius 
Bizantinus’ writings, the ancient metaphysical ideas were redefined and transformed. Leontius seems 
to play a key, even though much overlooked, role in the transformation of Neoplatonic and 
Aristotelian conceptions into ones suitable for the Christian doctrine. His works display the 
influence of such Greek Fathers as Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus and Cyril of Alexandria, 
as well as of non-patristic philosophical sources. Leontius’ writings show deep interest in logic, 
which was inspired by Porphyry’s Introduction and the summary of Aristotle’s Categories by 
Porphyry or his pupils, and which cut [zanurzone] deep into Leontius’ theology, especially his 
Christological and Trinitarian doctrines. Leontius’ knowledge of Stoic doctrines could also be drawn 
from the works of Neoplatonic commentators. 
The paper focuses on the conceptual core of Leontius work, analyzing and elucidating the usage and 
philosophical importance of terms like being, substance, nature, hypostasis, individual, particular, 
universal and person. In this first approach of mine to the subject I shall concentrate on the 
Neoplatonic element in Leontius’ conceptual world as well on the differences between Leeontius 
usage of philosophical vocabulary and the usage introduced by Chalcedon teaching. 
 
